James v. City of Birmingham

• Court: U.S. District Court — Northern District of Alabama
• Writing for the Court: JOHN E. OTT
• Citation: James v. City of Birmingham, 926 F.Supp.2d 1260 (N.D. Ala. 2013)
• Decision Date: 19 February 2013
• Docket Number: Civil Action No. 2:10–cv–02082–JEO.
• Parties: Antonio JAMES, Plaintiff, v. CITY OF BIRMINGHAM, ALABAMA, et al., Defendants.

926 F.Supp.2d 1260

Antonio JAMES, Plaintiff,

v.CITY OF BIRMINGHAM, ALABAMA, et al., Defendants.

Civil Action No. 2:10–cv–02082–JEO.

United States District Court,

N.D. Alabama,

Southern Division.

Feb. 19, 2013.

Henry L. Penick, Penick & Associates PC, Birmingham, AL, for Plaintiff.

Rozalind Terese Simon, City of Birmingham, Jeffrey Paul Gilliam, Rozalind Terese Simon, City of Birmingham, Birmingham, AL, for Defendants.

MEMORANDUM OPINION

JOHN E. OTT, United States Chief Magistrate Judge.

This case is before the court on defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment. (Doc. 53).¹ The motion has been fully briefed and is properly under submission before the court. (Docs. 54, 57 & 58). This case stems from an interaction between plaintiff and several City of Birmingham police officers that resulted in plaintiff being hit with a Taser and arrested for drinking in public. After the dismissal of two defendants and Count I (the excessive force claim),² the following claims remain: false imprisonment brought pursuant to § 1983 (Count II); malicious prosecution brought pursuant to § 1983 (Count III); negligence in hiring, training, supervision, and retention brought pursuant to § 1983 (Count IV); state law claim for assault and battery (Count V); state law claim for false arrest (Count VI); and state law claim for malicious prosecution (Count VII). (Doc. 1). Defendants contend that they are entitled to judgment as a matter of law on all remaining claims. (Doc. 1 at 1–2, 5). For the reasons set forth below, the motion is due to be granted in part and denied in part.

FACTUAL BACKGROUND AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY³

Around 6:30 p.m. on July 28, 2008, plaintiff, Antonio James, left his job and went to a friend's house in Birmingham, Alabama. (Doc. 56 at ¶¶ 3–4). James's friend left the house shortly after James arrived, and, at approximately 7:30 p.m., James answered a knock at the front door. Upon opening the door, he saw a male police officer for the city of Birmingham, Jacorey Foster, standing on the front porch. ( Id. at ¶ 5). Unbeknownst to James, the police had received a tip that “a possible felony suspect was located at the residence.” (Doc. 54–1 at 1).

James testified that he was holding a beer as he opened the door but that he “had not drunk from it,” and he did not drink alcohol at any time while the police were on the porch. (Doc. 56 at ¶¶ 5, 11). James testified that he remained in the doorway of the residence at all times and at no time stepped onto the front porch. ( Id. at ¶ 12). The officer instructed James to get down. ( Id.) James asked if he could help the officer or if the officer had a search warrant or if he was chasing someone, but again the officer ordered him to get down.⁴ ( Id.) At that time, James noticed a female officer, Katrina Looney, approach and stand next to Foster, and Foster instructed Looney to “hit him.” ( Id. at ¶ 6). James responded, “what do you mean, hit me?” ( Id.) Looney then fired the taser two times, hitting James in the right hand and stomach. ( Id.) James fell and lost consciousness. ( Id. at ¶ 7). The officers then took James to Cooper Green Hospital in Birmingham, Alabama. (Doc. 54–1 at 2). Upon his release from the hospital, the officers transferred James to the Birmingham jail and charged him with drinking in public. ( Id.) James testified that he was not told that he was charged with drinking in public until he was released on bond on July 29, 2008. ( Id. at ¶ 10).

While Officer Looney testified that James made statements such as: “I have been drinking all day, since 10:00 this morning, and y'all messed up my high;” “Regular beer doesn't do anything for me, I drink 211's and I've had over a case today;” and “I was drunk when y'all tased me.” (Doc. 54–1 at 2). James testified that he did not make any of those statements. (Doc. 56 at ¶¶ 13–15). On January 26, 2010, when James appeared in court for the drinking in public charge, the case was dismissed. ( Id. at ¶ 24; see also Doc. 1 at ¶ 28).

