James D., In re

• Decision Date: 12 March 1981
• Citation: 116 Cal.App.3d 810,172 Cal.Rptr. 321
• Court: California Court of Appeals Court of Appeals
• Parties: In re JAMES D., a Person Coming Under the Juvenile Court Law. The PEOPLE, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. JAMES D., Defendant and Appellant. Civ. 49063.

Page 321

172 Cal.Rptr. 321

116 Cal.App.3d 810

In re JAMES D., a Person Coming Under the Juvenile Court Law.

The PEOPLE, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. JAMES D., Defendant and Appellant.

Civ. 49063.

Court of Appeal, First District, Division 1, California.

March 12, 1981.

As Modified on Denial of Rehearing April 9, 1981.

Hearing Denied June 3, 1981.

Jed Scully, McGeorge School of Law, Juvenile Law & Appellate Clinic, Sacramento, for defendant and appellant.

George Deukmejian, Atty. Gen., Robert H. Philibosian, Chief Asst. Atty. Gen., Edward P. O'Brien, Asst. Atty. Gen., W. Eric Collins, Mary Roth, Deputy Attys. Gen., San Francisco, for plaintiff and respondent.

ELKINGTON, Acting Presiding Justice.

James D., a minor (hereafter James), was found by the juvenile court to have committed offenses which, if committed by an adult, would have constituted the crimes denounced by Penal Code section 496, subdivision 1 (receiving stolen property), and Penal Code section 12094 (possession of a shotgun with obliterated identification). His appeal, permitted by Welfare and Institutions Code section 800, is from a judgment of commitment to the California Youth Authority thereafter entered.

We have considered the record and the briefs and arguments of the parties. It is concluded, for reasons which follow, that the judgment of commitment must be modified and affirmed.

Evidence before the juvenile court established the following factual context.

James lived in an outbuilding on property owned by his grandparents. Law enforcement officers investigating reports of random shotgun shooting in the neighborhood came to his door stating, or asking, "we'd like to search the premises for a shotgun," or "if he still had that shotgun." James responded by retrieving and handing the officers a shotgun whose mark of identification had been obliterated.

Thereafter the home next door was burglarized and suspicion settled on James. Upon an unquestioned search warrant James' outbuilding was searched, and much of the stolen property was found.

I. It is contended that: "Absent evidence establishing two essential elements of the alleged offense the trier of fact was precluded from finding appellant received stolen property."

The missing "essential elements," it is argued, were proof: "(1) that the particular property was stolen; (2) that the accused received, concealed or withheld it from the owner thereof; and (3) that the accused knew the property was stolen."

"With respect to conflicting testimony, of course, '... we accept that version of events which is the most favorable to the People, to the extent that it is supported by the record.' " (People v. Jimenez (1978) 21 Cal.3d 595, 609, 147 Cal.Rptr. 172, 580 P.2d 672.) And, circumstantial evidence and reasonable inferences drawn therefrom "may be sufficient to connect a defendant with the crime and to prove his guilt beyond a reasonable doubt." (People v. Pierce (1979) 24 Cal.3d 199, 210, 155 Cal.Rptr. 657, 595 P.2d 91.) " '(W)hen two or more inferences can reasonably be deduced from the facts,' either deduction will be supported by substantial evidence, and 'a reviewing court is without power to substitute its deductions for those of the trial court.' " (People v. Superior Court (Tunch) (1978) 80 Cal.App.3d 665, 670, 145 Cal.Rptr. 795.)

Here the subject property, mostly jewelry, was uncontrovertibly stolen. It was found in the outbuilding occupied by James; from that fact the juvenile court reasonably inferred that it was placed, or possessed, there by James, or by others with his permission and knowledge. Such an inference, believed by the trier of fact, is sufficient evidence of possession of, and receiving, stolen property. (In re Richard T. (1978) 79 Cal.App.3d 382, 388, 144 Cal.Rptr. 856; People v. Candiotto (1960) 183 Cal.App.2d 348, 349-350, 6 Cal.Rptr. 876.) And knowledge that the property was stolen may be inferred from circumstantial evidence (People v. Schroeder (1968) 264 Cal.App.2d 217, 70 Cal.Rptr. 491), such as where the accused is found, as here, in possession of the property soon after it was stolen (People v. Lyons (1958) 50 Cal.2d 245, 258, 324 P.2d 556), or an unsatisfactory explanation of its presence is given by him or there are other suspicious circumstances (id., p. 258, 324 P.2d 556). The juvenile court reasonably rejected James' explanation that he believed the partially dismantled jewelry found on his premises had been brought there, or was being manufactured, by one or more of three girls he had allowed to stay there.

Beyond any doubt there was adequate evidence supportive of the juvenile court's finding that James had knowingly received and possessed the stolen property.

