Jamerison v. Anthem Ins. Cos.

• Decision Date: 30 March 2022
• Docket Number: 4:20-cv-1640-MTS
• Parties: DARLENE JAMERISON, Plaintiff, v. ANTHEM INSURANCE COMPANIES, INC., Defendant.
• Court: U.S. District Court — Eastern District of Missouri

DARLENE JAMERISON, Plaintiff, v. ANTHEM INSURANCE COMPANIES, INC., Defendant.

No. 4:20-cv-1640-MTS

United States District Court, E.D. Missouri, Eastern Division

March 30, 2022

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER

MATTHEW T. SCHELP UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

Before the Court is Defendant Anthem Insurance Companies, Inc.'s Motion for Summary Judgment, Doc. [38], pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56, on Plaintiff's three-count Complaint, Doc. [3], asserting claims under the Missouri Human Rights Act (“MHRA”). For the reasons set forth below, the Court grants Defendant's Motion.

I. Background

Plaintiff Darlene Jamerison is a fifty-seven-year-old, African American woman who has worked for Defendant for thirty-six years. This case arises from allegations that Plaintiff's supervisor Mary Derhake, unlawfully harassed, retaliated, and discriminated against Plaintiff based on her race, age, and disability.

Since 1985, Plaintiff has held several positions with Defendant, including Membership Specialist, Claim Processor, Analyst, and Underwriter Assistant. Since 2012, Plaintiff has held the position of Underwriter Assistant. In April 2018, Plaintiff asked Derhake, the Director of Small Group Underwriting, to be promoted to a Small Group Underwriter II position to fill a vacant position. Doc. [40] ¶ 76. Derhake told Plaintiff she could not promote her to the Small Group Underwriter II position because it was not an in-line promotion, and that Plaintiff would have to apply for the position through “the proper channels like everybody else.” Id. ¶ 77. In May 2018, Derhake became Plaintiff's direct supervisor. From May 2018 to April 2019, Plaintiff reported to Derhake, and during this time, Plaintiff testifies Derhake discriminated and retaliated against her and created a hostile work environment.^[1] In April 2019, after a departmental reorganization, Plaintiff and Margie Droege-the Assistant Underwriter Team Lead-both lateraled to a different department and began reporting to Jennifer Flood.

Also in April 2019, Jim Clauss, the Vice President of Underwriting at Anthem in St. Louis, determined he needed to hire a Large Group Underwriter II. On April 16, 2019, the position was formally posted. The position required four minimum qualifications, one being that the candidate had “intermediary” or “guru” level proficiency in Microsoft Excel (“Excel”). Id. ¶ 47. All applicants were given the opportunity to self-select their proficiency level. Plaintiff applied for the Large Group Underwriter II position on May 10, 2019 and selected the “novice” option to classify her Excel proficiency. Of the fifteen total applicants for the Large Group Underwriter II position, seven met the minimum qualifications. Clauss hired Maggie Conkle, a forty-one year old Caucasian woman who met all four basic requirements and was currently employed at Defendant.

On May 28, 2019, a position for Small Group Underwriter II was formally posted on internal and external websites for three weeks. Id. ¶ 93. Plaintiff testified she was aware of the posting, thought about applying, and discussed applying for the position with several other employees. Id. ¶ 95. Plaintiff did not apply for the Small Group Underwriter II position. On June 12, 2019, Derhake interviewed Katherine Kozemcak, a forty year old Caucasian woman who met all the minimum qualifications and was currently employed at Defendant. Plaintiff did not discuss the position with Derhake, even after Plaintiff learned Derhake had interviewed Kozemcak. Doc. [40-5] at 11 (41:1-22; 43:21-25.). On June 18, 2019, Derhake hired Kozemcak.

On November 1, 2019, Plaintiff filed a Change of Discrimination with the Missouri Commission on Human Rights (MCHR) and the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC). Doc. [40] ¶ 172. Later, Plaintiff filed a three-count complaint under the MHRA for unlawful employment discrimination (Count I), hostile work environment (Count II), and retaliation (Count III). Doc. [3]. According to Plaintiff, all her allegations pertain to her manager, Mary Derhake, and Plaintiff's applications to the Large and Small Group Underwriter II positions. Doc. [40] ¶ 174. In the current Motion, Defendant moves for summary judgment on all three-counts. Doc. [38].

