James v. Colvin
| Decision Date | 11 March 2016 |
| Docket Number | Civil Action No. 14-cv-03045-NYW |
| Parties | BEATRICE GAIL JAMES, Plaintiff, v. CAROLYN W. COLVIN, Commissioner of Social Security, Defendant. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — District of Colorado |
This action comes before the court pursuant to Title II of the Social Security Act ("Act"), 42 U.S.C. §§ 401-33 for review of the Commissioner of Social Security's final decision denying Plaintiff Beatrice Gail James' application for Disability Insurance Benefits ("DIB"). Pursuant to the Order of Reference dated July 9, 2015, this civil action was referred to the Magistrate Judge "for all purposes" pursuant to the Pilot Program to Implement the Direct Assignment of Civil Cases to Full Time Magistrate Judges and Title 28 U.S.C. § 636(c). See [#19]. The court has carefully considered the Complaint [#1, filed Nov. 11, 2014], Defendant's Answer [#9, filed Mar. 13, 2015], Plaintiff's Opening Brief [#13, filed Apr. 22, 2015], Defendant's Response Brief [#14, filed May 20, 2015], Plaintiff's Reply Brief [#15, filed June 9, 2015], the entire case file, the administrative record, and applicable case law. For the following reasons, I AFFIRM the Commissioner's final decision.
Plaintiff filed an application for DIB under Title II of the Act on March 29, 2012. [#10-5 at 89].1 At the time of the application, Ms. James was 56 years old, with a high school education. [#10-6 at 101, 106]. As the basis for her disability claim, she states that her ability to work is limited by bulging discs in her neck and back, chronic pain, and asthma. [#10-6 at 105]. Ms. James states in her application that her disability began in 2005, at which time she quit her job and began helping with her husband's business. [#10-6 at 90]. She eventually stopped working altogether because they lost their business and she can no longer work at any other type of job, especially physical jobs. [#10-6 at 101, 105].
After denial of Ms. James' application, a hearing was held before an Administrative Law Judge ("ALJ") on May 13, 2013. [#10-2 at 20]. The ALJ issued a hearing decision on June 7, 2013, which denied the application for disability benefits at step two of the five-step sequence for determining disability. See Wall v. Astrue, 561 F.3d 1048, 1052 (10th Cir. 2009) (summarizing steps).
First, the ALJ determined that Ms. James last met insured status requirements of the Social Security Act on December 31, 2010 ("the date last insured"). [#10-2 at 14]. The ALJ then determined that Ms. James did not engage in substantial gainful activity between the alleged onset date of June 15, 2009, through the date last insured of December 31, 2010 ("insured period"). [#10-2 at 14]. Next, the ALJ found that during the insured period, Ms. James hadthree medically determinable impairments: unspecified back pain, unspecified neck pain, and asthma. [#10-2 at 14]. The ALJ then determined at step two that Ms. James did not have any impairment or combination of impairments that significantly limited the ability to perform basic work-related activities for 12 consecutive months; and therefore Ms. James did not have a severe impairment or combination of impairments. [#10-2 at 14]. On this basis, the ALJ concluded that Ms. James was not under a disability, as defined in the Social Security Act, at any time during the insured period between June 15, 2009 and December 31, 2010. [#10-2 at 18].
On September 25, 2014, the Appeals Council denied Plaintiff's request for review of the ALJ's decision, thereby rendering the ALJ's decision the final decision of the Commissioner. See [#10-2 at 1]; 20 C.F.R. § 404.981; Nelson v. Sullivan, 992 F.2d 1118, 1119 (10th Cir. 1993). Plaintiff filed this action on November 11, 2014. See [#1]. The court has jurisdiction to review the final decision of the Commissioner. 42 U.S.C. § 405(g).
In reviewing the Commissioner's final decision, the court is limited to determining whether the decision adheres to applicable legal standards and is supported by substantial evidence in the record as a whole. Berna v. Chater, 101 F.3d 631, 632 (10th Cir. 1996) (citation omitted); Angel v. Barnhart, 329 F.3d 1208, 1209 (10th Cir. 2003). The court may not reverse an ALJ simply because the court may have reached a different result based on the record; the question instead is whether there is substantial evidence showing that the ALJ was justified in his decision. See Ellison v. Sullivan, 929 F.2d 534, 536 (10th Cir. 1990). "Substantial evidence is more than a mere scintilla and is such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept asadequate to support a conclusion." Flaherty v. Astrue, 515 F.3d 1067, 1070 (10th Cir. 2007) (internal citation omitted). "Evidence is not substantial if it is overwhelmed by other evidence in the record or constitutes mere conclusion." Musgrave v. Sullivan, 966 F.2d 1371, 1374 (10th Cir. 1992) (internal citation omitted). The court will not "reweigh the evidence or retry the case," but must "meticulously examine the record as a whole, including anything that may undercut or detract from the ALJ's findings in order to determine if the substantiality test has been met." Flaherty, 515 F.3d at 1070 (internal citation omitted). Nevertheless, "if the ALJ failed to apply the correct legal test, there is a ground for reversal apart from a lack of substantial evidence." Thompson v. Sullivan, 987 F.2d 1482, 1487 (10th Cir. 1993) (internal citation omitted).
