Jaggers v. State
Citation | 687 N.E.2d 180 |
Decision Date | 03 November 1997 |
Docket Number | No. 47501-9711-CR-564,47501-9711-CR-564 |
Parties | Larry E. JAGGERS, Appellant (Defendant below), v. STATE of Indiana, Appellee (Plaintiff below). |
Court | Indiana Supreme Court |
Larry E. Jaggers was convicted of possession of more than thirty grams of marijuana, a Class D felony. 1 The trial court sentenced Jaggers to six months imprisonment and two years supervised probation. We grant transfer to address the interplay between the "good faith" exception to the exclusionary rule and the warrant statute, Indiana Code § 35-33-5-2. Because we hold that the evidence used to convict Jaggers was inadmissible, we reverse the conviction and remand for further proceedings.
On July 12, 1993, an Indiana state trooper received an anonymous telephone call asserting that a Lawrence Jaggers was cultivating and trafficking marijuana in his house in Mitchell, Indiana. The caller made two claims: (1) he had personally seen marijuana in and around Jaggers's house on numerous occasions over the course of several years, most recently in the prior week; and (2) Jaggers was growing marijuana on two plots of land away from his residence. The caller described the house and the location of the off-site plots, including approximately how many marijuana plants would be found there. Armed with this information, within the next two days the officer went to Jaggers's house and found that the caller's description of the house was accurate. A truck in the driveway was registered to Lawrence E. Jaggers of Lawrence County. On July 15, the officer drove to each of the described plots and found marijuana growing there. Both plots were on land easily accessible to the public, one approximately two miles and the other six miles from Jaggers's house. Based on the officer's testimony at a probable cause hearing later that day (described in Part II infra ), a magistrate immediately issued a warrant authorizing a search of the described house for "[m]arijuana, 'grow' lights, and records and other similar written material recording or otherwise reflecting illegal trafficking in marijuana." The officer executed the warrant at Jaggers's home that afternoon. The search uncovered a substantial quantity of marijuana and related paraphernalia. Jaggers was convicted in a bench trial and he appealed. With one judge dissenting, the Court of Appeals affirmed. Jaggers v. State, 681 N.E.2d 793 (Ind.Ct.App.1997) (unpublished table decision).
In deciding whether to issue a search warrant, "[t]he task of the issuing magistrate is simply to make a practical, commonsense decision whether, given all the circumstances set forth in the affidavit ... there is a fair probability that contraband or evidence of a crime will be found in a particular place." Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 238, 103 S.Ct. 2317, 2332, 76 L.Ed.2d 527 (1983). The duty of the reviewing court is to determine whether the magistrate had a "substantial basis" for concluding that probable cause existed. Id. at 238-39, 103 S.Ct. at 2332-33. "[S]ubstantial basis requires the reviewing court, with significant deference to the magistrate's determination, to focus on whether reasonable inferences drawn from the totality of the evidence support the determination" of probable cause. Houser v. State, 678 N.E.2d 95, 99 (Ind.1997). "Reviewing court" for these purposes includes both the trial court ruling on a motion to suppress and an appellate court reviewing that decision. Id. at 98. In this review, we consider only the evidence presented to the issuing magistrate and not post hac justifications for the search. Seltzer v. State, 489 N.E.2d 939, 941 (Ind.1986).
Jaggers moved unsuccessfully before trial to suppress the evidence seized as a result of the search. He now challenges the denial of that motion and the admission of the evidence over his objection at trial. Jaggers argues that the warrant did not issue upon probable cause because the informant's claim that Jaggers was cultivating and trafficking marijuana inside his home was entirely uncorroborated. The State responds that the officer corroborated the anonymous caller's statements sufficiently to establish probable cause. Jaggers's argument is based on both the Fourth Amendment and Indiana Code § 35-33-5-2. He does not assert any claim under Article I, Section 11 of the Indiana Constitution.
Gates instructed reviewing courts to accord magistrates greater flexibility and deference in determining the existence of probable cause based on hearsay: Gates, 462 U.S. at 232, 103 S.Ct. at 2329. However, Gates was also unequivocal that uncorroborated hearsay from a source whose credibility is itself unknown, standing alone, cannot support a finding of probable cause to issue a search warrant. Id. at 227, 103 S.Ct. at 2326. The hearsay must exhibit some hallmarks of reliability. Gates indicated that the trustworthiness of hearsay for purposes of proving probable cause can be established in a number of ways, including where (1) the informant has given correct information in the past; (2) independent police investigation corroborates the informant's statements; (3) some basis for the informant's knowledge is shown; or (4) the informant predicts conduct or activities by the suspect that are not ordinarily easily predicted. Depending on the facts, other considerations may come into play in establishing the reliability of the informant or the hearsay.
Even under Gates's deferential standard of review, the determination of probable cause in this case lacked a substantial basis. The independent police investigation corroborated the informant's assertion that marijuana was being grown on two plots of land miles from Jaggers's residence and that Jaggers appeared to live where the informant said he lived--nothing more. These facts did not establish any corroboration of the anonymous claim that Jaggers's house contained evidence of crime. Nor did they confirm that the off-site marijuana plants belonged to Jaggers. Cf. Kail v. State, 528 N.E.2d 799, 804-08 (Ind.Ct.App.1988) ( ). The critical claim here--that Jaggers was cultivating and trafficking marijuana in his house and also controlled the off-site plots--was entirely uncorroborated.
Equally critically, the informant's credibility was entirely unknown. Use of anonymous informants to establish probable cause often presents heightened reliability concerns. Because there is no possibility of criminal liability for filing a false police report, the informant has no incentive to be truthful. See Gates, 462 U.S. at 233-34, 103 S.Ct. at 2330 () (citation omitted). Anonymity effectively shields from scrutiny any possible ulterior motives; the situation is rife with the potential for pranks and mischief. Accordingly, some corroboration of the accusations is all the more essential when the informant is anonymous. See, e.g., Sanders v. State, 576 N.E.2d 1328 (Ind.Ct.App.1991) ( ).
At the same time, anonymous tips can provide important information enabling police to apprehend suspects who otherwise might escape detection. A balance must be struck between these considerations. As Gates put it: "While a conscientious assessment of the basis for crediting [anonymous] tips is required by the Fourth Amendment, a standard that leaves virtually no place for anonymous citizen informants is not." Gates, 462 U.S. at 238, 103 S.Ct. at 2332. The only factor cutting towards crediting the tip in this case was that the caller claimed to have personally witnessed the criminal activity. Gates indicated that "a statement that the event was observed firsthand" entitles the tip to "greater weight than might otherwise be the case." Id. at 234, 103 S.Ct. at 2330. However, the caller gave no information that would have enabled a neutral and detached magistrate to assess the credibility of this claim of firsthand observation. The caller's assertion of personal knowledge carries little weight in light of the total lack of corroboration of the claim and no basis for concluding that the caller was a credible source. In short, the search warrant here was issued on uncorroborated hearsay from an informant whose credibility was entirely unknown. This does not satisfy the Fourth Amendment's requirement of probable cause.
The reason for the prohibition on searches based on uncorroborated hearsay goes to the root of the Fourth Amendment and Indiana statutory and constitutional protection against unreasonable searches and warrants without probable cause. If any anonymous caller's allegation, uncorroborated by anything beyond public knowledge, could justify a search, every citizen's home would be fair game for a variety of innocent and not so innocent intrusions.
Jaggers contends the caller's information also does not satisfy the Indiana statute regulating the issuance of search...
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