II. It is also contended that: "Statements and evidence obtained in violation of appellant's Fifth Amendment rights requires reversal."

James' instant argument is that the officers unlawfully failed to advise him of his Miranda (Miranda v. Arizona (1966) 384 U.S. 436, 86 S.Ct. 1602, 16 L.Ed.2d 694) rights, when in the course of their investigation they had earlier come to his front door. His production of the shotgun, he urges, was tantamount to an unlawfully obtained incriminating admission.

Miranda's admonition is required prior to any "custodial" interrogation of a criminal suspect. Here, as found by the juvenile court, the officers were engaged in " 'general on-the-scene investigatory questioning' with respect to which Miranda notice requirements are inapplicable." (People v. Hill (1974) 12 Cal.3d 731, 767, 117 Cal.Rptr. 393, 528 P.2d 1 (overruled on other grounds, People v. DeVaughn, 18 Cal.3d 889, 896, fn. 5, 135 Cal.Rptr. 786, 558 P.2d 872).) We are bound by that ruling unless it is "palpably erroneous." (In re Eric J. (1979) 25 Cal.3d 522, 527, 159 Cal.Rptr. 317, 601 P.2d 549.) We do not find it so.

III. James' remaining contention is stated in this manner: "Reversible error existed as a matter of law when the court used improper trial court procedures by hearing fitness and dispositional facts not admissible at the adjudication on the same day that the court heard and ruled on the adjudication hearing."

The juvenile court judge had held, according to Welfare and Institutions Code section 707, a so-called "fitness hearing" to determine whether James should be tried before the superior court as would an adult, or instead be deemed amenable to the juvenile court's processes. At that hearing the court was furnished with evidence of what might reasonably be termed James' lengthy and substantial criminal record. Nevertheless the juvenile court ruled that James was a fit and proper subject to be dealt with under the provisions of the Juvenile Court Law.

The same juvenile court judge thereafter presided, without objection by James, or his attorney, over the so-called jurisdictional (or adjudicatory, or guilt inquiry) phase of the juvenile court proceedings. It is now argued that with knowledge of James' record and proclivity for crime, the judge's impartiality in respect of the jurisdictional facts could no longer be assured and he should, on his own motion, not have conducted the jurisdictional hearing.

We are brought to a consideration of the relevant law.

Our inquiry is properly commenced with Donald L. v. Superior Court (1972) 7 Cal.3d 592, 102 Cal.Rptr. 850, 498 P.2d 1098, where the state's high court, among other things, found no infirmity in Welfare and Institutions Code's procedure for resolving the issue of a minor's fitness (upon a newly charged offense) for continued juvenile court treatment prior to, as distinguished from during, the juvenile court's jurisdictional hearing. In doing so, the court point out (p. 599, 102 Cal.Rptr. 850, 498 P.2d 1098) that jurisdiction of the juvenile court in such proceedings " 'must measure up to the essentials of due process and fair treatment ....' " Those principles, it held (p. 598, 102 Cal.Rptr. 850, 498 P.2d 1098), required "that the minor be protected against premature resolution of the jurisdictional issue on the basis of incompetent background (and often prejudicial) material adduced on the issue of amenability to juvenile court treatment."

(In the case at bench the juvenile court judge found in favor of James, the juvenile, on the fitness issue as, of course, must always have been the case where a jurisdictional hearing is thereafter held.)

Three years after Donald L., the nation's Supreme Court decided the case of Breed v. Jones (1975) 421 U.S. 519, 95 S.Ct. 1779, 44 L.Ed.2d 346, arising out of California and relating generally to the statutes and constitutional principles with which Donald L. was, and now we, are concerned.

Breed v. Jones iterated (p. 537, 95 S.Ct. p. 1789) that such juvenile court proceedings " 'must measure up to the essentials of due process,' " which in turn would ordinarily require different judges at the fitness and jurisdictional hearings. But the court (p. 539, 95 S.Ct. p. 1790) found no due process, or other fault, with statutes providing that "a different judge ... preside at an adjudicatory hearing" unless waived by the minor for his, or his attorney's, failure to object.

As observed by Donald L. and Breed v. Jones, James had a due process right to a different judge at the jurisdictional hearing. Our inquiry is whether that right was waived by James' failure to assert it.

Of value to us is the case of In re Gladys R. (1970) 1 Cal.3d 855, 83 Cal.Rptr. 671, 464 P.2d 127, which antedated Donald L. and Breed v. Jones. There the juvenile court judge had reviewed a "social study" of the minor's many behavioral problems before entering upon the jurisdictional hearing, a practice which at the time appears to have been widespread. The minor's attorney had made no objection to the judge's continued functioning at the second hearing. Finding judicial interpretation of related statutes to have "previously remained unsettled," the high court held the practice constitutionally improper and...