Jamerson v. Heimgartner
| Decision Date | 21 April 2020 |
| Docket Number | Case No. 5:17-3205-JAR-KGG |
| Parties | JAMES LEE JAMERSON, Plaintiff, v. JAMES HEIMGARTNER, et al., Defendants. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — District of Kansas |
Plaintiff James Lee Jamerson brings this pro se civil rights action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and Kansas law against multiple defendants in their individual and official capacities, each of whom interacted with Plaintiff during his incarceration. Seven defendants remain parties to this action: (1) James Heimgartner, Warden at El Dorado Correctional Facility ("EDCF"); (2) Douglas Burris, Deputy Secretary of Corrections designee for the Kansas Department of Corrections ("KDOC"); (3) Ron Baker, a Major at Lansing Correctional Facility ("LCF"); (4) Daniel Jackson, a unit team member at EDCF; (5) Laurie Rohling, a unit team member at EDCF; (6) Randolph Johnson, a disciplinary hearing officer at EDCF; and (7) Amanda King, a mental health counselor at EDCF.
This matter is before the Court on King's Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(c) (Doc. 63); the remaining Defendants' ("KDOC Defendants") Motion to Dismiss, or in the Alternative, for Summary Judgment (Doc. 56); and Plaintiffs' Motion for Extension of Time (Doc. 67). For the reasons set forth more fully below, King's motion is granted, the KDOC Defendants' motion is granted, and Plaintiff's motion is denied.
Plaintiff first filed this pro se civil rights action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and Kansas state law on November 22, 2017. The Court issued its first "Memorandum and Order and Order to Show Cause" on February 7, 2018, noting Plaintiff's claims appeared to be barred by the statute of limitations and Plaintiff had not demonstrated he was entitled to statutory or equitable tolling.1 The Court ordered Plaintiff to show good cause, in writing, by March 7, 2018 as to why his Complaint should not be dismissed. Plaintiff filed a response to the Court's show cause order.2 In its subsequent Memorandum and Order dismissing Plaintiff's claims as barred by the statute of limitations, the Court did not address whether Plaintiff had demonstrated he was entitled to equitable tolling. Instead, the Court reasoned that "[e]ven if Plaintiff could successfully argue equitable tolling regarding his remaining claims, Plaintiff has failed to state a plausible claim for relief."3 The Court dismissed the action on April 25, 2018. Plaintiff appealed, and the Tenth Circuit remanded the case for further proceedings consistent with its Order because the Court had not fully addressed whether equitable tolling applied to Plaintiff's claims.4
Following the appeal and remand, Plaintiff was permitted to file an Amended Complaint (Doc. 27), and the Kansas Department of Corrections filed a Martinez report.5 Plaintiff's remaining claims against King are that in December 2011, "Amanda King, did violate Jamerson's Eighth and Fourteenth Amendment rights of the United States Constitution and thestate of Kansas statute K.S.A. 75-6106 (Kansas Tort Claims Act) and Kansas Bill of rights 9 for the defendant failing to follow KDOC IMPP (Internal Management Policy and procedure)."6 Plaintiff's remaining claims against the KDOC Defendants are for: (1) violating Plaintiff's Eighth and Fourteenth Amendment rights by falsifying documents so that Plaintiff would be labelled a gang member who trafficked contraband and would remain in extended administrative segregation; (2) violating Sections 9 and 19 of the Kansas Bill of Rights; (3) violating the Kansas Tort Claims Act; and (4) violating various KDOC policies and regulations.