James filed his complaint against three police officers (Katrina Looney, Eric Turner, and Christopher Robinette),⁵ A.C. Roper (chief of police of the City of Birmingham), and the City of Birmingham on July 29, 2010, pursuant to 42 U.S.C. §§ 1983 and 1988, the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution, and state law claims for assaultand battery, false arrest, and malicious prosecution. (Doc. 1 at ¶ 2). The court previously dismissed plaintiff's § 1983 claim of excessive force as barred by the two-year statute of limitations. (Doc. 49 at 8). The court later dismissed defendants Christopher Robinette and Eric Turner because those officers were not present during the incident. (Doc. 55). The following claims remain pending before the court: (1) false imprisonment against Looney pursuant to § 1983; (2) malicious prosecution against Looney and the City of Birmingham pursuant to § 1983; (3) negligence in hiring, training, supervision, and retention against Roper and the City of Birmingham pursuant to § 1983; (4) a state law claim for assault and battery against Looney; (5) a state law claim for false arrest against Looney; and (6) a state law claim for malicious prosecution against Looney and the City of Birmingham. (Doc. 1 at 4–9).

SUMMARY JUDGMENT STANDARD OF REVIEW

“Summary judgment is appropriate ‘if the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show there is no genuine [dispute] as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.’ ” Greenberg v. BellSouth Telecomm., Inc., 498 F.3d 1258, 1263 (11th Cir.2007) (per curiam) (citation to former rule omitted); Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(a) (“The court shall grant summary judgment if the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.”). ⁶ The party moving for summary judgment “always bears the initial responsibility of informing the district court of the basis for its motion, and identifying those portions of the [record, including pleadings, discovery materials and affidavits], which it believes demonstrate the absence of a genuine issue [-now dispute-] of material fact.” Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323, 106 S.Ct. 2548, 91 L.Ed.2d 265 (1986). The movant may meet this burden by presenting evidence indicating there is no dispute of material fact or by showing that the nonmoving party has failed to present evidence in support of some element of its case on which it bears the ultimate burden of proof. Id. at 322–24, 106 S.Ct. 2548. “[T]he judge's function is not himself to weigh the evidence and determine the truth of the matter but to determine whether there is a genuine issue for trial.” Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 249, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986). A judge's guide is the same standard necessary to direct a verdict: “whether the evidence presents a sufficient disagreement to require submission to a jury or whether it is so one-sided that one party must prevail as a matter of law.” Allen v. Tyson Foods, Inc., 121 F.3d 642, 646 (11th Cir.1997) (quoting Anderson, 477 U.S. at 251–52, 106 S.Ct. 2505). However, the nonmoving party “must do more than simply show that there is some metaphysical doubt as to the material facts.” Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 586, 106 S.Ct. 1348, 89 L.Ed.2d 538 (1986). If the evidence is merely colorable, or is not significantly probative, summary judgment may be granted. Anderson, 477 U.S. at 249, 106 S.Ct. 2505;accord Spence v. Zimmerman, 873 F.2d 256 (11th Cir.1989). Furthermore, the court must “view the evidence presented through the prism of the substantive evidentiary burden” so there must be sufficient evidence on which the jury could reasonably find for the plaintiff. Cottle v. Storer Communication, Inc., 849 F.2d 570, 575 (11th Cir.1988) (quoting Anderson, 477 U.S. at 254, 106 S.Ct. 2505). Nevertheless, “the evidence of the nonmovant is to be believed, and all justifiable inferences are to be drawn in his favor.” Anderson, 477 U.S. at 255, 106 S.Ct. 2505. The nonmovant need not be given the benefit of every inference, but only of every reasonable inference. Brown v. Clewiston, 848 F.2d 1534, 1540 n. 12 (11th Cir.1988). “If reasonable minds could differ on the inferences arising from undisputed facts, then a court should deny summary judgment.” Allen, 121 F.3d at 646.

ANALYSIS

I. Section 1983 Claims

Plaintiff brings three claims pursuant to § 1983: (1) a false imprisonment claim against defendant Looney; (2) a malicious prosecution claim against defendants Looney and the City; and (3) a “negligence in hiring, training, supervision and retention” claim against defendants Roper and the City. (Doc. 1 at 4–7).⁷ The court will first address plaintiff's claims against the City before addressing those claims against Roper and finally the claims against Looney.

A. The City of Birmingham

Plaintiff's Complaint raises two § 1983 claims against the City—a claim for malicious prosecution and a claim for negligence in hiring, training, supervision, and retention. As a preliminary matter, plaintiff failed to respond to defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment as to the claims against the City. (Doc. 57). By not responding, plaintiff abandoned his § 1983 claims against the City. Davis v. Coca–Cola Bottling Co. Consol., 516 F.3d 955, 971 n. 36 (11th Cir.2008) (“[Plaintiff] did not defend the claim on summary judgment; he thus abandoned it.”); Road Sprinkler Fitters Local Union No. 669 v. Indep. Sprinkler Corp., 10 F.3d 1563, 1568 (11th Cir.1994) (holding that claims not addressed in response to motion for summary judgment are deemed abandoned).

However, even assuming plaintiff had not abandoned his claims against the City, the City would still be entitled to summary judgment as to the § 1983 claims. It is well settled that a municipality cannot be...