James v. Bd. of Educ. of Chi.

• Decision Date: 06 February 2015
• Docket Number: No. 1–14–1481.,1–14–1481.
• Citation: 27 N.E.3d 201
• Parties: Ron JAMES, Petitioner, v. The BOARD OF EDUCATION OF the CITY OF CHICAGO, David Vitale, President of the Board, Barbara Byrd–Bennett, Chief Executive Officer of the Board, Jesse Ruiz, Henry Bienen, Mahilia Hines, Penny Pritzker, Rod Sierra, and Andrea Zopp, as Members of the Board, Anne Weiland, Hearing Officer, and the Illinois State Board of Education, Respondents.
• Court: United States Appellate Court of Illinois

27 N.E.3d 201

Ron JAMES, Petitioner

v.The BOARD OF EDUCATION OF the CITY OF CHICAGO, David Vitale, President of the Board, Barbara Byrd–Bennett, Chief Executive Officer of the Board, Jesse Ruiz, Henry Bienen, Mahilia Hines, Penny Pritzker, Rod Sierra, and Andrea Zopp, as Members of the Board, Anne Weiland, Hearing Officer, and the Illinois State Board of Education, Respondents.

No. 1–14–1481.

Appellate Court of Illinois, First District, Sixth Division.

Feb. 6, 2015.

Kurtis Hale, Poltrock & Poltrock, Chicago, for petitioner.

James L. Bebley, General Counsel, and Lee Ann Lowder, Chicago Board of Education Law Department, Chicago, for respondents.

OPINION

Presiding Justice HOFFMAN delivered the judgment of the court, with opinion.

¶ 1 The petitioner, Ron James, appeals from a final administrative decision of the Chicago Board of Education (the Board) which resulted in the termination of his employment as a tenured teacher at the Hyde Park Career Academy High School. For the reasons that follow, we confirm the decision of the Board.

¶ 2 On January 10, 2013, the petitioner pretended to throw a stapler at a disruptive student. The stapler detached from its cover, flew across the classroom, and struck another student's head, requiring minor medical attention. As a result of the incident, the Board filed dismissal charges against the petitioner, alleging that he violated several terms of his employment, including refraining from negligent and incompetent conduct and avoiding physical contact with students.

¶ 3 On November 5, 2013, an administrative hearing before the Illinois State Board of Education was conducted at which the petitioner testified that he had been employed as a teacher with CPS since 2005, currently teaching social studies and coaching the softball and football teams. He testified that he is a former football and baseball player himself. The petitioner had no history of any disciplinary actions against him.

¶ 4 Regarding the January 10, 2013, incident, the petitioner stated that a disruptive student entered his classroom at the end of his sixth period class. The student was using vulgar language, demanding that another student retrieve a paper from his locker. The petitioner testified that he told the disruptive student to “stop cursing in my classroom” and “to get out” of the classroom. The student refused and continued cursing at which time the petitioner stated “don't make me bust your head with this stapler.” The petitioner testified that he was “being playful” in order to get the disruptive student to behave. The petitioner then stood up and picked up the stapler which was on his desk.

¶ 5 The petitioner identified a similar stapler as the one he had on January 10, 2013. The top part had a plastic covering, and the bottom part of the stapler was metal. He testified that, when he “reached up as if” he was going to throw the stapler, “the stapler slid out of the [plastic] sleeve” and hit another student, V.H., in the back of her head. He estimated that V.H. was standing about seven to ten feet away from him at the time. The petitioner immediately went to check on V.H., but she stated that she was not hurt.

¶ 6 On cross-examination, the petitioner denied that he intended to throw the stapler at the disruptive student. He admitted that a CPS investigator observed that the stapler had traveled a “pretty far distance” and that he responded by stating that he is “a pretty strong guy. I mean, the torque that I put on there with faking like I was throwing it was enough torque that it happened this way.” He also admitted that his method, “playful or not,” is not the “appropriate method as a teacher to modify a disruptive student's behavior.”

¶ 7 D.H., one of the petitioner's students who witnessed the incident, testified that the petitioner told a disruptive student to leave his classroom, and the student did not want to leave so the petitioner tried to scare him. According to D.H., “the stapler managed to come out of his hand and get thrown but it was an accident, and he didn't mean to throw it.” D.H. was asked to demonstrate what occurred with the stapler, and the hearing officer described his demonstration for the record as follows: “D.H. has stood up, picked up the stapler in one hand, transferred it to another and raised it about shoulder height, and flicked his wrist with the stapler.” When asked how he knew that the stapler was launched “accidentally,” D.H. replied “ [b]ecause [the petitioner] wouldn't do anything like this.” D.H. described V.H. as “emotional” and “shocked” after she was hit with the stapler.

