James Julian, Inc. v. Raytheon Co., Civ. A. No. 80-30 MMS.
| Decision Date | 31 August 1984 |
| Docket Number | Civ. A. No. 80-30 MMS. |
| Citation | 593 F. Supp. 915 |
| Parties | JAMES JULIAN, INC., Plaintiff, v. RAYTHEON COMPANY, et al., Defendants. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — District of Delaware |
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John Van Brunt, Jr., Wilmington, Del., for plaintiff.
Robert Burton Coonin, Wilmington, Del., Berkowitz, Greenstein, Schagrin & Coonin, P.A., Wilmington, Del. (Martin Wald, Schnader, Harrison, Segal & Lewis, Philadelphia, of counsel), for defendants Operating Engineers Local No. 542 and Spanich.
Clifford B. Hearn, Wilmington, Del. (William J. Einhorn, Sagot & Jennings, Philadelphia, of counsel), for defendant Wharf & Dock Builders Local 454.
Harvey B. Rubenstein, Wilmington, Del., for defendants Ironworkers No. 451 and Peterson.
Joseph Benson, Wilmington, Del. (Richard B. Sigmond, Mernaze, Katz, Spear & Wilderman, Philadelphia, of counsel), for defendants Building Trades Council of Delaware & DiMauro.
James Julian, Inc. ("Julian"), a construction contractor, brought this action to obtain relief from various union, non-union, and individual defendants under sections 1 and 2 of the Sherman Antitrust Act (15 U.S.C. §§ 1, 2), under section 303 of the Labor Management Relations Act (29 U.S.C. § 187) and under state tort law. The non-union defendants, Raytheon Company ("Raytheon") and Raytheon Service Company ("RSC"),1 reached a settlement with Julian and have been dismissed from the action.2 The remaining union defendants are: Building and Construction Trades Council of Delaware ("Trades Council") and its President, Frank E. DiMauro, Operating Engineers Local 542 ("Operating Engineers") and its agent Albert W. Spanich, Iron Workers Local 451 ("Iron Workers") and its agent Edward F. Peterson, and Wharf and Dock Builders and Pile Drivers Local Union No. 454 of the United Brotherhood of Carpenters and Joiners of America ("Wharf and Dock Builders").
Prior opinions may be consulted for a more detailed factual background.3 The central facts are as follows. Julian and RSC signed a letter of intent, or "teaming agreement," in 1976 under which Julian was to act as general contractor in the construction of a solid waste disposal plant for the Delaware Solid Waste Authority (the "Authority"). Julian's troubles began in 1978, when work on the project commenced. Its employees were represented by United Mineworkers District 50, now Local 15253 of the United Steel Workers of America, which was not a member of the Trades Council. At two meetings held in November of 1978, Raytheon representatives met with the Trades Council and its member unions. There is evidence that various union spokesman demanded at those meetings that project work be assigned to Trades Council unions and threatened to disrupt construction if their demands were not met. Picketing later occurred on several occasions. Raytheon, allegedly succumbing to union pressures, contracted a portion of project work to Raymond International Buildings, Inc. ("Raymond"), which employed Trades Council workers, and ultimately terminated Julian's contract.
The Iron Workers and Albert W. Spanich have moved for partial summary judgment on Count I of Julian's complaint, which alleges the Sherman Act violations. The remaining defendants have moved for summary judgment not only on the Sherman Act claim but also on the LMRA section 303 claim (Count III) and state tort claim (Count VI).4
The Court has already denied two potentially case dispositive motions in this case. In 1980 the Court denied a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim upon which relief could be granted and for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. In that opinion the Court held that Julian alleged sufficient facts to state a Sherman Act claim against the defendants and that the claim fell outside of the "statutory" and "non-statutory" labor exemptions to the antitrust laws. James Julian, 499 F.Supp. at 955-58. In addition, the Court held that Julian's complaint alleged a valid claim under section 303 of the LMRA for damages resulting from a violation of section 8(b)(4) of the National Labor Relations Act ("NLRA"), 29 U.S.C. § 158(b)(4) (1982).5 Finally, the Court held that it had pendent jurisdiction to hear the state tort claims under United Mine Workers of America v. Gibbs, 383 U.S. 715, 86 S.Ct. 1130, 16 L.Ed.2d 218 (1966).
In February, 1983, the Court denied a motion for summary judgment brought by defendants Iron Workers and Peterson. Sufficient admissible and probative evidence existed, the Court held, to permit the question of an antitrust conspiracy to proceed to trial. James Julian, 557 F.Supp. at 1063-66. The Court also denied summary judgment on the section 303 and pendent state claims. Id. at 1066-67.
