Jagenberg, Inc. v. Georgia Ports Authority

• Decision Date: 28 March 1995
• Docket Number: Civ. A. No. 494-113.
• Citation: 1995 AMC 2333,882 F. Supp. 1065
• Parties: JAGENBERG, INC. and Allianz Versicherungs A.G., Plaintiffs, v. GEORGIA PORTS AUTHORITY and Atlantic Container Line A.B., Defendants.
• Court: U.S. District Court — Southern District of Georgia

882 F. Supp. 1065

1995 AMC 2333

JAGENBERG, INC. and Allianz Versicherungs A.G., Plaintiffs, v. GEORGIA PORTS AUTHORITY and Atlantic Container Line A.B., Defendants.

Civ. A. No. 494-113.

United States District Court, S.D. Georgia, Savannah Division.

March 28, 1995.

COPYRIGHT MATERIAL OMITTED

Richard A. Rominger, Thomas Langston Bass, Jr., Brennan, Harris & Rominger, Savannah, GA, Machale A. Miller, O'Neil, Eichin, Miller, Breckinridge & Saporito, New Orleans, LA, for Jagenberg, Inc. and Allianz Versicherungs, A.G.

Glen M. Darbyshire, Hunter, Maclean, Exley & Dunn, Thomas J. Mahoney, Jr., Thomas Joseph Mahoney, III, Ranitz, Mahoney, Forbes & Coolidge, P.C., Savannah, GA, for Georgia Ports Authority.

Gustave R. Dubus, III, Chamlee, Dubus & Sipple, Savannah, GA, for Atlantic Container Line A.B.

ORDER

EDENFIELD, Chief Judge.

Plaintiffs seek to recover damages for loss of cargo consisting of components from an industrial Airknife machine, unloaded and stored by Defendants at the Port of Savannah in May, 1993. Both Defendants now move for partial summary judgment. For reasons stated below the Court DENIES the motion of Defendant Georgia Ports Authority ("GPA") and GRANTS the motion of Defendant Atlantic Container Line ("ACL").

I. JURISDICTION

The Court exercises jurisdiction over this case under 28 U.S.C. § 1332, and makes no finding as to whether jurisdiction would be proper in admiralty, under 28 U.S.C. § 1333. At first glance it appears that admiralty jurisdiction would be inappropriate, but courts have so held under circumstances similar to those in the case at bar. E.g., Certain Underwriters of Lloyds' v. Barber Blue Sea Line, 675 F.2d 266, 268 n. 1 (11th Cir.1982); Orient Overseas Line v. Globemaster Baltimore, Inc., 33 Md.App. 372, 365 A.2d 325, 335 (1976). See also Puerto Rico Maritime Shipping Authority v. Luallipam, Inc., 631 F.Supp. 1472 (D.P.R.1986) ("A contract to transport goods by sea concerns commerce on navigable waters and, as such, is wholly maritime."); R. Randall Bridwell, Admiralty Contract Jurisdiction & Contract Liens Under American Law, in Southeastern Admiralty Law Institute Program Materials 06-1, 06-5 (1988) (listing maritime contracts as within admiralty jurisdiction). Such a holding makes sense; "commerce and uniformity go together," In re Dillahey, 733 F.Supp. 874, 879 (D.N.J.1990) (citation omitted), and carriers of maritime cargo would benefit from uniform rules of liability for their agents and independent contractors at all United States ports, regardless of the state in which those ports are found. Cf. Richards v. Blake Builders Supply, Inc., 528 F.2d 745, 747 (4th Cir.1975) (stating that during the Constitutional Convention "thirteen separate bodies of law were thought quite unacceptable for the governance of international trade").

II. SUMMARY JUDGMENT STANDARD

Rule 56(c) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure provides that summary judgment is appropriate when "there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and ... the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law." All evidence must be considered "in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party," with all reasonable doubts resolved in favor of that party. Earley v. Champion Int'l Corp., 907 F.2d 1077, 1080 (11th Cir.1990). If the evidence favoring the nonmoving party is merely colorable, or is not significantly probative, summary judgment is appropriate. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 249-50, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 2510-11, 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986) (subsequent history omitted). A mere "scintilla" of evidence will not suffice to support the nonmovant's position. Walker v. Darby, 911 F.2d 1573, 1577 (11th Cir.1990).

III. GEORGIA PORTS AUTHORITY'S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT

A. Facts

The material facts relevant to this motion are not disputed. The parties' disagreement centers on the legal interrelationships between the carrier's bill of lading, the Carriage of Goods by Sea Act ("COGSA"), and the Harter Act.

The essential facts are as follows:

Jagenberg, Inc., is a Delaware corporation having its principal place of business in Connecticut. It is the consignee and agent for Jagenberg AG, the shipper of the cargo in question. Jagenberg, Inc., is bound by all contract terms of carriage set by Jagenberg AG as shipper. They will henceforth be collectively referred to as "Jagenberg." Allianz Versicherungs AG is a foreign corporation and the insurer of the cargo.