II. Legal Standard

A claim of unlawful discrimination may be established through direct or indirect evidence. Because Plaintiff's claim is not based on any direct evidence of discrimination, the Court will apply the McDonnell Douglas burden-shifting analysis. Mo. Rev. Stat. § 213.101.3 (stating “the court shall consider the burden-shifting analysis of McDonnell Douglas . . . to be highly persuasive for analysis in cases not involving direct evidence of discrimination.”); Eivins v. Mo. Dep't of Corr., 636 S.W.3d 155, 166 (Mo.Ct.App. 2021) (“Like federal courts, Missouri courts use the burden-shifting analysis developed in McDonnell Douglas . . . to evaluate proof in discrimination cases where disparate treatment is alleged.”). When deciding a case under the MHRA, courts are guided by Missouri law and federal employment discrimination case law consistent with Missouri law. Lampley v. Mo. Comm'n on Hum. Rts., 570 S.W.3d 16, 22 (Mo. banc 2019) (“When reviewing cases under the [MHRA, courts] are guided by both Missouri law and any federal employment discrimination (i.e., Title VII) case law that is consistent with Missouri law.”).

Under the McDonnell Douglas burden-shifting framework, Plaintiff must first demonstrate a prima facie case of discrimination; then the burden shifts to Defendant to articulate a legitimate, non-discriminatory reason for the challenged action; finally, if Defendant offers such a reason, the burden shifts back to Plaintiff to show the proffered reason is merely a pretext for discrimination. Eivins, 636 S.W.3d at 166-67. If Plaintiff fails to make a prima facie case, the Court grants summary judgment. See, e.g., M.W. by & though K.W. v. Six Flags St. Louis, LLC, 605 S.W.3d 400, 419 (Mo.Ct.App. 2020) (affirming summary judgment in favor of employer when plaintiff failed to present sufficient evidence from which a factfinder could find necessary elements of her prima facie discrimination claim) (Ransom, J.); see also Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323 (1986) (explaining if Plaintiff fails to make a sufficient showing on an essential element of her case with respect to which he or she has the burden of proof, the moving party is “entitled to a judgment as a matter of law”).

The Court views any factual disputes in the light most favorable to Plaintiff, Scott v. Harris, 550 U.S. 372, 380 (2007), and will grant summary judgment only if evidence could not support any reasonable inference for Plaintiff. Hilde v. Cty. of Eveleth, 777 F.3d 998, 1004 (8th Cir. 2015) (“if the plaintiff lacks evidence that clearly points to the presence of an illegal motive, he must avoid summary judgment by creating the requisite inference of unlawful discrimination through the McDonnell Douglas analysis, including sufficient evidence of pretext.”); see also Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 252 (1986) (“[t]he mere existence of a scintilla of evidence in support of the plaintiff's position will be insufficient; there must be evidence on which the jury could reasonably find for the plaintiff.”). Despite this deferential standard, Plaintiff will not withstand summary judgment with “[m]ere allegations, unsupported by specific facts or evidence beyond [her] own conclusions.” Thomas v. Corwin, 483 F.3d 516, 526 (8th Cir. 2007); Bram v. AT&T Mobility Servs., LLC, 564 S.W.3d 787, 799 (Mo.Ct.App. 2018) (explaining an “inference” of discrimination is not raised by a “plaintiff's general, conclusory allegations and opinions” (quoting Palesch v. Mo. Comm'n on Human Rights, 233 F.3d 560, 570 (8th Cir. 2000)).

For reasons discussed below, the Court finds Plaintiff's claims for discrimination, failure to promote, retaliation, and hostile work environment failed at the prima facie stage and that, even if she had met the elements of her prima facie case, she would be unable to establish pretext on this record.

III. Discussion

Before the Court begins its analysis, some housekeeping is in order. The MHRA prohibits an employer from discriminating against an employee on the basis of race, sex, age, or disability. See Mo. Rev. Stat. § 213.055.1(1)(a). Here, Plaintiff alleged she was discriminated against based on her race, disability, and age. In the current Motion, Defendant argued Plaintiff was not disabled under the MHRA, and Plaintiff failed to address this argument in her Opposition Brief. Thus, Plaintiff concedes Defendant's argument that she was not disabled under the MHRA.^[2] See, e.g., Satcher v. Univ. of Ark. at Pine Bluff Bd. of Trs., 558 F.3d 731, 735 (8th Cir. 2009) (The “failure to oppose a basis for summary judgment constitutes waiver of that argument”). Similarly, Plaintiff did not address Defendant's argument that Plaintiff was not discriminated against based on her age.^[3] Thus, the Court only considers discrimination under the MHRA based on Plaintiff's race.

A. Failure-to-Promote^[4]

Plaintiff claims she was not promoted to two positions-Large Group Underwriter II and

Small Group Underwriter II-based on her race. If true, the MHRA prohibits such conduct. See Mo. Rev. Stat. § 213.055.1(1)(a). To establish a prima facie claim for discriminatory failure-to-promote under Missouri law Plaintiff must show, among other elements, that she applied for and qualified for the position. Eivins, 636 S.W.3d at 165. Here, Plaintiff was not qualified for one of the positions, and she did not even apply for the other. Because Plaintiff failed to present sufficient evidence to support an essential element of her failure-to-promote claim,...