As stated above, in Ground 1 of his petition Petitioner asserts the trial court erred in denying Petitioner's motion for judgment of acquittal at the close of all evidence, as the State's evidence was insufficient to prove that Petitioner committed the crime of burglary in the first degree. (§2254 Petition, PP. 6-11). Petitioner raised this claim on direct appeal of his convictions, and the Missouri Court of Appeals denied the claim as follows:
In his sole point, Defendant1 contends the trial court erred in overruling his motions for judgment of acquittal for burglary in the first degree. Defendant argues the evidence was insufficient to establish that Defendant knowingly entered the building unlawfully. We disagree.
Appellate review of the trial court's denial of a defendant's motion for judgment of acquittal at the close of all evidence is limited to determination of whether there is sufficient evidence from which reasonable juror[s] might have found defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. State v. Brooks, 158 S.W.3d 841, 847(Mo. App. E.D. 2005). On review, we accept as true all of the evidence favorable to the State, including all favorable inferences drawn from the evidence and disregard all evidence and inferences to the contrary. Id. When reviewing for sufficiency of the evidence, circumstantial evidence is afforded the same weight as direct evidence.
Id.
Section 569.160 provides, in pertinent part:
[a] person commits the crime of burglary in the first degree if he knowingly enters unlawfully or knowingly remains unlawfully in a building or inhabitable structure for the purpose of committing a crime therein, and when in effecting entry or while in the building or inhabitable structure or in immediate flight therefrom, he or another participant in the crime:
(1) Is armed with explosives or a deadly weapon or;
(2) Causes or threatens immediate physical injury to any person who is not a participant in the crime; or
(3) There is present in the structure another person who is not a participant in the crime.
The verdict director for the burglary count in this case required the jury to find, beyond a reasonable doubt, that Defendant "knowingly entered unlawfully in an inhabitable structure located at 5076 Page Blvd and possessed by Monte Connelly." The terms "enter unlawfully" and "remain unlawfully" are defined in Section 569.010(8), which provides that "a person 'enters unlawfully or remains unlawfully' in or upon premises when he is not licensed or privileged to do so." State v. Thomas, 70 S.W.3d 496, 508 (Mo. App. E.D. 2002).
Here, the jury could reasonably infer from the evidence presented at trial that Defendant knowingly unlawfully entered the building and Connelly and Jordan's room. Defendant did not live at that address. The door to the main entrance of the building was knocked off its hinges. Defendant heard a "boom" as the door was kicked in immediately prior to Defendant and Lee James entering the building. There was no evidence that Defendant had been invited onto the premises or Connelly's or Jordan's room. This evidence is sufficient to support a finding that Defendant entered unlawfully.
Defendant contends there was no evidence regarding whether Defendant's entry into the building was made by force or by permission of another occupant of the boarding house. Here, the evidence that the door had been kicked allowed for the reasonable inference that Defendant did not have permission to enter the building, but entered unlawfully.
Defendant further argues there was no evidence that Defendant broke the door in and thus, there was insufficient evidence to show that he entered unlawfully. Defendant maintains the circumstantial evidence showed Lee James was the one who would have sought entry into the building by using force to get into the building, andDefendant was merely an accomplice. However, there is no requirement that a person must break down a door to gain unlawful entry, only that he is not licensed or privileged to enter the inhabitable structure. It does not matter whether Lee James kicked in the door or whether Defendant kicked in the door. The fact that Defendant entered into the building after the door was kicked in showed he did so without license or privilege and thus, entered unlawfully.
Finally, Defendant asserts the State failed to prove he entered the building unlawfully because the building was a boarding house and there was no proof that Defendant needed a special license or privilege to be in the common areas of the building, such as the stairwell or the hallway, where there was no evidence that a key was required to gain entry, or that any license Defendant would have had to be in the common areas of the building had been revoked. Defendant points to the evidence that both Connelly and Jordan testified they saw Defendant and Lee James in the hallway of the building before he shot them. However, even though the building was a boarding house, there was no evidence that the hallway and stairwell was open to the public. The fact that the front door of the building was kicked in provides a reasonable inference that there were no common areas open to the public. Defendant did not have a valid license to be in the hallway. Moreover, the evidence further showed Defendant entered Connelly's and Jordan's room without permission or license.
The evidence presented at trial was sufficient to show Defendant knowingly entered unlawfully the building and Connelly's and Jordan's room. The trial court did not err in overruling Defendant's motion for judgment of acquittal. Defendant's point is denied.
(Resp. Exh. E, PP. 3-6 (footnotes omitted)).
With respect to federal court review of state court conclusions, 28 U.S.C. § 2254 states in pertinent part as follows:
(d) An application for a writ of habeas corpus on behalf of a person in custody pursuant to the judgment of a State court shall not be granted with respect to any claim that was adjudicated on the merits in State court proceedings unless the adjudication of the claim -
(1) resulted in a decision that was contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court of the United States; or
(2) resulted in a decision that was based on an unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented in the State court proceeding.
28 U.S.C. § 2254(d).
The Supreme Court has held that in reviewing whether the evidence presented in state court was sufficient to support a criminal conviction, "the relevant question is whether, after viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution, any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt." Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 318-19, 99 S.Ct. 2781, 2788-89, 61 L.Ed.2d 560 (1979) (emphasis in original) (citation omitted). Here, there was evidence of damage to the door at the bottom of the stairwell in the boarding house, and testimony from one of the victims regarding hearing a door being kicked in immediately prior to Petitioner's appearance. (Resp. Exh. A, PP. 236, 297-98). Furthermore, the evidence presented indicated that regardless of whether Petitioner himself entered the victim's unit, at the very least he reached into the room with his gun. (Id., PP. 330-31). Taken together, this evidence was sufficient to permit a reasonable jury to find that Petitioner knowingly entered the building unlawfully, and thus was sufficient to justify a verdict of guilt beyond a reasonable doubt on the burglary count. The decision of the Missouri court thus is entitled to...
