James Madison Development Corp. v. State by City of Madison Land Acquisition Bd.

• Decision Date: 06 November 1970
• Docket Number: No. 169,169
• Citation: 180 N.W.2d 597,48 Wis.2d 629
• Parties: JAMES MADISON DEVELOPMENT CORP., a Wis. corporation, Appellant, v. STATE of Wisconsin by CITY OF MADISON LAND ACQUISITION BOARD, Respondent.
• Court: Wisconsin Supreme Court

Page 597

180 N.W.2d 597

48 Wis.2d 629

JAMES MADISON DEVELOPMENT CORP., a Wis. corporation, Appellant, v. STATE of Wisconsin by CITY OF MADISON LAND ACQUISITION BOARD, Respondent.

No. 169.

Supreme Court of Wisconsin.

Nov. 6, 1970.

This appeal involves the amount of damages awarded in a condemnation action. From 1959--1968 respondent planned an expressway roughly parallel to University avenue in Madison (the current Campus Drive), for which purpose many properties were to be condemned, including the property at 2570 University avenue, the property here involved.

In February, 1965, the James Madison Corporation, predecessor to the appellant, James Madison Development Corporation, purchased this property on a land contract for $225,000. The land contract provided for a down payment of $500, the balance, at six percent interest per annum, to be paid in monthly installments of not less than $1,625. As of the date of this purchase, the respondent had made no attempt to acquire this property for the highway project.

At the time of the purchase, the building was already leased to the University of Wisconsin for $2,500 per month. After being notified of respondent's intention to acquire the property, the University vacated the premises on February 1, 1968, and the building remained empty from then on and after the taking by respondent on June 5, 1968. During this five-month period appellant's fire insurance policy was canceled and some vandalism occurred. The landcontract payments continued.

Appellant then attempted to find another tenant and approached the Wisconsin Alumni Research Foundation (WARF). WARF wrote appellant on April 24, 1968, stating they were interested in leasing the premises:

'If a suitable lease term (3--5 years) could be arranged, we would be interested in the lease terms that we discussed.

'The rent figure of $2900 per month is satisfactory excluding property taxes and insurance. Interior maintenance and utilities would be handled by the leasee (sic).

'If a lease is possible, details would be worked out. * * *'

On June 5, 1968, the date of taking, respondent made its jurisdictional offer of $200,000. Appellant refused it and on October 2, 1968, gave notice of appeal of damages to circuit court. Trial was had to a jury on July 30--31, 1969, which resulted in a verdict of $220,900. The trial court approved the verdict and entered judgment in the amount of.$22,407.96, including interest and costs, $200,000 having previously been paid into court. Appeal is taken from this judgment.

Aubrey R. Fowler, Madison, for appellant.

Edwin C. Conrad, City Atty., Robert T. Semrad, Principal Asst. City Atty., Madison, for respondent.

WILKIE, Justice.

The primary issue presented on this appeal is whether there is any credible evidence to sustain the jury's verdict. There is. The test for our review in a condemnation award case of this sort has been well settled in Weeden v. Beloit: ¹

'In reviewing a jury verdict this court need only consider that evidence which supports the verdict. It is also clearly a rule of this court that a verdict should not be disturbed 'if there is any credible evidence which under any reasonable view fairly admits of an inference that supports the jury's finding.' This approach is especially applicable when, as in the instant case, the trial court approved of the verdict. That this approach is equally applicable in condemnation cases is evident from the following statement made by this court in affirming a jury verdict on a condemnation award:

"We must be mindful that the court below passed upon the matter under circumstances more favorable for arriving at a just result than are afforded here. To disturb the result would require overriding the conclusion of the jury, reinforced by that of the trial judge.'

'The instant case also presented the jury and the trial court with considerable conflicting expert testimony. It was the duty of the trier of the fact to determine the credibility of the witnesses and resolve the conflicting testimony. This rule is equally applicable in condemnation cases.' ²

As in Weeden the jury here heard conflicting expert testimony as to the value of the land in question and the proper methods and factors to be used and considered in arriving at the value. The jury's verdict was approved by the trial court and was 'well within the range of values placed in evidence.' ³

Appellant presented three expert witnesses whose appraisals indicated values of $227,500 (in 1965), $275,000 and $260,000. Appellant also presented testimony of an official of a lending institution who allowed the previous owner of the property to mortgage the property at $135,000 in 1965, on the strength of the appraisal and the land contract, under its policy of allowing a maximum loan of 60 percent of value. Testimony of the former owner and of a major stockholder of appellant-corporation was presented as to the circumstances surrounding the 1965 land contract.

The only witness for respondent was Donald Evans, an appraiser. Evans testified that in his opinion the property had a fair market value of $200,000 as of June 5, 1968.

Although appellant raises no issue as to the competency of respondent's witness, appellant seeks to destroy his opinion evidence as a matter of law for two reasons:

1. The law gives great weight to recent sales of the same property as compared to mere opinion. ⁴ The 1965 land contract price was $225,000, $25,000 higher than Evans' 1968 appraisal value of $200,000. Appellant argues that this 1965 price, when coupled with testimony of increasing property values in the area, renders Evans' opinion of little value, since his conclusion that the 1965 land contract price was inflated was based upon incorrect assumptions about the nature and effect of that contract.

2. Evans' 1968 appraisal itself was entitled to little weight since Evans 'ignored' various factors necessary to an accurate appraisal and applied incorrect methods.

The 1965 land contract.

Evans' appraisal indicated a value on the property of $200,000. He testified at length that using the cost-less-depreciation approach, a value of $198,000 was indicated, whereas the capitalization-of-income method reflected a value of only $191,500. Considering the market value of the property along with the other two approaches, his opinion was that the value of the property was greater than the value indicated by either of these...