Jaglowicz v. Bethel Twp.
| Decision Date | 14 April 2016 |
| Docket Number | CIVIL ACTION NO. 15-4902 |
| Citation | 178 F.Supp.3d 262 |
| Parties | Raymond C. Jaglowicz v. Bethel Township, Police Chief Tom Worrilow, John Camero, III, Ed Miles, Miles Davey, Jean Stoyer and Todd Apple. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Eastern District of Pennsylvania |
Kevin B. Watson, Cipriani & Werner PC, Blue Bell, PA, for Raymond C. Jaglowicz.
Robert P. Didomenicis, Holsten & Associates, Media, PA, for Bethel Township, Police Chief Tom Worrilow, John Camero, III, Ed Miles, Miles Davey, Jean Stoyer and Todd Apple.
Savage
Raymond Jaglowicz, who was not reappointed as a police officer in Bethel Township, sued the township, its five supervisors, and its police chief. His central claim is that his employment was terminated without due process in violation of the Police Tenure Act (“PTA”) and the Fourteenth Amendment.1
Moving for summary judgment, the defendants argue that Bethel Township's police force was not covered by the PTA and Jaglowicz was not protected by the PTA because he was not a full-time officer. They contend that without the protection of the PTA, Jaglowicz did not have the required property interest in his employment to establish a due process violation under the Fourteenth Amendment. They also maintain that Chief Tom Worrilow is not subject to personal liability and the individual defendants are entitled to qualified immunity.
Because there is a factual dispute whether Jaglowicz was a “regular full-time police officer” entitled to protection under the PTA, we shall deny the motion with respect to claims against Bethel Township under the PTA and the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. We shall grant the motion on all remaining claims. We also conclude that the individual defendants are entitled to qualified immunity.
Bethel Township appoints its police officers for one-year terms at the township reorganization meeting held each January.2 Jaglowicz began his employment with the Bethel Township police force in January 2010,3 when he was appointed for a one-year term. He was re-appointed each year until January 2015.4 At the 2015 reorganization meeting, the township supervisors voted unanimously to appoint Worrilow as “Part-time Police Chief” and eighteen others as “Part-time Police Officer[s]” for one year.5 Jaglowicz was not among those appointed.
Jaglowicz contends he was not reappointed because he had used a Taser while arresting a suspect on September 16, 2014.6 A citizen's complaint arising out of the incident was filed on October 21, 2014.7 During the course of his investigation of the complaint, Chief Worrilow interviewed numerous people, including Jaglowicz.8 At no time did Jaglowicz receive notice that Bethel Township intended to terminate his employment or to take disciplinary action.9 He was not charged with criminal misconduct.10 Although Worrilow concluded that Jaglowicz “probably over stepped his authority in making this arrest,” he also found that Jaglowicz was “most likely correct in using force to stop the suspect...”.11 Worrilow recommended to the police liaison on the board of supervisors that Jaglowicz be reappointed.12
In his complaint, Jaglowicz claimed that when they terminated his employment, the defendants deprived him of procedural due process under the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments, the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, and the PTA.13 He also claimed Bethel Township breached its oral employment contract and failed to create a police pension fund in violation of the Municipal Police Pension Law (“MPPL”).14
The parties conducted virtually no discovery. The defendants moved for summary judgment on all claims. Worrilow and the township supervisors also invoked qualified immunity.
Counsel for Jaglowicz conceded, at oral argument, that he cannot make out a due process claim under the Fifth Amendment, the Fourteenth Amendment based on a liberty interest, or the Equal Protection Clause.15 He also acknowledged that Jaglowicz had not established a violation of the MPPL.16 He did not dispute that the record did not support a claim against Chief Worrilow.17 Consequently, the only remaining claims on summary judgment are under the PTA and the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment based on a property interest against Bethel Township and the five township supervisors, and for breach of contract against the township only.
