Jalloh v. Underwood

Citation464 F.Supp.3d 125
Decision Date22 May 2020
Docket NumberCivil Action No. 16-1613 (TJK)
Parties Usman JALLOH, Plaintiff, v. Robert UNDERWOOD et al., Defendants.
CourtU.S. District Court — District of Columbia

Donald Frank Rosendorf, Law Office of Donald F. Rosendorf, Alexandria, VA, for Plaintiff.

David A. Jackson, Office of Attorney General, Washington, DC, for Defendants Robert Underwood, Arthur Kimball.

Stephen E. Whitted, Law Office of Prince George's County Maryland, Largo, MD, for Defendants Sean Miller, Thomas Anderson.

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER

TIMOTHY J. KELLY, United States District Judge

Plaintiff Usman Jalloh filed this lawsuit under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and the Constitution's Fourth Amendment against Defendants Robert Underwood, Arthur Kimball, Sean Miller, and Thomas Anderson. He alleges that Defendants—all police officers—violated his rights by beating and then maliciously prosecuting him. To summarize their encounter: after a brief discussion over whether Jalloh was properly parked, Officer Underwood alleges that Jalloh hit him with his ice cream truck (which Jalloh denies). Officer Underwood and Sergeant Kimball chased Jalloh from the District of Columbia into Maryland, and—by then joined by Officers Miller and Anderson—stopped him and forcibly removed him from his truck. Jalloh alleges that the officers then beat him and denied him proper medical care (which the officers deny). Jalloh was later charged in the Superior Court of the District of Columbia with assaulting a police officer while armed, fleeing, and reckless driving, but the case was eventually dismissed without prejudice. Officer Underwood and Sergeant Kimball, employed by the District of Columbia, and Officers Miller and Anderson, employed by Prince George's County, Maryland, have filed two separate motions for partial summary judgment. For the reasons below, both motions will be granted in part and denied in part.

I. Legal Standard

"The court shall grant summary judgment if the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). A fact is "material" if a dispute over it "might affect the outcome of the suit under the governing law," and a dispute is "genuine" if "the evidence is such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party." Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc. , 477 U.S. 242, 248, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986). To survive summary judgment, a plaintiff must "go beyond the pleadings and by her own affidavits, or by the depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, designate specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial." Celotex Corp. v. Catrett , 477 U.S. 317, 324, 106 S.Ct. 2548, 91 L.Ed.2d 265 (1986) (internal quotation omitted).

II. Analysis
A. Count I—Excessive Force under the Fourth Amendment

Jalloh asserts Count I against all Defendants, but only Officer Anderson moves for summary judgment. ECF No. 1 ("Compl.") at 10. Jalloh's excessive force claim against Officer Anderson turns on whether he used objectively reasonable force under the circumstances. See County of Los Angeles v. Mendez , ––– U.S. ––––, 137 S. Ct. 1539, 1546–47, 198 L.Ed.2d 52 (2017). And even if he did not, to overcome qualified immunity, Jalloh must still show that Officer Anderson's conduct violated clearly established law of which a reasonable person would have known. Pearson v. Callahan , 555 U.S. 223, 231, 129 S.Ct. 808, 172 L.Ed.2d 565 (2009). To determine whether an officer's use of force was reasonable, the Court must consider various factors including: "the severity of the crime at issue, whether the suspect poses an immediate threat to the safety of the officers or others, and whether he is actively resisting arrest or attempting to evade arrest by flight." Graham v. Connor , 490 U.S. 386, 396, 109 S.Ct. 1865, 104 L.Ed.2d 443 (1989). "The calculus of reasonableness must embody allowance for the fact that police officers are often forced to make split-second judgments—in circumstances that are tense, uncertain, and rapidly evolving—about the amount of force that is necessary in a particular situation." Id. at 396–97, 109 S.Ct. 1865. A defendant's motion for summary judgment on a § 1983 excessive force claim "is to be denied only when, viewing the facts in the record and all reasonable inferences derived therefrom in the light most favorable to the plaintiff, a reasonable jury could conclude that the excessiveness of the force is so apparent that no reasonable officer could have believed in the lawfulness of his actions." Wardlaw v. Pickett , 1 F.3d 1297, 1303 (D.C. Cir. 1993) (citing Martin v. Malhoyt , 830 F.2d 237, 253–54 (D.C. Cir. 1987) ).

The parties agree that while Officer Anderson helped remove Jalloh from his truck, he did not participate in the beating that allegedly followed. See Compl. at 6–7; ECF No. 63 at 3–7. Therefore, Officer Anderson argues that—even accepting Jalloh's version of events—any force he used in removing Jalloh from the truck was reasonable and, in any event, he is entitled to qualified immunity. ECF No. 54-1 at 7–12.

