Jadwin v. County of Kern, No. 1:07-CV-00026-OWW-DLB.
Court | United States District Courts. 9th Circuit. United States District Courts. 9th Circuit. Eastern District of California |
Writing for the Court | Oliver W. Wanger |
Citation | 610 F.Supp.2d 1129 |
Decision Date | 08 April 2009 |
Docket Number | No. 1:07-CV-00026-OWW-DLB. |
Parties | David F. JADWIN, D.O., Plaintiff, v. COUNTY OF KERN; Peter Bryan (Both individually and in his former capacity as Chief Executive Of Kern Medical Center); Irwin Harris, M.D.; and Does 1 through 10, inclusive, Defendants. |
v.
COUNTY OF KERN; Peter Bryan (Both individually and in his former capacity as Chief Executive Of Kern Medical Center); Irwin Harris, M.D.; and Does 1 through 10, inclusive, Defendants.
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Eugene David Lee, Law Office Eugene Lee, Los Angeles, CA, Joan Elizabeth Herrington, Bay Area Employment Law Office, Oakland, CA, for Plaintiff.
Mark A. Wasser, Law Offices of Mark A. Wasser, Sacramento, CA, for Defendants.
MEMORANDUM DECISION AND ORDER RE DEFENDANTS' AND PLAINTIFF'S CROSS-MOTIONS FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT OR, IN THE ALTERNATIVE, PARTIAL SUMMARY JUDGMENT
OLIVER W. WANGER, District Judge.
Before the court are cross-motions for summary judgment or, in the alternative, partial summary judgment, brought by Plaintiff David F. Jadwin, D.O. ("Plaintiff") and, collectively, by Defendants County of Kern ("County"), Peter Bryan ("Bryan") and Irwin Harris ("Harris"), M.D., on all eleven claims in Plaintiff's Second Amended Complaint. The following background facts are taken from the parties' submissions in connection with the motions and other documents on file in this case.1
This case arises out of Plaintiff's former employment with Kern County. Plaintiff worked at the Kern Medical Center ("KMC"), an acute care teaching hospital owned and operated by the County. As of October 2000, Plaintiff, a pathologist, served as the Chair of KMC's Pathology Department. According to his employment contract with the County, his chairmanship was a full-time position. Throughout his employment, while undoubtedly dedicated to his work, Plaintiff
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engaged in several disagreements and/or confrontations with his fellow colleagues on a variety of issues. For example, in August 2003, during a conversation with another physician, Plaintiff grabbed the physician's necktie and pulled him into the hallway. Plaintiff apologized for this incident.
Plaintiff's lawsuit stems from the events surrounding his eventual removal from his chairmanship position and the non-renewal of his employment contract with the County. The following events are central:
(1) On July 10, 2006, upon the recommendation of Bryan, KMC's then Chief Executive Officer, the Joint Conference Committee ("JCC") voted to remove Plaintiff from his chairmanship. This vote came after Plaintiff had taken a medical leave of absence.
(2) Subsequently, in light of his removal from the chairmanship, Plaintiff executed an amendment to his employment contract which reduced his base salary.
(3) After working for the County under this amended agreement, Plaintiff was involuntarily placed on paid administrative leave pending resolution of a personnel matter. Plaintiff remained on paid administrative leave until his employment contract expired, and the County did not renew Plaintiff's employment agreement.
Plaintiff attributes these events—his removal from the chairmanship and the associated reduction in salary, his involuntary paid administrative leave, and the non-renewal of his contract—to illegal motives which violate several state and federal employment laws.
A. The Removal From The Chairmanship And Preceding Events
On October 24, 2000, Plaintiff signed an employment contract with the County. The term of Plaintiff's employment was set to expire on November 30, 2006. On October 5, 2002, Plaintiff executed a second employment contract which called for a term ending October 4, 2007. The contract provided that, as a Core Physician, Plaintiff must perform certain services as set forth in Exhibit A. According to Exhibit A, Plaintiff, in his role as Pathology Chairman, was expected to serve as the medical director for the anatomic pathology service and clinical laboratories at KMC, and report to the KMC Medical Director. Exhibit A explains that "[t]his is a full-time position requiring 48 hours of service, on average, per week." (Doc. 266 at 27.)
On October 12, 2005, Plaintiff presented at an intra-hospital conference called the "Tumor Conference." According to Plaintiff, his presentation dealt with the medical appropriateness of a proposed radical hysterectomy for a KMC patient. Plaintiff believed the proposed hysterectomy was based on inaccurate pathology reports from outside reviewers and Plaintiff suggested that internal review of such outside work be conducted.
