Jaeger v. Chapman

Decision Date11 January 1950
Docket NumberNo. 14148,14148
Citation213 P.2d 404,95 Cal.App.2d 520
CourtCalifornia Court of Appeals
PartiesJAEGER v. CHAPMAN et al.

Alexander, Bacon & Mundhenk, San Francisco, Herbert Chamberlin, San Francisco, attorneys for defendant and appellant.

John H. Machado, San Jose, attorney for plaintiff and respondent.

PETERS, Presiding Justice.

At about 4:30 p. m. on a clear day on Highway 101, about four miles north of Gilroy in Santa Clara County, the automobile being driven south on that highway by defendant-appellant Harry Miles, and in which plaintiff-respondent Lillian Jaeger was riding as a passenger, crashed into the back of an automobile occupied by the Chapmans, which was also proceeding south on that highway, and being driven by Meriel Chapman. Respondent was seriously injured. She brought this action against Miles and the Chapmans. The jury found in favor of the Chapmans, but brought in a verdict against Miles. From the judgment based on the verdict Miles appeals, making as his sole contention the point that the trial court committed prejudicial error in refusing to give two instructions proffered by him.

At the scene of the accident Highway 101 has two northbound and two southbound lanes. Masten Avenue comes into the highway from the east. Southbound traffic on the highway gained access to Masten Avenue by turning left across the highway at the end of a macadam and gravel barrier which was sixty-six feet long, eight feet wide and fifteen inches high, and which divided the north and southbound traffic lanes.

Both vehicles were proceeding south on the highway, with the Chapmans' car ahead of the Miles' automobile. About 300 yards north of Masten Avenue Mrs. Chapman drove from the slow or righthand southbound lane to the fast or left southbound lane, intending to turn left at Masten Avenue. There is ample and substantial evidence that she extended her left arm as a signal to cars behind her that she intended to turn left. Mrs. Chapman testified that just before making the turn she slowed down from about forty miles an hour to about ten or fifteen miles per hour.

Appellant Miles was traveling in the fast or left southbound lane behind the Chapmans' car. He testified that he was going about 45 miles per hour; that when the Chapmans' car was still north of the Masten Avenue intersection it suddenly stopped on the highway; that he applied his brakes and went into a skid but was unable to stop before hitting the Chapmans' car. The accident happened just about at the end of the barrier where a left turn from the southbound lane of the highway would be taken.

The Chapmans denied that they were negligent and, in addition, alleged that the accident was proximately caused by the negligence of Miles. The appellant Miles denied that he had been negligent and alleged 'that insofar as he is concerned the accident complained of was unavoidable, and alleges that the injuries and damages complained of, if any, were due to and caused by an unavoidable accident.'

Appellant offered and the trial court refused to give the following instruction: 'In law we recognize what is termed an unavoidable or inevitable accident. These terms do not mean literally that it was not possible for such an accident to be avoided. They simply denote that an accident occurred without having been proximately caused by negligence. Even if such an accident could have been avoided by the exercise of exceptional foresight, skill or caution, still no one may be held liable for injury resulting from it.'

The words 'unavoidable' and 'inevitable' simply denote that the accident may have occurred without being caused by the negligence of anyone. Wilkerson v. Brown, 84 Cal.App.2d 401, 190 P.2d 958; Temple v. De Mirjian, 51 Cal.App.2d 559, 125 P.2d 544. Although the proffered instruction contained a correct statement of law, it merely states, in a specialized fashion, the defense that a defendant is not liable if he was not negligent. The jury was fully, correctly and fairly instructed on the general rules of liability for negligence. The court gave the following two instructions: 'I instruct you that you cannot award any damages against defendant Harry Miles unless you find that said defendant was negligent, and unless you find that negligence on his part was a proximate cause of the accident. In determining whether or not defendant Harry Miles was negligent it is your duty to determine what a person of ordinary prudence would have done under the same or similar circumstances.' The mere fact that the automobile that was driven by Mr. Miles came in contact with Mrs. Chapman's automobile does not in itself establish any liability on the part of Mr. Miles; and if Mr. Miles was not careless or negligent in any respect in driving his automobile, then no damages should be awarded against him.'

The court also instructed that the jury should not award any damages against Miles if he was free from fault and was not careless or negligent, and that the burden to prove that Miles was negligent and that such negligence, if proved, was a proximate cause of the accident was on the plaintiff. In addition, the court instructed that: 'A person who, without negligence on his part, is suddenly and unexpectedly confronted with peril, arising from the presence of imminent danger to himself or to others, is not expected, nor required, to use the same judgment and prudence that is required of him, in the exercise of ordinary care, in calmer and more deliberate moments. His duty is to exercise only the care that an ordinarily prudent person would exercise in same situation. If at that moment, he does what appears to be the best thing to do, and if his choice and manner of action are the same as might have been followed by any ordinarily prudent person under the same conditions, he does all the law requires of him, although, in the light of after events, it should appear that a different course would have been better and safer.'

Thus the jury was fully instructed that the defendant was not liable if he was not negligent and if such negligence was not a proximate cause of the accident. While it would not have been error to have given such an instruction, it was not error to refuse to give it where all elements of defendant's liability were covered by other instructions. The defendant is not entitled to have his defense overemphasized and cannot complain that his defense is not stated in a particular way, as long as the...

To continue reading

Request your trial
29 cases
  • Franco v. Fujimoto
    • United States
    • Hawaii Supreme Court
    • 24 d2 Março d2 1964
    ...error to refuse the instruction where all elements of defendant's liability were covered by other instructions. E. g., Jaeger v. Chapman, 95 Cal.App.2d 520, 213 P.2d 404; McMahon v. Marshall, 111 Cal.App.2d 248, 244 P.2d 481; Lloyd v. Southern Pac. Co., 111 Cal.App.2d 626, 245 P.2d In Jaege......
  • Fibreboard Paper Products Corp. v. East Bay Union of Machinists, Local 1304, United Steelworkers of America, AFL-CIO
    • United States
    • California Court of Appeals
    • 10 d3 Junho d3 1964
    ...instructed as to the law of the case. (Huggans v. Southern Pacific Co., 92 Cal.App.2d 599, 614, 207 P.2d 864; Jaeger v. Chapman, 95 Cal.App.2d 520, 525, 213 P.2d 404.) Proposed instructions numbered 36 and 37 appear to be a paraphrase of certain language taken from opinions in the cases cit......
  • Fry v. Carter
    • United States
    • Maryland Court of Appeals
    • 12 d4 Junho d4 2003
    ...is not negligent and because the jury was fully instructed on the general rules of liability for negligence. Jaeger v. Chapman, 95 Cal.App.2d 520, 523, 213 P.2d 404, moreover, points out that the defendant is not entitled to have his defense overemphasized and cannot complain that it is not......
  • Morgan v. Stubblefield, s. 36004
    • United States
    • California Court of Appeals
    • 30 d5 Abril d5 1971
    ...respects was required to make a more acceptable presentation of the law.' This limited statement was relied upon in Jaeger v. Chapman, 95 Cal.App.2d 520, 213 P.2d 404 (1950) to greatly broaden the rule. There the Court of Appeal stated (p. 523, 213 P.2d p. 407): 'Of course, although mislead......
  • Request a trial to view additional results

VLEX uses login cookies to provide you with a better browsing experience. If you click on 'Accept' or continue browsing this site we consider that you accept our cookie policy. ACCEPT