James Taylor, Appellant v. Nicholas Longworth and Thomas Carneal, Appellees

• Decision Date: 01 January 1840
• Citation: 10 L.Ed. 405,14 Pet. 172,39 U.S. 172
• Parties: JAMES TAYLOR, APPELLANT, v. NICHOLAS LONGWORTH AND THOMAS D. CARNEAL, APPELLEES
• Court: U.S. Supreme Court

39 U.S. 172

14 Pet. 172

10 L.Ed. 405

JAMES TAYLOR, APPELLANT, v. NICHOLAS LONGWORTH AND THOMAS D. CARNEAL, APPELLEES.

January Term, 1840

ON appeal from the Circuit Court of the United States for the District of Ohio.

The appellee, Nicholas Longworth, brought a suit, by a bill in the Circuit Court of Ohio, for a specific performance of a contract made with James Taylor, for the sale, by Taylor to him, of a lot of ground in the city of Cincinnati. Afterwards, Thomas D. Carneal was made a party to the proceedings. The Circuit Court made a decree in favour of the complainants; and the defendant, James Taylor, prosecuted this appeal.

The facts of the case are stated fully in the opinion of the Court. It was submitted to the Court on orinted arguments, by Mr. Storer and Mr. Fox, for the appellant; and by Mr. Chase, for the appellees.

Mr. Justice STORY delivered the opinion of the Court.

This is an appeal from a decree of the Circuit Court of Ohio, in a suit in equity, brought by Longworth, the appellee, against Taylor, the appellant, for a specific performance of a contract for the purchase of land.

The facts, so far as they are important, to be considered upon the present appeal, are as follow: On the 5th of April, 1814, by a sealed contract between the parties, Longworth purchased of Taylor part of a lot in Cincinnati, No. 81, for the price of one hundred and twenty-five dollars per foot in front, whatever measurement it should hold out, one-third payable on signing the contract, one-third in six months, and the remaining third in twelve months. A deed of general warranty was to be given by Taylor, in the course of three months; and a mortgage was to be given on the premises by Longworth, to secure the remaining payments. On the same day, by a written endorsement on the contract, Taylor acknowledged the receipt of the sum of two thousand four hundred and fifty-eight dollars and thirty-three cents, 'supposed to be about the first payment.' The whole purchase money upon the admeasurement of the lot, amounted to seven thousand four hundred and six dollars and twenty-five cents. No deed was executed by Taylor according to the contract, or at any time subsequent: but Longworth was put in immediate possession of the lot. When the second instalment of the purchase money became due, it was not paid; but by an arrangement between the parties, it was postponed upon Longworth's agreeing to pay the same interest annually thereon, as was received for dividends upon stock in the Miami bank, which was nine or ten per cent. This interest was accordingly paid up to near the close of the year 1819; and in the intermediate time Longworth caused four houses to be built, for stores, on the lot, at the cost of about four thousand four hundred and sixty-four dollars. In the year 1819, or the beginning of 1820, Longworth was informed that one Chambers and his wife had a claim on the lot, which was deemed valid by the counsel employed to investigate it; and that a suit would be commenced on it. A suit was accordingly commenced in equity, against Taylor, Longworth, and others, in November, 1823, which was not determined until after 1829. In September, 1822, no interest on the purchase money having been paid by Longworth after 1819, Taylor commenced an action of ejectment against Longworth, for the lot; and recovered possession thereof in August, 1824.

In June, 1825, the present bill in equity was brought by Longworth for a specific performance of the original contract for the purchase of the lot. In the progress of the cause, several supplementary and amended bills were filed; and after the answers were put in, and the evidence taken, the cause came on to be heard; and the Court being of opinion that one Carneal, a citizen of Ohio, who was assignee of one Canby, a subpurchaser of a part of the lot from Longworth, ought to be made a party to the suit, the cause was directed to stand over: and he was accordingly made a party plaintiff, and came in and submitted to such decree as might be made by the Court on the case, as it then stood between the original parties. The cause was afterwards fully argued, and a decree for a specific performance was pronounced; from which the present appeal has been taken.

Some question has been suggested in respect to the propriety of making Carneal a party at so late a stage of the cause; and of the right of Taylor, in virtue thereof, to insist by way of plea upon his exemption from being sued, except in the District of Kentucky, where he resided. But we do not think that there is any valid objection to the proceedings on this account. By his general appearance to the suit in the prior proceedings, Taylor necessarily waived any objection to the suit founded on his residence in another district; and he became, like every other party properly before a Court of Equity, subject to all the orders of the Court. Whether Carneal, as a sub-purchaser, was an indispensable party under all the circumstances of the case, may admit of doubt; but, as his being made a party in no respect changed the actual posture of the case as to the other parties, he merely submitting to be bound by the proceedings, we see no objection to his joinder in that stage of the cause, which in any degree touches either the propriety or the validity of the decree.

The only substantial question in the cause is, whether, under all the circumstances, the plaintiff, Longworth, is entitled to a specific performance of the contract for the purchase: and upon the fullest consideration we are of opinion that he is, and that the decree is therefore right. We shall now proceed to state, in a brief manner, the grounds upon which we hold this opinion.

In the first place, there is no doubt that time may be of the essence of a contract for the sale of property. It may be made so by the express stipulations of the parties, or it may arise by implication from the very nature of the property, or the avowed objects of the seller or the purchaser. And even when time is not thus either expressly or impliedly of the...