¶ 8 V.H. testified consistently with the petitioner and D.H. She stated that a disruptive student came into the petitioner's classroom, “cursing, going crazy,” and the petitioner told the student to leave. V.H. stated that the student continued cursing and refused to leave, and the petitioner responded by telling the student: “get out of my classroom before I throw this stapler at you.” According to V.H., “everybody was laughing like we thought he was just joking.” However, after that, she was struck by the stapler in the back of her head. The petitioner immediately ran over to V.H., but she pushed him away and went to the dean's office to get a late pass for her next class. While waiting in the dean's office, V.H. noticed that her head was bleeding. She proceeded to the school nurse's office and, later, her mother took her to the hospital where she was given an ointment for the wound and released. V.H. testified that she experienced blurry vision in her right eye and headaches after being hit by the stapler. She also saw her family physician for her symptoms and has been diagnosed with cluster headaches. V.H. stated that she never suffered from cluster headaches before the stapler injury.

¶ 9 The hearing officer concluded, in relevant part, that the Board had proven, by a preponderance of the evidence, the dismissal charges set forth in charges 2, 3, and 8: that the petitioner failed to act in the manner of a reasonably prudent educator in the supervision of students (charge 2); that the petitioner negligently or incompetently performed an act in connection with his duties (charge 3); and conduct unbecoming a Chicago Public School (CPS) teacher (charge 8). The hearing officer concluded that the petitioner “was negligent under the terms of 105 ILCS 5/34–85 and his conduct is deemed irremediable. No written warning is required prior to discharge under the code and the Board of Education is within its legal authority to discharge [the petitioner].” However, the hearing officer stated that the unusual facts of the case compelled her to urge the Board “to give consideration to modifying what it can legally do to a more nuanced and reasonable response.” Specifically, the hearing officer noted that the petitioner was a respected coach and teacher with six years' tenure and no disciplinary record whatsoever. She also noted that the testimony of the petitioner's students showed that he was a trusted and respected teacher, and his testimony demonstrated sincere regret for his lapse in judgment which caused harm to V.H. According to the hearing officer, the “actual harm was purely accidental,” and she recommended “[s]ome discipline, short of discharge, at the Board's discretion.”

¶ 10 On April 23, 2014, the Board issued resolution no. 14–0423–RS3 in which it accepted in part and rejected in part the hearing officer's findings and conclusions and rejected her recommendation for disciplinary action short of discharge. Contrary to the hearing officer's conclusion, the Board determined that it had also proven, by a preponderance of the evidence, the allegations in charge 1, that the petitioner failed to perform his duties. The Board accepted the hearing officer's findings as to charges 2, 3, and 8, but disagreed with her finding that the actual harm caused to V.H. was “purely accidental,” noting that this finding was inconsistent with her finding that the petitioner was negligent. The Board determined that the harm caused by the petitioner's conduct was reasonably foreseeable and supported the negligence finding.

¶ 11 The Board then concluded that negligent conduct that harms a student constitutes grounds for discharge without the opportunity for remediation under section 34–85 of the School Code (Code) (105 ILCS 5/34–85 (West 2012) ). The Board also found that conduct that in any way causes psychological or physical harm or injury to a student also does not require a written warning under the Code. Therefore, the Board concluded that no written warning was required before discharge and, under the circumstances, dismissed the petitioner from his employment with CPS. The petitioner thereafter filed for review of the Board's decision pursuant to Illinois Supreme Court Rule 335 (eff. Feb. 1, 1994).

¶ 12 This court's review of the Board's decision is governed by the Administrative Review Law (735 ILCS 5/3–101 et seq. (West 2012)). See 105 ILCS 5/34–85 (West 2012). The standard of review to be applied to the agency's decision turns on whether the issue presented is a question of fact, a question of law, or a mixed question of law and fact. Board of Education of City of Chicago v. Illinois Education Labor Relations Board, 2014 IL App (1st) 130285, ¶ 19, 383 Ill.Dec. 481, 14 N.E.3d 1092, appeal allowed, (Ill. Nov. 26, 2014). We review an agency's conclusion on a question of law de novo. Id.; City of Belvidere v. Illinois State Labor Relations Board, 181 Ill.2d 191, 205, 229 Ill.Dec. 522, 692 N.E.2d 295 (1998). A decision involving a question of fact is afforded deference and will not be reversed unless it is against the manifest weight of the evidence. Id. “An administrative agency's factual determinations are contrary to the manifest weight of evidence where the opposite conclusion is clearly evident.” City of Belvidere, 181 Ill.2d at 205, 229 Ill.Dec. 522, 692 N.E.2d 295 (1998). Finally, a mixed question of law and fact...