James Alexander, Inc. v. United States

• Decision Date: 04 May 1942
• Docket Number: No. 9821.,9821.
• Parties: JAMES ALEXANDER, Inc., et al. v. UNITED STATES et al.
• Court: U.S. Court of Appeals — Fifth Circuit

128 F.2d 82 (1942)

JAMES ALEXANDER, Inc., et al. v. UNITED STATES et al.

No. 9821.

Circuit Court of Appeals, Fifth Circuit.

May 4, 1942.

J. T. G. Crawford and Olin E. Watts, both of Jacksonville, Fla., for appellants.

H. S. Phillips, U. S. Atty., of Tampa, Fla., W. Joe Sears, Jr., Sp. Asst. to the Atty. Gen., and John W. Ball, Sp. Atty., Department of Justice, both of Jacksonville, Fla., Norman M. Littell, Asst. Atty. Gen., and John F. Cotter, Atty., Department of Justice, both of Washington, D. C., for appellee United States.

J. Tom Watson, Atty. Gen., State of Florida, and Millard B. Conklin, Asst. Atty. Gen., State of Florida, for appellee State of Florida.

William D. Jones, Jr., of Jacksonville, Fla., for appellee Duval County Air Base Authority.

Before FOSTER, SIBLEY, and HUTCHESON, Circuit Judges.

SIBLEY, Circuit Judge.

This case began with a petition filed Feb. 20, 1940, by the United States to condemn lands in Duval County, Florida, for a naval aviation base. On April 15, James Alexander, Inc., answered claiming title to a parcel of the land, subject to a mortgage in favor of A. L. Lewis. Lewis answered claiming mortgage rights, and also that on March 5, 1940, he had bid in at a public sale for taxes the Alexander, Inc., land, paying $114 therefor. On April 24 the State of Florida filed answer claiming fee simple ownership of these lands, and praying an award of their value; and Duval County Air Base Authority also filed an answer, claiming fee simple title derived from the State under Chapter 19784, Sp.Laws of Florida of 1939, which created the Authority as a public corporation, and it prayed an award in its favor. The United States filed a declaration of taking and paid into court a sum tentatively fixed by the Secretary of the Navy as just compensation, and the court ordered possession surrendered to the United States. Alexander, Inc., and Lewis filed other pleadings attacking the title claimed by the State and the Authority, and the court on a hearing found that the Authority was the owner, and that Alexander, Inc., and Lewis had no title or lien on the land; and fixed the value of the land in contention at $1,320, which having been deposited, a full title was decreed vested in the United States. Alexander, Inc., and Lewis appeal. The State of Florida does not appeal, but by its Attorney General files a brief in support of the decree.

The court found and it is not disputed that the lands in contention were duly assessed for taxes in 1925 and 1928, and that proper sales were held in 1926 and 1929 at which the lands were bid off for the State of Florida and tax sale certificates regularly issued. Matters so stood until June 9, 1937, when Chapter 18296 of the Florida Laws for that year, known as the Murphy Act, was enacted, Section 9 of which purported to cut off two years thereafter all right of redemption of lands which had more than two years previous to June 9, 1937, been bid off for the State at tax sales. The validity of this provision is asserted by the State and the Authority, and denied by the appellants. On May 11, 1939, Chapter 19784, Laws of Florida of 1939, was enacted, creating and regulating the Authority; and Section 10 thereof purported to give the Authority the right "to take, exclusively occupy, use and possess, insofar as may be necessary for carrying out the provisions of this Act, any areas of land owned by the State of Florida, and within the territorial extent of said Authority * * * and, when so taken and occupied, due notice of such taking and occupancy having been filed with the Secretary of State by the Authority, such areas of land are hereby granted to and shall be the property of the Authority." The disputed land was so taken and occupied and notice thereof filed with the Secretary of State. The State does not contest the validity of this grant to the Authority, but the appellants contend it is contrary to Art. III, § 16, of the Florida Constitution because the title of the Act does not express any purpose to grant the State's land, and because the broad power given to select the land is an unauthorized delegation of legislative authority. Lewis contends he has standing thus to attack the grant, because of his claim to have bought the State's title at the second tax sale which occurred after the filing of the condemnation proceeding, at which he paid the price he bid, though the trustees of the Internal Improvement Fund of the State of Florida, who were conducting the sale pursuant to the provisions of the Murphy Act, declined to make a deed after learning of the grant to the Authority and of the condemnation proceeding, and tendered back to Lewis the money he had paid.

We hold Section 9 of the Murphy Act valid as against the contention made that it takes the property of appellants without due process of law, contrary to the Fourteenth Amendment, and impairs the previous mortgage contract of Lewis contrary to Art. I, § 10, of the Constitution of the United States. The Murphy Act refers to the vast accumulations of delinquent taxes and outstanding tax sale certificates held by the State, and the resulting inability of the State and County governments properly to function, and it sought to put the overburdened lands which had been unredeemed more than two years back on the tax rolls by selling the tax certificates, on application, during a limited period for what they would bring, the defaulting owner being permitted to be a bidder. Section 9 seeks to bring this business to a conclusion at the end of two years from its enactment by declaring that all lands against which there are tax sale certificates more than two years old at the time the Act becomes a law shall, two years thereafter "become absolutely vested in State of Florida, and every right, title or interest of every nature or kind whatsoever of former owner of said...