Atlantic Container Line operated the vessel transporting the cargo from Rotterdam, The Netherlands, to the Port of Savannah for ultimate delivery to Macon, Georgia. Georgia Ports Authority is an agency of the State of Georgia that owns and operates ocean terminal facilities in Savannah. In this case GPA acted under agreement with ACL with respect to handling and storage of cargo at the Port of Savannah. It is not disputed that GPA was an agent of ACL. See also GPA Tariff at 51.

Jagenberg formed a contract with ACL for shipment of an Airknife Coating Head from Rotterdam to Macon via Savannah, the terms of which are contained in a short form bill of lading issued by ACL entitled "ACL Datafreight Receipt" and a long form bill of lading printed on the reverse side of the Receipt. The bill of lading was a "through bill," i.e., it obligated the carrier to transport the cargo "through" the Port of Savannah to its ultimate destination.

The cargo shipment consisted of twenty five packages, twenty two of which were packed in containerized units. The remaining three were crated separately, one of which contained the cargo at issue here — a large component of the Airknife Coating Head. It was completely enclosed within a wooden crate and lashed to a metal flatrack. The flatrack was designed to sit upon and attach to a chassis that could be pulled by a conventional tractor, thus enabling ground transportation of the cargo.

The cargo arrived in Savannah on May 15, 1993, and was turned over to GPA for storage pending arrival of an inland trucker hired by ACL to take it to Macon. By May 20, 1993, all of the containerized units and some of the crates had been trucked to Macon, but while a GPA employee was retrieving the remaining items from a storage area designated for ACL cargo, the items fell from the chassis and were damaged. Jagenberg and Allianz brought suit against GPA and ACL, arguing that the Defendants breached their obligations as bailees of the cargo and negligently damaged it in the amount of $750,000.

It is also undisputed that the Datafreight Receipt contained a specific space for Jagenberg to describe the goods and declare their value in U.S. dollars "subject to extra freight as per tariff and clause six of the ACL B/L." Jagenberg chose not to declare a specific value for its shipment, but had sufficient notice and opportunity to do so. Finally, neither party disputes that the damaged item in question constituted a single "package" for purposes of COGSA, 46 U.S.C.App. § 1304(5), and clause six of the ACL bill of lading.

B. Law

1. GPA's Argument

GPA asks for partial summary judgment not on liability, but on damages. GPA contends that it is protected by the $500 package liability limitation provided in COGSA. 46 U.S.C.App. § 1304(5). While that limitation is "clearly designed to protect the shipping industry," Heri v. Fritz Companies, Inc., 841 F.Supp. 1188, 1191 (N.D.Ga.1993), it is often contractually extended to activities prior to loading and after discharge and to parties that technically are not carriers but act as agents or contractors for them.

The COGSA limitation is incorporated in clause six of the ACL bill of lading. That clause provides

6. PACKAGE/UNIT LIMITATION AND DECLARED VALUE

(1) Package or Unit Limitation

Where the Hague Rules or any legislation making such Rules compulsorily applicable (such as COGSA or COGWA) to this Bill of Lading apply, the Carrier shall not, unless a declared value has been noted ... be or become liable for any loss or damage to or in connection with the goods in an amount per package or unit in excess of the package or unit limitation as laid down by such Rules or legislation. Such limitation amount according to ... COGSA is US$500.

GPA argues that for purposes of the bill of lading, it was a "Carrier": "In this Bill of Lading the word "Carrier" includes Atlantic Container Line AB, the vessel, owner, master and any charterer, pre-carrier, on-carrier and any other person participating in the carriage of the goods." Bill of Lading cl. 1 (emphasis added). Clause five of the bill is a "Himalaya clause," extending the privileges of the "Carrier" to other entities:

5. CERTAIN RIGHTS AND IMMUNITIES FOR THE CARRIER AND OTHER PERSONS

(1) The Carrier shall be entitled to subcontract on any terms the whole or any part of the carriage.

(2) The Merchant Jagenberg undertakes that no claim or allegation shall be made against any person or vessel whatsoever, other than the Carrier including, but not limited, to the Carrier's servants or agents, any independent contractor and his servants or agents, and all others by whom the whole or any part of the carriage, whether directly or indirectly, is procured, performed or undertaken, which imposes or attempts to impose upon any such person or vessel any liability whatsoever in connection with the goods or the carriage, and if any claim or allegation should nevertheless be made to defend, indemnify and hold harmless the Carrier against all consequences thereof. Without prejudice to the foregoing every such person and vessel shall have the benefit of all provisions herein benefiting the Carrier as if such provisions were expressly for his benefit and in entering into this contract the Carrier, to the extent of these provisions, does so not only on his own behalf but also as agent or trustee for such persons and vessels and such persons and vessels shall to this extent be or be deemed to be parties to this contract.

(3) The Merchant shall defend, indemnify and

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