Jaghoori v. Langford
| Decision Date | 03 June 2022 |
| Docket Number | 124,515 |
| Citation | 510 P.3d 16 (Table) |
| Parties | Manzoor JAGHOORI, Appellant, v. Donald LANGFORD, Warden, et al., Appellees. |
| Court | Kansas Court of Appeals |
Bradley T. Steen, of Law Office of B. Truman Steen, LLC, of Ellsworth, for appellant.
Robert E. Wasinger, legal counsel, of Department of Corrections, Ellsworth Correctional Facility, for appellee.
Before Hill, P.J., Malone, J., and Patrick D. McAnany, S.J.
Manzoor Jaghoori, an inmate with the Kansas Department of Corrections (KDOC), appeals the district court's summary dismissal of his K.S.A. 60-1501 petition. Jaghoori's petition claimed that prison authorities violated his due process rights when he was disciplined for possession of dangerous contraband. But because the sanction Jaghoori received for the disciplinary violation did not deprive him of a constitutionally protected liberty or property interest, the district court did not err in summarily dismissing the petition.
Jaghoori was an inmate at the Ellsworth Correctional Facility (ECF) at the time of these proceedings. He had recently been transferred from the Norton Correctional Facility (NCF). On April 27, 2021, during a routine facility shakedown, prison officials found a bottle of adhesive inside Jaghoori's locker and an unmarked container of yellow liquid on his bunk shelf. The ECF warden, Donald Langford, charged Jaghoori with a disciplinary offense in violation of K.A.R. 44-12-901, Dangerous Contraband, Class I offense.
The hearing officer sanctioned Jaghoori with 20 days of restricted privileges. Jaghoori appealed the decision, and it was affirmed by the Secretary of Corrections.
On August 13, 2021, Jaghoori filed a pro se K.S.A. 60-1501 petition with the district court, claiming that the confiscated items did not meet the broad definition of dangerous contraband under K.A.R. 44-12-901. The petition alleged that he had been "sanctioned to 20 days of restriction, 11 days loss of good time credits and given a higher custody level." Jaghoori alleged that the sanctions deprived him of a liberty and property interest and that his due process rights were violated when he was denied a fair hearing.
On September 1, 2021, the district court summarily denied Jaghoori's petition for failure to state facts entitling him to relief and failure to list all civil actions filed in the last five years. Jaghoori timely appealed the district court's judgment, and the district court appointed counsel to represent Jaghoori on appeal.
On appeal, Jaghoori claims the district court erred in summarily dismissing his K.S.A. 60-1501 petition. Jaghoori asserts the district court should have given him a chance to supplement his petition with a list of civil actions from the last five years. He also argues that the district court should not have dismissed his petition for failure to state a claim because he adequately pled a due process violation. Langford and the KDOC (Respondents) argue that this court should uphold the district court's summary dismissal of Jaghoori's K.S.A. 60-1501 petition because Jaghoori was not deprived of a constitutionally protected interest implicating due process. Jaghoori has filed no reply brief to respond to the Respondents' claim.
The Kansas Supreme Court recently clarified the legal framework and standard of review for K.S.A. 60-1501 petitions. Denney v. Norwood , 315 Kan. 163, 170-74, 505 P.3d 730 (2022). When determining whether it should issue a writ of habeas corpus, the district court must accept all well-pled factual allegations as true. And to issue the writ, the district court must find that the petition alleges " ‘shocking and intolerable conduct or continuing mistreatment of a constitutional stature.’ " Denney , 315 Kan. at 173 (quoting Johnson v. State , 289 Kan. 642, 648, 215 P.3d 575 [2009] ). But "[i]f the court determines that the motion, files, and the records of the case conclusively show that the inmate is entitled to no relief, then the court shall dissolve the writ." Denney , 315 Kan. at 174. See K.S.A. 2020 Supp. 60-1505(a) ; K.S.A. 2020 Supp. 60-1503(a).
An appellate court's review of a summary dismissal of a K.S.A. 60-1501 petition is de novo. "[A]ppellate courts are in just as good a position as the district court to determine whether it plainly appears from the face of the petition and any supporting exhibits that the plaintiff is entitled to no relief." Denney , 315 Kan. at 175.
For an appellate court to review a prison disciplinary sanction, the inmate's claim under K.S.A. 60-1501 must assert the deprivation of some constitutionally protected interest; otherwise, the petition may be summarily dismissed. Hogue v. Bruce , 279 Kan. 848, 850, 113 P.3d 234 (2005). The inmate bears the burden of proof to establish a violation of a constitutional right. Anderson v. McKune , 23 Kan. App. 2d 803, 807, 937 P.2d 16 (1997).
In considering Jaghoori's claims of due process violations, this court applies a two-step analysis. The first step is to determine whether the State has deprived the inmate of life, liberty, or property. If there has been a deprivation of life, liberty, or property because of State action, the second step is to determine the extent and nature of the process due. Hogue , 279 Kan. at 850.
On appeal, Jaghoori acknowledges the two-step process but does not explain what protected liberty or property interest the State deprived him of with the disciplinary action; he only argues there was insufficient evidence to convict him of the violation. In the Facts section of his brief, Jaghoori reasserts the similar claim he made in his petition that he was sanctioned with "20 days of restriction, 11 days loss of good time credits, increased custody level, and ordered that the facility would hold the glue and oil."
But as the Respondents point out, the record does not support Jaghoori's assertion of the disciplinary sanctions that were imposed for the violation. The record reflects the only sanction the hearing officer imposed was 20 days of restricted privileges. The Good Time Award Record/Review exhibit from ECF included in the record shows that no good time credits were forfeited as a sanction for the violation but that 11 days of unearned good time credits were withheld during the period the violation occurred.
The restriction of an inmate's privileges is not a significant and atypical hardship that will support a claim based on a violation of due process. Ramirez v. State , 23 Kan. App. 2d 445, 447, 931 P.2d 1265 (1997). As for good time credits, the law recognizes a distinction between a forfeiture of good time credits already earned as opposed to the withholding of unearned good time credits; the former constitutes a deprivation of an inmate's liberty interest while the latter does not. See In re Habeas Corpus Application of Pierpoint , 271 Kan. 620, Syl. ¶ 8, 24 P.3d 128 (2001) ; Davis v. McCune , 30 Kan. App. 2d 822, 824, 48 P.3d 1287 (2002). The withholding of 11 days of unearned good time credits during the period of Jaghoori's violation was not a deprivation of a protected liberty interest.
The only property the hearing officer found as contraband was the adhesive glue the prison officials confiscated. An inmate has no property interest in an item classified as contraband. Bryant v. Barbara , 11 Kan. App. 2d 165, 168, 717 P.2d 522 (1986). Thus, despite Jaghoori's disciplinary conviction, he has suffered no deprivation that would implicate...
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