James v. Boston Elevated Ry. Co.
| Decision Date | 26 February 1909 |
| Citation | 201 Mass. 263,87 N.E. 474 |
| Parties | JAMES v. BOSTON ELEVATED RY. CO. |
| Court | United States State Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts Supreme Court |
Coakley Coakley & Sherman, for plaintiff.
Hugh D McLellan, for defendant.
The plaintiff was injured while riding as a passenger in one of the defendant's electric cars which left the track for some unknown cause. In her suit to recover damages for the injury the declaration contained three counts, the first of which was treated at the trial and described in the bill of exceptions as alleging negligence on the part of the persons operating the car. The second alleged negligence in suffering the car to be in an improper and unsafe condition, and the third alleged negligence as to the condition of the track and the roadbed. On inspection of the first count we are of opinion that it is broad enough to include any kind of negligence, on the part of the defendant or its servants, which caused the accident.
At the trial the plaintiff relied largely upon the fact that the car went off the track near the end of a bridge, and turned around, so as to stand almost at right angles to the track as evidence of negligence under the doctrine of 'res ipsa loquitur.' At the close of the evidence the defendant's counsel requested an instruction to the jury, as to each count of the declaration, that the plaintiff was not entitled to recover under that particular count. These requests were refused, and the case was submitted to the jury generally, and they returned a general verdict for the plaintiff. It is impossible to tell on which count the verdict was found, or whether the finding was for the plaintiff on each count. There was evidence to warrant a verdict for the plaintiff on the first count; for the mere fact that the car left the track in the manner described was enough to justify a finding of negligence of some kind for which the defendant was responsible. It is a question of more difficulty whether there was any evidence to warrant a finding that the accident was caused by the improper condition of the track, as distinguished from other causes. There was some testimony of an irregularity in the track at a joint, between two rails, and that the car left the track at that point; but there was absolutely no evidence of any defect or want of repair in the car itself. Considering the case in reference to the second count alone, it is plain that there was no evidence that would warrant the jury in finding proof of the facts alleged. If there are different kinds of negligence that might cause an accident, the fact that the accident happens from some unknown cause is not enough to show that it happened from some particular cause, alleged in a particular count of the declaration. This was expressly decided in Minihan v. Boston Elev. Ry., 197 Mass. 367, 83 N.E. 871, and it follows from the general principles on which the doctrine of 'res ipsa loquitur' is founded. Pinney v. Hall, 156 Mass. 225, 30 N.E. 1016; Thomas v. Boston Elev. Ry. Co., 193 Mass. 438, 79 N.E. 749; Curtin v. Boston Elev. Ry. Co., 194 Mass....
To continue reading
Request your trial