Following the conference, Harris, Chief Medical Officer, received three letters of dissatisfaction from physicians who were in attendance—Drs. Scott Ragland, Jennifer Abraham, and Bill Taylor. In a letter dated October 17, 2005, Plaintiff was informed that his "repeated misconduct at the Tumor Conference on October 12, 2005 was noted by numerous attendants, three of which have written letters of their dissatisfaction, which will be entered into your medical staff file. You exceeded your time reasonably allotted for the presentation of pathologic findings, you ignored the requests of the leader of the conference to be brief, and you became so detailed in trying to make your political point, that you lost the audience and failed to meet the teaching objective of the conference for the benefit of the residents." (Doc. 266 at
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129.) Plaintiff did not believe that the criticism was justified.
A few months later, Plaintiff took a leave of absence in the form of a reduced work schedule. (Doc. 278 at 23). In a letter to Bryan dated January 9, 2006,2 Plaintiff requested a leave of absence in light of "depression" he had developed as a result of alleged professional mistreatment and harassment:
During the past five years I have performed impeccable service for KMC each and every day. Virtually every interaction I have had with hundreds of KMC associates has been professional, respectful and courteous. I have always performed or tried to perform my duties in a virtuous and ethical manner. I have received high performance ratings from staff and residents on departmental evaluations.
Over the past several years I have been the victim of professional mistreatment by a few members of the medical staff. You are aware of these instances, as they have been discussed during multiple hospital leadership meetings and during our one-to-one meetings. I do not consider these to be directly as a result of communication failures on my part, but rather inappropriate harassment by a small group [of] individuals. I believe this harassment is in response to the many quality management issues that I have raised.
This harassment has led me [sic] develop depression and insomnia that has impacted my health and work. Although I enjoy much of my work at KMC, it is not possible for me to continue to work under this form of harassment. These issues largely have gone unresolved for years in spite of multiple requests from me for action. The most recent issue involving the October Oncology Conference is to date still unresolved.
This form of harassment is unacceptable and must be resolved quickly. I therefore request administrative leave with pay until this issue is resolved. It is my wish to resolve this issue immediately, and I request that you correct this hostile environment immediately.
(Doc. 266 at 133.) It is undisputed that, on January 9, 2006, Plaintiff asked Bryan to allow Plaintiff to work part-time and at home while Plaintiff was recovering from his disabling depression. (Doc. 278 at 28.)
On January 13, 2006, Plaintiff's psychiatrist, Paul Riskin, completed a form entitled "Certification of Health Care Provider Medical Leave of Absence." The form states that Plaintiff's medical condition or need for treatment commenced on "12-16-05" and the "probabl[e] duration of medical condition or need for treatment" is "2-3 mo." Plaintiff's probable return date was listed as "3-16-06." (Doc. 270 at 4.) On the form, Riskin identified his practice as "psychiatry" and certified that Plaintiff had a serious health condition. (Id.) He wrote that "it is my hope that 1-2 work days should be a reasonable schedule for a period of 2-3 months" and "Patient should work 1-2 days per week." (Id.) From the facts, it remains unclear whether the County actually received this form on January 13, 2006.
On or about March 2, 2006, Plaintiff submitted a "Kern County Personnel Department Request For Leave Of Absence" form on which Plaintiff checked the box "Initial Request." (Doc. 270 at 6.) He requested a leave of absence from "12-16-05" to "3-15-06." (Id.) Under the section entitled "Mandatory Leave FMLA/CFRA" Plaintiff requested "Intermittent-Employee"
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leave. (Id.) He indicated that he had a physician's note.
In a letter entitled "DESIGNATION OF LEAVE (Serious Health Condition of Employee-Intermittent)," dated March 2, 2006, Sandra Chester from Human Resources ("HR") informed Plaintiff that HR had been notified of his request for leave and, as HR understood it, Plaintiff intended for his leave to commence on December 16, 2005, and end on March 15, 2006. (Doc. 259-6 at 6.) The letter also stated that "[b]ased on the information available to us, it appears that you are eligible for a leave under FMLA/CFRA. Unless we provide you with information that your leave has not been approved or that we are withdrawing our FMLA/CFRA designation, the requested leave will count against your FMLA/CFRA entitlement." (Id.) On March 13, 2006, Plaintiff's request for leave was approved, i.e., Plaintiff's Request For Leave Of Absence form was marked as "approved" and signed. (Doc. 259-6 at 5.) It is undisputed that Plaintiff took a reduced schedule CFRA medical leave from December 16, 2005, to March 15, 2006. (Doc. 278 at 23.)
On the day he was due back, March 16, 2006, Plaintiff wrote an...
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Fenn v. Penske Logistics, Inc., CASE NO. CV F 10-1507 LJO SMS
...that he was qualified individual, and (3) the employer failed to reasonably accommodate for his disability. Jadwin v. County of Kern, 610 F.Supp.2d 1129, 1175-1176 (E.D. Cal. 2009). Defendants hold Mr. Fenn "to put the employer on notice of his disability and resulting limitations." See Pri......
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Turner v. City & Cnty. of S.F., C–11–1427 EMC.
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Soria v. Univision Radio L. A., Inc., B263224
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