James v. American Intern. Recovery, Inc.

• Decision Date: 03 June 1992
• Docket Number: No. 1:89-CV-321-RHH.,1:89-CV-321-RHH.
• Citation: 799 F. Supp. 1156
• Parties: Colzie D. JAMES, Plaintiff, v. AMERICAN INTERNATIONAL RECOVERY, INC., Defendant.
• Court: U.S. District Court — Northern District of Georgia

799 F. Supp. 1156

Colzie D. JAMES, Plaintiff, v. AMERICAN INTERNATIONAL RECOVERY, INC., Defendant.

No. 1:89-CV-321-RHH.

United States District Court, N.D. Georgia, Atlanta Division.

June 3, 1992.

COPYRIGHT MATERIAL OMITTED

Steven Keith Leibel, Atlanta, Ga., for plaintiff.

Robert Victor Schnitz, Fisher & Phillips, William Emery Gray, II, Dennis, Corry Porter & Thornton, Atlanta, Ga., P. Kevin Connelly, Connelly Sheehan & Moran, Chicago, Ill., for defendant.

ORDER

ROBERT H. HALL, District Judge.

This is a civil rights case brought pursuant to Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e et seq., and 42 U.S.C. § 1981. The case is currently before the court on: (1) Plaintiff's Motion to Set Aside Magistrate's Report and Recommendation 82-2; (2) Plaintiff's Motion for Leave to Alert Court to Recent Development Concerning the Retroactivity of the Civil Rights Act of 1991 93-1; (3) Defendant's Motion to Alert Court to Recent Developments Concerning Non-retroactivity of the Civil Rights Act of 1991 98-1; and (4) Plaintiff's Motion to Alter or Amend Judgment and Order filed December 3, 1991 86-1.

The court: (1) DENIES as moot Plaintiff's Motion to Set Aside Magistrate's Report and Recommendation 82-1; (2) GRANTS Plaintiff's Motion for Leave to Alert Court to Recent Development Concerning the Retroactivity of the Civil Rights Act of 1991 93-1; (3) GRANTS Defendant's Motion to Alert Court to Recent Developments Concerning Non-retroactivity of the Civil Rights Act of 1991 98-1; and (4) DENIES Plaintiff's Motion to Alter or Amend Judgment and Order filed December 3, 1991 86-1.

BACKGROUND

Plaintiff Colzie D. James was employed by Defendant American International Recovery, Inc. from approximately May, 1984 until her discharge on April 19, 1988. On February 15, 1989, Plaintiff commenced the instant lawsuit, alleging in her Complaint that Defendant discriminated against her on the basis of sex and race by harassing her on the job and ultimately terminating her employment. Specifically, Plaintiff in her Complaint alleged Defendant's discrimination in violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, as amended, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e, et seq. ("Title VII") and 42 U.S.C. § 1981.

Thereafter, this case was referred to a Magistrate Judge sitting as a Special Master pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f)(5), Rule 53 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, and Rule 920-2, Internal Operating Procedures of this court. See Parker v. Dole, 668 F.Supp. 1563 (N.D.Ga.1987) (Hall, J.) (holding that the referral of discrimination cases to Magistrate Judges is permissible and is in keeping with the purposes of Title VII).

On June 17, 1989, the United States Supreme Court issued its decision in Patterson v. McLean Credit Union, 491 U.S. 164, 109 S.Ct. 2363, 105 L.Ed.2d 132 (1989), which decision limited the scope of 42 U.S.C. § 1981. See discussion, infra p. 1161. Pursuant to Patterson, the Magistrate Judge in the instant case dismissed Plaintiff's § 1981 claim. Because the dismissal of Plaintiff's § 1981 claim left Plaintiff with only a Title VII claim, the Magistrate Judge also struck Plaintiff's demand for jury trial. This case was tried before the Magistrate Judge on April 2-4, 1991. On November 1, 1991, the Magistrate Judge issued his Report and Recommendation recommending that Plaintiff's Title VII claim be dismissed as unsupported by the evidence, and that judgment be entered in Defendant's favor on all of Plaintiff's claims.

On November 20, 1991, Plaintiff filed a Motion to Set Aside Magistrate's Report and Recommendation. Plaintiff therein contended that due to the imminent passage of the Civil Rights Act of 1991,¹ the Magistrate Judge's dismissal of Plaintiff's § 1981 claim, as well as his denial of her demand for jury trial of the matter, were in error. Thus, contended Plaintiff, this court should set aside and disregard the Magistrate's Report and Recommendation, reinstate Plaintiff's § 1981 claim, and allow Plaintiff's demand for jury trial of the matter.

On December 3, 1991, after fully reviewing the Magistrate Judge's Report and Recommendation, as well as Plaintiff's Motion to Set Aside, this court adopted the Magistrate Judge's Report and Recommendation, dismissed Plaintiff's Complaint, and entered judgment in Defendant's favor with regard to all of Plaintiff's claims. With regard to Plaintiff's contention that the dismissal of her § 1981 claim and the denial of her demand for jury trial were in error due to the passage of the Civil Rights Act of 1991, this court specifically held: "The Civil Rights Act of 1991 was signed by the President and became effective on November 21, 1991. It does not apply to cases arising before the effective date of the Act." Order dated Dec. 3, 1991.