An individual is eligible for DIB benefits under the Act during the period of time she is insured, has not attained retirement age, has filed an application for DIB, and is under a disability as defined in the Act. 42 U.S.C. §§ 416(i), 423(a)(1). An individual is determined to be under a disability only if her "physical or mental impairment or impairments are of such severity that [she] is not only unable to do [her] previous work but cannot, considering [her] age, education, and work experience, engage in any other kind of substantial gainful work which exists in the national economy . . . ." 42 U.S.C. §§ 423(d)(2)(A); 1382c(a)(3)(B).
In order to receive benefits, a claimant must establish her disability prior to the date the claimant last met the earnings requirements of the Social Security Act (Act), i.e., the date last insured. 42 U.S.C. §§ 401-433. See Adams v. Chater, 93 F.3d 712, 714 (10th Cir. 1996); Henrie v. United States Dep't of Health & Human Servs., 13 F.3d 359, 360 (10th Cir. 1993).
The Commissioner has developed a five-step evaluation process for determining whether a claimant is disabled under the Act. See Williams v. Bowen, 844 F.2d 748, 750-52 (10th Cir. 1988) (). "If a determination can be made at any of the steps that a claimant is or is not disabled, evaluation under a subsequent step is not necessary." Id. at 750. "Step one requires the agency to determine whether a claimant is 'presently engaged in substantial gainful activity.'" Wall, 561 F.3d at 1052 (quoting Allen v. Barnhart, 357 F.3d 1140, 1142 (10th Cir. 2004). Step two requires the agency to consider whether a claimant has "a medically severe impairment or impairments." Allen, 357 F.3d at 1142. "An impairment is severe under the applicable regulations if it significantly limits a claimant's physical or mental ability to perform basic work activities." Wall, 561 F.3d at 1052 (citing 20 C.F.R. § 404.1521). At step three, the ALJ considers whether a claimant's medically severe impairments Vigil v. Colvin, 805 F.3d 1199, 1203 (10th Cir. 2015). If the claimant's impairments are not equivalent to a listed impairment, at step four of the evaluation process, the ALJ must determine a claimant's Residual Functional Capacity (RFC) and compare the RFC to the claimant's past relevant work. The RFC is what a claimant is still "functionally capable of doing on a regular and continuing basis, despite his impairments: the claimant's maximum sustained work capability." Williams, 844 F.2d at 751. "The claimant bears the burden of proof through step four of the analysis." Neilson v. Sullivan, 992 F.2d 1118, 1120 (10th Cir. 1993). At step five, the burden shifts to the Commissioner to show that a claimant can perform work that exists in the national economy, taking into account the claimant's RFC, age, education, and work experience. Neilson, 992 F.2d at 1120. The ALJ may rely upon the testimony of a vocational expert to satisfy his burden atstep five, so long as the question posed to the vocational expert accurately portrays Plaintiff's limitations as supported by the record. See Qualls v. Apfel, 206 F.3d 1368, 1373 (10th Cir. 2000); Trimiar v. Sullivan, 966 F.2d 1326, 1329 (10th Cir. 1992).
Ms. James objects to the ALJ's decision on several grounds. First, the ALJ erred when he found that none of Plaintiff's medically determinable impairments were "severe," and that none of the errors related to this finding were "harmless." [#13 at 2]. Second, Ms. James argues that the ALJ erred in failing to adequately develop the record. [#13 at 2].
Plaintiff argues that the ALJ erred in finding that she did not have a severe impairment or combination of impairments at step two of the evaluation process. She argues that the ALJ's finding is not supported by substantial evidence because he failed to adequately weight the medical evidence in the record.
"At step two, it is the claimant's burden to demonstrate an impairment, or a combination of impairments, that significantly limit her ability to do basic work activities." Langley v. Barnhart, 373 F.3d 1116, 1118 (10th Cir. 2004) (citing Bowen v. Yuckert, 482 U.S. 137, 146 n.5 (1987)). In order to meet this burden, a claimant must...
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