Although some new legal theories are now raised in the recent briefing, and although additional defendants have joined in this second summary judgment motion, the essence of the pending motion is a repeat of the prior motion: defendants contend that insufficient evidence exists to support an antitrust claim because of the various exemptions from antitrust liability enjoyed by labor unions. No significant discovery is relied upon in this motion that was not available at the time of the prior summary judgment motion. Thus, for the third time, the Court must deny defendants' motion and move this case towards trial.
Defendants claim that insufficient evidence exists of a conspiracy between themselves and Raytheon. Because the unions acted alone, defendants assert, the unions are immune from antitrust liability under the "statutory" antitrust exemption provided by sections 6 and 20 of the Clayton Act, 15 U.S.C. § 17 and 29 U.S.C. § 52, and the Norris-LaGuardia Act, 29 U.S.C. §§ 104, 105, and 113. See Connell Construction Co. v. Plumbers & Steamfitters Local Union No. 100, 421 U.S. 616, 621-22, 95 S.Ct. 1830, 1834-35, 44 L.Ed.2d 418 (1975); United Mine Workers v. Pennington, 381 U.S. 657, 661-62, 85 S.Ct. 1585, 1588-89, 14 L.Ed.2d 626 (1965). In any event, defendants argue, even if the unions did reach an agreement with Raytheon, such an agreement is entitled to "non-statutory" immunity because it was related to collective bargaining and was not entered into for the purpose of restraining competition. Finally, defendants contend, even if an agreement between themselves and Raytheon existed, and even if such an agreement is unprotected by an antitrust exemption, plaintiff's claim still must fail because Julian cannot show antitrust injury or unreasonable restraint of trade.
Plaintiff concedes that an agreement solely among the union defendants would be immune to antitrust attack. It is well settled that when unions act alone in their self interest their actions are statutorily exempt from the antitrust laws. See Connell, 421 U.S. at 622-23, 95 S.Ct. at 1835-36; United States v. Hutcheson, 312 U.S. 219, 232-33, 61 S.Ct. 463, 466-67, 85 L.Ed. 788 (1941); Feather v. United Mine Workers, 711 F.2d 530, 541 (3d Cir.1983); Jou-Jou Designs, Inc. v. International Ladies Garment Workers Union, 643 F.2d 905, 910 (2d Cir.1981). Instead, Julian contends that the Trades Council and its member unions pressured Raytheon into reaching an agreement to contract work to Raymond and then to terminate its contract with Julian. Although some agreements with non-union entities are entitled to nonstatutory antitrust immunity, this agreement, Julian asserts, is not immune because it was not "sought or obtained in the context of a collective-bargaining relationship," Woelke & Romero Framing, Inc. v. NLRB, 456 U.S. 645, 653, 102 S.Ct. 2071, 2076, 72 L.Ed.2d 398 (1982).
The Court must first address defendants' primary argument on summary judgment: that the unions acted alone, not in concert with a non-union entity.
Summary judgment is a drastic remedy which the Court may resort to only if the moving party demonstrates that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Sunshine Books, Ltd. v. Temple University, 697 F.2d 90, 95 (3d Cir.1982). Moreover, all inferences drawn from the underlying facts must be viewed in the light most favorable to the party opposing the motion. Id. In this case defendants have filed sworn affidavits denying the existence of an agreement or conspiracy. Plaintiff is therefore not entitled to rest solely on its complaint. It must produce "significant probative evidence" demonstrating the existence of a factual dispute as to the allegations in its complaint. Sunshine Books, 697 F.2d at 96; James Julian, 557 F.Supp. at 1062.
Special difficulties arise in assessing summary judgment motions which turn on whether evidence exists to support the existence of a conspiracy. As the Third Circuit Court of Appeals recently observed in In re Japanese Electronic Products Antitrust Litigation, 723 F.2d 238 (3d Cir. 1983), conspirators in an illegal enterprise rarely leave trails of direct evidence proving the agreement. Id. at 304. "Broad latitude" is therefore permitted for the inference of facts from "the totality of the circumstances." Id. Only when "reasonable inference-drawing degenerates into groundless speculation" will circumstantial evidence prove insufficient to support an inference of conspiracy. Id. "All admissible evidence, direct and circumstantial," must be examined "in order to determine what legitimate inferences could be drawn as to the ultimate facts in issue," and this must be done without "fragmentizing or compartmentalizing the evidence." Id. at 305. See Continental Ore Co. v. Union Carbide & Carbon Corp., 370 U.S. 690, 698-99, 82 S.Ct. 1404, 1410-11, 8 L.Ed.2d 777 (1962).
As in the prior opinion, the Court believes plaintiff has produced significant probative evidence demonstrating the presence of a factual dispute as to existence of a conspiracy with Raytheon. Although this evidence...
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