Presently, Plaintiff has filed, in addition to her Motion to Set Aside Magistrate's Report and Recommendation 82-1, which this court failed specifically to deny, a Motion to Alter or Amend Judgment and Order filed December 3, 1991 86-1, as well as a Motion for Leave to Alert Court to Recent Development Concerning the Retroactivity of the Civil Rights Act of 1991 89-1. In addition, Defendant has filed a Motion for Leave to Alert Court to Recent Developments Concerning Non-retroactivity of the Civil Rights Act of 1991 98-1. The court will consider each Motion separately.

DISCUSSION

I. Plaintiff's Motion to Set Aside Magistrate's Report and Recommendation

Plaintiff filed this Motion subsequent to the Magistrate Judge's issuance of his Report and Recommendation in the instant case. Although this court indeed considered Plaintiff's Motion prior to the court's issuance of its December 3, 1991 Order adopting the Magistrate's Report and Recommendation, the court in that December 3, 1991 Order did not expressly state that it was denying Plaintiff's Motion to Set Aside. As a result, Plaintiff's Motion apparently was never expressly acted upon by this court, although the practical, and intended, effect of the court's December 3, 1991 Order in fact was to deny Plaintiff's Motion.

Nevertheless, for the sake of clarity, the court hereby expressly states that it DENIES as moot Plaintiff's Motion to Set Aside. That Motion, aside from having been rendered moot by this court's December 3, 1991 Order, also advances arguments virtually identical to those presently being reasserted by Plaintiff in her Motion to Alter or Amend this Court's December 3, 1991 Judgment and Order. See infra, p. 1160.

II. Plaintiffs and Defendant's Motions for Leave to Alert Court to Recent Developments

In these Motions, both Plaintiff and Defendant request leave to alert this court to recent developments with regard to the currently much debated issue of whether the Civil Rights Act of 1991 is to be applied retroactively so as to allow civil rights plaintiffs with cases currently pending before the court the additional relief provided by the Act. This indeed presents a very difficult question, and one regarding which recent court decisions evidence a marked uncertainty and disagreement. See cases cited, infra p. 1162 n. 6. Accordingly, this court welcomes the input of the parties as regards recent developments in this area, the landscape of which literally changes on a daily basis. As a result, the court as an initial matter GRANTS both Plaintiff's and Defendant's Motions to Alert Court to Recent Developments.

III. Plaintiff's Motion to Alter or Amend Judgment and Order filed December 3, 1991

Plaintiff, pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 59(e),² in this Motion requests that the court alter or amend its Judgment and Order, filed December 3, 1991, in which the court adopted the Magistrate Judge's Report and Recommendation, dismissed Plaintiff's Complaint, and entered judgment in Defendant's favor on all of Plaintiff's claims. In this Motion, Plaintiff in essence reasserts the arguments previously submitted in support of her Motion to Set Aside Magistrate's Report and Recommendation, which has been denied by this court. See supra, p. 1160. Specifically, Plaintiff bases her Motion upon her argument that the Civil Rights Act of 1991 should be retroactively applied to her case, so as to allow reinstatement of her previously dismissed § 1981 claim, as well as the allowance of her demand for jury trial of this matter. Thus, Plaintiff requests that this court alter or amend its December 3, 1991 Judgment and Order by rejecting the Magistrate's Report and Recommendation, reinstating Plaintiff's § 1981 claim, and reinstating and granting Plaintiff's demand for jury trial of the instant matter.

In considering Plaintiff's Motion, the central issue before the court is whether certain provisions of the Civil Rights Act of 1991 ("1991 Act"),³ enacted on November 21, 1991, are to be applied retroactively⁴ to cases pending before the court at the time of the statute's enactment.

A. The 1991 Civil Rights Act

The 1991 Act states that among its purposes are "to amend the Civil Rights Act of 1964 to strengthen and improve Federal civil rights laws, to provide for damages in cases of intentional employment discrimination, and to clarify provisions regarding disparate impact actions...." Pub.L. No. 102-166, 105 Stat. 1071 (1991), "Synopsis." Moreover, § 3 of the Act provides:

SEC. 3. PURPOSES

The purposes of this Act are—

(1) to provide appropriate remedies for intentional discrimination and unlawful harassment in the workplace;

(2) to codify the concepts of "business necessity" and "job related" enunciated by the Supreme Court in Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424 91 S.Ct. 849, 28 L.Ed.2d 158 (1971), and in other Supreme Court decisions prior to Wards Cove Packing Co. v. Atonio, 490 U.S. 642 109 S.Ct. 2115, 104 L.Ed.2d 733 (1989);

(3) to confirm statutory authority and provide statutory guidelines for the adjudication of disparate impact suits under title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 (42 U.S.C. 2000e et seq.); and

(4) to respond to recent decisions of the

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