Jaggers v. Southeastern Greyhound Lines, 126.

• Decision Date: 31 July 1940
• Docket Number: No. 126.,126.
• Citation: 34 F. Supp. 667
• Court: U.S. District Court — Middle District of Tennessee
• Parties: JAGGERS v. SOUTHEASTERN GREYHOUND LINES, Inc.

34 F. Supp. 667

JAGGERS v. SOUTHEASTERN GREYHOUND LINES, Inc.

No. 126.

District Court, M. D. Tennessee, Columbia Division.

July 31, 1940.

Bass, Berry & Sims, of Nashville, Tenn., Harry T. Cook, of McMinnville, Tenn., and Hugh T. Shelton and Pride Tomlinson, both of Columbia, Tenn., for plaintiff.

W. M. Fuqua and Lindsey M. Davis, both of Nashville, Tenn., and Thomas H. Peebles, of Columbia, Tenn., for defendant.

DARR, District Judge.

This case is before the court on a motion of the defendant for a directed verdict, or in the alternative, for a new trial.

The plaintiff was injured while riding as a guest in an automobile driven by Sam Lefwich, resulting from the Lefwich car colliding with the rear end of the defendant's large passenger bus.

The collision occurred at a point on a main highway in Tennessee where the defendant had stopped its bus to allow a passenger to get off. While so standing the Lefwich car struck the left rear corner of the bus whereby the plaintiff was injured.

The defendant's bus had stopped in such position as to leave fourteen feet and three inches of the main traveled portion of the highway in the clear on the left side. The collision occurred at night and there was some eight or ten lights on the rear of the bus burning at the time. There was no other traffic on the highway. The bus was in plain view of anyone approaching from the rear for a distance of several hundred feet.

The negligence upon which the plaintiff recovered a verdict was predicated upon the violation by the defendant of a Tennessee statute. This statute provides that it is unlawful for any person to park or leave standing any vehicle, whether attended or unattended, upon any paved or traveled portion of a highway unless there is fifteen feet of the paved or main traveled portion of the highway clear for traffic on the left. Code of Tennessee, Section 2690.

The jury was charged that the stopping of the bus in the position it was, constituted a violation of this statute and the question for them to determine was whether this violation was the proximate cause of the plaintiff's injury. That is, if the Lefwich car struck the bus on the nine inches that stood unlawfully on the highway, then the violation of the statute was the proximate cause, but that if the Lefwich car struck the bus at any place other than the nine inches indicated, the violation of the statute was not the proximate cause. The jury found that the violation of the statute was the proximate cause of the injury and returned a verdict for the plaintiff.

It was insisted at the trial, and now insisted on the motion, that the stopping for the purpose of the unloading of a passenger was not a violation of the statute. The defendant says that this was a temporary stop for a necessary purpose and is not within the prohibitions of the statute. On this point, the defendant relies upon the cases of McAvon v. Brightmoor Transit Company, 245 Mich. 45, 222 N.W. 126; United Paper Corporation v. Lietz, 1929, 198 Wis. 278, 223 N.W. 843; Long v. Steffen, 194 Wis. 179, 215 N.W. 892, 61 A.L.R. 1155; Sahms v. Marcus, 239 Mich. 684, 214 N.W. 969; Geisen v. Luce, 1932, 185 Minn. 479, 242 N.W. 8.

On the other hand, as against the contention that the stopping of this bus did not violate the statute, the plaintiff cites the following authorities: 2 Blashfield, Cyclopedia of Automobile Law and Practice, Perm.Ed., §§ 1191, 1192, pp. 322, 323 — 326, 327; Fontaine v. Charas, Nov. 5, 1935, 87 N.H. 424, 181 A. 417; Capital Motor Lines v. Gillette, 235 Ala. 157, 177 So. 881, decided Nov. 26, 1937; Townsend v. Jaloff, 124 Or. 644, 264 P. 349, decided February 14, 1928; Ringwald v. Beene, 170 Tenn. 116, 92 S.W.2d 411.

These cases have been all carefully examined and there seems to be some difference of opinions in the various courts, although some apparent conflict arises by a difference in the wording of the statute and the circumstances of the particular case.

It is my judgment that the legislature of Tennessee had an intention to make stronger the statute by adding the words "leave standing". I think this was put in to carry the idea that not only was it prohibited to park a vehicle, which might mean for an appreciable length of time, but that stopping at all without leaving the required clearance would violate the statute. The word leave means "to put, place, deposit, deliver, or the like". The word stand means "to cease from movement or progress; to pause; stop; remain stationary or inactive".

Applying the meaning of these words, I think that if a vehicle is stopped at a point where the clearance is not left as provided by the statute, even though temporary, the statute is violated.

Under this construction it would not mean that in all conditions a person would not be excused from violating the letter of the statute. The violation of this statute would be excused for the same reasons as the violation of other statutes are excused — such as, an emergency, the working of undue hardship, the protection of life or limb, and the like.

It would be against the public weel to decide that passenger buses could stop on highways, not giving the clearance required by this statute, to take...