The KDOC Defendants filed their Motion to Dismiss, or in the Alternative, for Summary Judgment on November 27, 2019. Under the Local Rules for the District of Kansas, Plaintiff had until December 18, 2019 to file his response.7 King filed her Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings on December 13, 2019. Plaintiff had until January 3, 2020 to file his response to that motion.8 The Court did not receive a response to either motion by these respective deadlines, nor did the Court receive a motion for extension of time. As such, the Court ordered Plaintiff to show cause, in writing, on or before March 13, 2020, why the motions should not both be granted as unopposed.9 Plaintiff was further ordered to file any response to the motions by March 13, 2020.10
In his April 14, 2020 motion for extension of time, Plaintiff requests an additional forty-five days to respond to the Court's Show Cause Order, including filing responses to the pendingdispositive motions. He explains that he "has basically been unable to attend the law library or use its research computers for the past month" because of the prison's response to the ongoing COVID-19 pandemic.11 Plaintiff also states that "the research computers have been basically useless for almost a month" because of a "glitch that disabled the research program."12 Plaintiff requests "an additional 45 days" for him "to respond to the courts [sic] order and all the defendants' pending motions."13
Under D. Kan Rule 6.1(a), Excusable neglect is a somewhat elastic concept and is not limited strictly to omissions caused by circumstances beyond the control of the movant.14 The determination of whether neglect is excusable "is at bottom an equitable one, taking account of all relevant circumstances surrounding the party's omission," including "the danger of prejudice to the [opposing party], the length of the delay and its potential impact on judicial proceedings, the reason for the delay, including whether it was within the reasonable control of the movant, and whether the movant acted in good faith."15 Perhaps the single most important factor in determining whether neglect is excusable is fault in the delay.16 Whether the moving party's underlying claim is meritorious should also be taken into consideration.17Further, "[a] court may take into account whether the mistake was a single unintentional incident (as opposed to a pattern of deliberate dilatoriness and delay)."18
Plaintiff has failed to show excusable neglect. His response deadline to the KDOC Defendants' motion was December 18, 2019—approximately four months ago; similarly, his response deadline to King's motion was January 3, 2020. Plaintiff did not attempt to file any response to these motions, and the time for doing so has long since passed. His motion provides no explanation for missing these initial deadlines, which passed well before the COVID-19 pandemic impacted his access to the resources needed to prepare his responses. Having received no response, the Court then issued its Order to Show Cause, giving Plaintiff until March 13, 2020 to show cause as to why his claims should not be dismissed. Plaintiff did not abide by that deadline either. And while the Court understands that the COVID-19 pandemic may have impacted Plaintiff's access to certain prison resources, Plaintiff's own motion states that these access issues only began a month ago, after his deadlines passed. This does not explain his failure to file a response to the Court's show cause order on or before March 13, 2020. The length of delay, the repeated missed deadlines, and Plaintiff's fault in the delay all weigh firmly against a finding of excusable neglect. Plaintiff's motion is therefore denied.
In her Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings, King seeks dismissal under Rule 12(c) on grounds that the only claims against her arose on December 10, 2011, and are thereby barred by the statute of limitations. She also asserts that Plaintiff has failed to state a claim against her. Plaintiff's Amended Complaint is unclear which of King's actions or inactions he alleges were unlawful; however, his only allegations related to King relate to Plaintiff's segregation review in2011. Plaintiff's claims against the KDOC Defendants, which are described more fully in the section addressing their motion, include allegations related to incidents in 2013 and 2014.
A motion for judgment on the pleadings under Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(c) is reviewed under the same standard as a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6).19 To survive a motion to dismiss, a complaint must present factual allegations, assumed to be true, that "raise a right to relief above the speculative level" and must contain "enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face."20 Under this standard, "the complaint must give the court reason to believe that this plaintiff has a reasonable likelihood of mustering factual support for these claims."21 The plausibility standard does not require a showing of probability that "a defendant has acted unlawfully," but requires more than "a sheer possibility."22
The plausibility standard announced in Bell Atlantic v. Twombly23 seeks a middle ground between heighted fact pleading and "allowing complaints that are no more than 'labels and conclusions' or a 'formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action,' which the Court stated 'will not do.'"24 Twombly does not change other principles, such as that a court must accept all factual allegations as true and may not dismiss on the ground that it appears unlikely the allegations can be proven.25
The Supreme Court has explained the analysis as a two-step process. For purposes of a motion to dismiss, the court "must take all the factual allegations in the complaint as true," but is "'not bound to accept as true a legal conclusion couched as a factual allegation.'"26 Thus, the Court must first determine if the allegations are factual and entitled to an assumption of truth, or merely legal conclusions that are not so entitled.27 Second...
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