Jaffarian v. Murphy

• Decision Date: 28 October 1932
• Parties: JAFFARIAN et al. v. MURPHY.
• Court: United States State Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts Supreme Court

280 Mass. 402

183 N.E. 110

JAFFARIAN et al.

v.MURPHY.

Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts, Middlesex.

Oct. 28, 1932.

Exceptions from Superior Court, Middlesex County; Pinanski, Judge.

Action by Edward J. Jaffarian and others against John J. Murphy. Verdict for plaintiffs, and defendant brings exceptions.

Exceptions sustained and judgment rendered for defendant.

F. R. Mullin, P. F. Spain, and Francis J. Murray, all of Boston, for plaintiffs.

H. Bergson and D. J. Kelley, both of Boston, for defendant.

RUGG, C. J.

The plaintiffs seek in this action of tort to recover damages from the defendant arising out of his conduct as mayor of Somerville in denying their application for a license to operate a miniature golf course, whereby it was necessary for them to seek relief by mandamus. The declaration is broad enough to include general damages. The trial was confined to recovery of a reasonable sum for counsel fees growing out of these circumstances: In August, 1930, the plaintiffs filed in the Supreme Judicial Court a petition for mandamus alleging that they applied to the defendant, as mayor of Somerville, for a license to conduct a miniature golf course, and that the defendant had wrongfully and in bad faith refused their application, and praying that the writ should issue commanding the defendant to give lawful consideration to their application, and also praying that the writ should issue commanding him to grant the license. The facts finally found upon that petition were that the reason given by the respondent for refusing the petitioners' application was not his real reason and was not in his mind when he rejected the application; that the respondent rejected the application for some motive, the reasons for which could not be ascertained; that ‘in rejecting the application he did not exercise good faith, did not give it his fair consideration, but was most arbitrary and capricious in exercising his discretion.’ Allegations of that petition to the effect that the respondent acted because of personal financial interest were found to be without support in the evidence. The petitioners' motion for the assessment of damages in the mandamus case was overruled without prejudice on the ground that there were ‘other and adequate remedies provided by law, if he is so entitled.’ In November, 1930, judgment was ordered to be entered for a peremptory writ of mandamus, commanding the respondent to investigate impartially the application of the petitioners for a permit and to undertake such investigation with a genuine determination to grant a license provided the applicants conformed to the requirements of law. In January, 1931, the single justice found that it was the uniform practice and a rule of the mayor of Somerville for all licenses for the maintenance of amusements to expire on December 31 of the year in which they were issued, and that the question raised by the petition for mandamus had become moot and for that reason he ordered that the bills of exceptions of the petitioners and of the respondent be dismissed. The case was taken to the full court, 275 Mass. 264, 175 N. E. 639, and the rescript in the case was ‘exceptions sustained.’ In the present action the contention of the plaintiffs is that the defendant is liable to them in tort and that because of his wrongful conduct they have been obliged to employ counsel and to be put to expense to obtain the legal rights denied them. They contend, not that they were entitled as matter of right to a license, but that they were entitled to have their application fairly and honestly considered, and that because this right was denied them they suffered damages. The record in the mandamus proceedings and other facts bearing upon liability and damages were introduced in evidence. Upon the evidence and under the rulings of the court, one of which was in substance that the findings in the mandamus proceedings made a case for the plaintiffs on liability in the present action, the jury returned a verdict for the plaintiffs assessing damages in a substantial sum.

In general, parties aggrieved by rulings and orders of one exercising judicial powers must seek to have errors in the proceedings corrected by appeal or exception. They have no private action against the judge who makes erroneous rulings or decisions. Pratt v. Gardner, 2 Cush. 63,48 Am. Dec. 652;Bradley v. Fisher, 13 Wall. 335, 20 L. Ed. 646;Alzua v. Johnson, 231 U. S. 106, 111, 34 S. Ct. 27, 58 L. Ed. 142. In cases where an official or board acting in a quasi judicial capacity within the scope of its authority errs, commonly the law affords an aggrieved party adequate relief by resort to one of the extraordinary writs. See Hodgdon v. Moulton, 207 Mass. 445, 93 N. E. 656;Jaffarian v. Mayor of Somerville, 275 Mass. 264, 175 N. E. 639. The authority of the mayor of Somerville to pass upon applications for miniature golf courses is derived from G. L. c. 140, § 181, which provides: ‘The mayor or selectmen may * * * grant, upon such terms and conditions as they deem reasonable, a license for theatrical exhibitions, public shows, public amusements and exhibitions of every description * * * and the mayor or selectmen may revoke or suspend such license at their pleasure. * * *’ In passing upon applications under this statute the mayor is acting in a quasi judicial capacity and is bound to exercise his discretion impartially. Jaffarian v. Mayor of Somerville, 275 Mass. 264, 175 N. E. 639. This court, having stated the facts in that case, said at page 266 of 275 Mass.,175 N. E. 639, 640: ‘On those facts alone the petitioners would be entitled to a peremptory writ.’

The plaintiffs contend that the defendant is liable to them in tort as matter of law under the rule stated in Stiles v. Municipal Council of Lowell, 233 Mass. 174, 182, 123 N. E. 615, 616, 4 A. L. R. 1365: “All inferior tribunals and magistrates * * * if they act without jurisdiction over the subject-matter or * * * if they are guilty of excess of jurisdiction * * * are liable in damages to the party injured by such unauthorized acts.' Piper v. Pearson, 2 Gray, 120, 122, 61 Am. Dec. 438.' They say that the defendant was acting in excess of his jurisdiction in not giving them a fair hearing, in not giving the matter fair consideration, and in exercising his discretion in an arbitrary and capricious manner. The mayor's conduct in not acting in good faith and in abusing his power in a tyrannical and unlawful manner did not affect his jurisdiction in the matter, although it affected the validity of his decision. Conducting a hearing within his jurisdiction in an unjustifiable manner cannot be what is meant in the law by excess of jurisdiction. The mayor by his improper conduct in acting within the limits of his jurisdiction could not be held to be acting in excess of his jurisdiction. His conduct or state of mind while acting within the limits of his jurisdiction would not affect that jurisdiction. In Clarke v. May, 2 Gray, 410, 61 Am. Dec. 470, a justice of the peace was held to have exceeded his jurisdiction in undertaking to punish a witness for contempt by a separate and independent proceeding after the trial, while his only power under the statute was to punish a witness summoned who failed or neglected to appear. In Warr v. Collector of Taxes of Taunton, 234 Mass. 279, 283, 125 N. E. 557, 559, the tax collector had gone wholly beyond the limits of his jurisdiction and was attempting to sell property which the law gave him no right to touch in the way and manner undertaken. The court said: ‘In essence he ceases to be tax collector because acting in excess of and therefore without jurisdiction.’ In Piper v. Pearson, 2 Gray, 120, 61 Am. Dec. 438, a justice of the peace who tried a case in the exclusive jurisdiction of a police court and committed a witness to prison was held liable in damages to the witness on the ground that he acted beyond the limits of his jurisdiction and the proceeding was void.

The case of Stiles v. Municipal Council of Lowell, 233 Mass. 174, 123 N. E. 615...