Summary judgment is appropriate if the movant shows “that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and [that] the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a)
. Judgment will be entered against a party who fails to sufficiently establish any element essential to that party's case and who bears the ultimate burden of proof at trial. See
Celotex Corp. v. Catrett , 477 U.S. 317, 322, 106 S.Ct. 2548, 91 L.Ed.2d 265 (1986). In examining the motion, we must draw all reasonable inferences in the nonmovant's favor. InterVest, Inc. v. Bloomberg, L.P. , 340 F.3d 144, 159–60 (3d Cir.2003).
The initial burden of demonstrating there are no genuine issues of material fact falls on the moving party. Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a)
. Once the moving party has met its burden, the nonmoving party must counter with “specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial.” Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp. , 475 U.S. 574, 587, 106 S.Ct. 1348, 89 L.Ed.2d 538 (1986) (citation omitted). The nonmovant must show more than the “mere existence of a scintilla of evidence” for elements on which she bears the burden of production. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc. , 477 U.S. 242, 252, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986). Bare assertions, conclusory allegations or suspicions are not sufficient to defeat summary judgment. Fireman's Ins. Co. v. DuFresne , 676 F.2d 965, 969 (3d Cir.1982). Thus, “[w]here the record taken as a whole could not lead a rational trier of fact to find for the non-moving party, there is no 'genuine issue for trial.”' Matsushita , 475 U.S. at 587, 106 S.Ct. 1348 (citation omitted).
The PTA provides the following protections:
53 P.S. § 812
(emphasis added).
The defendants maintain that even though Bethel Township is a township of the second class,18 the PTA does not apply because the township has more than three members on its police force. They rely on this language in the PTA:
This act shall apply to each township of the second class, to each borough and township of the first class having a police force of less than three members and not subject to...the Borough Code...[or to] the First Class Township Code.
53 P.S. § 811
.
The defendants interpret this section as limiting the PTA's application to police forces with “less than three members” regardless of township classification. They argue the PTA does not apply because Bethel employed twenty police officers in 2014.19
The size of a second-class township's police force does not govern whether the PTA applies. Section 812
provides that the PTA protects full-time police officers in “any township of the second class.” 53 P.S. § 812.
The Pennsylvania Supreme Court, in explaining the purpose of the PTA, made clear that it applied to all second class townships:
Evidently to remedy an obviously inequitable situation, the Legislature in 1951 passed the Police Tenure Act, which extended tenure to police forces of less than three members in boroughs, incorporated towns and townships of the first class and to all police forces of townships of the second class, regardless of the number employed . This was an expression of public policy to grant job tenure to all police employed by such municipalities regardless of their political classification.
Deskins v. Borough of W. Brownsville , 388 Pa. 547, 131 A.2d 101, 102 (1957)
(quoting McCandless Twp. v. Wylie , 375 Pa. 378, 100 A.2d 590, 592 (1953) ) (emphasis added); see also
Clark v. Twp. of Falls , 890 F.2d 611, 614, 617 (3d Cir.1989) (); Dombrosky v. Banach , No. 3:09–2579, 2012 WL 1899656, at *9 ().
Contrary to the defendants' contention, the PTA applies to all second class townships, like Bethel Township, no matter how many police officers they employ. Having concluded that the PTA applies to Bethel Township, we must determine whether it applies to Jaglowicz.
The PTA protects only a “regular full time police officer.” 53 P.S. § 812
. The defendants do not dispute Jaglowicz was a “regular” police officer. Instead, they argue that because Jaglowicz worked less than forty hours a week, he was a part-time employee who was not covered by the PTA. Thus, the issue is whether Jaglowicz was considered a full-time police officer within the meaning of the PTA.
Bethel Township measures full-time work in terms of hours worked. For purposes of the PTA, what...
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Toth v. Bethel Twp.
...by the Act, whose protections extend only to "full time" officers. This precise issue was recently addressed by Judge Savage in Jaglowicz , 178 F.Supp.3d 262, on which the Officials heavily rely. Jaglowicz was another Bethel police officer who, like Toth, was not reappointed at the January ......