At the time Officer Anderson assisted in removing Jalloh from his truck, he knew that Jalloh had been accused of assaulting a police officer, and he had just completed a high-speed chase tracking him down. ECF No. 54-1 at 9–10; ECF No. 54, Ex. F at 16:40:04 (showing a speed of 71 miles per hour). Once Jalloh's truck stopped, Officer Anderson, along with two other officers, briefly reached in to forcibly pull him out and secure him on the ground, which was captured on video. See ECF No. 54, Ex. F at 16:40:31–38. Officer Anderson claims that he unbuckled Jalloh's seatbelt, while Jalloh asserts that he was not wearing a seatbelt and that the force used to remove him and "fling" him to the ground was excessive because the police could have allowed him to stand upright. See ECF No. 63 at 7. But even assuming Jalloh was not wearing a seatbelt, under the circumstances, it was reasonable for Officer Anderson to assume that Jalloh might flee, resist, or try to injure the officers, and to take appropriate precautions. See Graham , 490 U.S. at 396, 109 S.Ct. 1865. The Court has viewed the video of Officer Anderson participating in removing Jalloh from the truck and finds that Officer Anderson's actions were reasonable under the circumstances and did not violate the Fourth Amendment. See Rogala v. District of Columbia , 161 F.3d 44, 54 (D.C. Cir. 1998) (finding that an officer acted reasonably in pulling an arrestee from her car when she refused to get out); Jackson v. District of Columbia , 83 F. Supp. 3d 158, 169–171 (D.D.C. 2015). And because Officer Anderson did not violate Jalloh's rights by using excessive force, he is also entitled to qualified immunity on this count. See Ashcroft v. al-Kidd , 563 U.S. 731, 735, 131 S.Ct. 2074, 179 L.Ed.2d 1149 (2011). The Court will therefore grant summary judgment for Officer Anderson on Count I.

B. Count II—Failure to Provide Medical Assistance under the Fourth Amendment

Count II alleges that all Defendants failed to provide Jalloh medical assistance during his beating. Compl. at 11–12. The parties’ representations on this count are, to be frank, a bit of a mess. Officers Miller and Anderson (the "Maryland Defendants") have moved for summary judgment on this count. Officer Underwood and Sergeant Kimball (the "District Defendants") although at first joining the motion filed by the Maryland Defendants, later withdrew their motion as to this count. ECF No. 70 at 4–5. Further, the District Defendants represent that the parties have agreed that Jalloh is not pursuing this count against the Maryland Defendants, and only against them. ECF No. 56-1 at 2. And although Jalloh has not directly taken issue with this representation, he has opposed the Maryland Defendants’ motion as to this count. In short, it is unclear whether there is even a dispute related to Count II for the Court to decide, and in part for that reason, the Court will deny the motion without prejudice.

Before moving on, though, the Court notes that—even assuming Jalloh intends to pursue Count II against the Maryland Defendants—their argument does not necessarily suggest that summary judgment would be appropriate in their favor, even if it is correct in substance. They rely solely on City of Revere v. Massachusetts General Hospital , 463 U.S. 239, 103 S.Ct. 2979, 77 L.Ed.2d 605 (1983) to argue for summary judgment because Jalloh brought his claim under the Fourth Amendment, rather than the Fifth Amendment. ECF No. 54-1 at 12. In response, Jalloh, citing a lack of prejudice to the defendants, requests leave to amend his complaint if he cited the wrong amendment. ECF No. 63 at 8–9. Indeed, in Revere , even though the plaintiff incorrectly brought his medical care claim under the Eighth Amendment, the Court proceeded to analyze it under the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, rather than dismiss it for that reason. 463 U.S. at 244–245 & n.6, 103 S.Ct. 2979 ; cf. Johnson v. City of Shelby , 574 U.S. 10, 11, 135 S.Ct. 346, 190 L.Ed.2d 309 (2014) ("Federal pleading rules call for ‘a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief’ ... they do not countenance dismissal of a complaint for imperfect statement of the legal theory supporting the claim asserted.").

Moreover, whether Count II may be brought under the Fourth Amendment against either the Maryland Defendants or the District Defendants is an unsettled question that the parties have not briefed. After Revere , which said nothing about the Fourth Amendment, the Supreme Court clarified that the Fourth Amendment, not the Fourteenth Amendment, governs an arrestee's excessive force claims. Graham , 490 U.S. at 388, 109 S.Ct. 1865. Since then, the D.C. Circuit has not addressed whether an arrestee's claim that authorities failed to provide him medical assistance may be grounded in the ...

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