James v. Commonwealth
| Decision Date | 06 December 2022 |
| Docket Number | 0896-21-2 |
| Parties | TREQUAN DEVONTE JAMES v. COMMONWEALTH OF VIRGINIA |
| Court | Virginia Court of Appeals |
FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF THE CITY OF RICHMOND Phillip L Hairston, Judge
Daniel W. Hall (Law Office of Daniel W. Hall, on brief), for appellant.
Timothy J. Huffstutter, Assistant Attorney General (Jason S Miyares, Attorney General, on brief), for appellee.
Present: Chief Judge Decker, Judges Beales and White Argued by videoconference
Trequan Devonte James challenges his convictions for first-degree murder and use of a firearm in the commission of a felony in violation of Code §§ 18.2-32 and -53.1. He contends that the trial court erred by admitting certain evidence and concluding that the evidence as a whole was sufficient to support his convictions. To the extent that the appellant preserved these assignments of error for appeal, we hold that the admission of the challenged evidence was not error and that the evidence supported the jury's findings of guilt.[1] Consequently, we affirm the appellant's convictions.
BACKGROUND[2]
On September 22, 2019, the appellant murdered Jamal Ellis, his maternal uncle. At the time, they lived together in a City of Richmond residence, along with other members of their extended family.
On the evening of the murder, Richard Archer, a cousin of the victim and the appellant, was at the residence with the victim when the appellant "entered . . . in a rush." The appellant asked the victim whether he had his gun with him and then asked the victim to accompany him to a store. Archer noticed some sort of "tension" between the two men. When they left the house, the victim had on dark clothing, and the appellant was wearing a white t-shirt, a baseball cap, and black-and-white tennis shoes.
Two witnesses, LaKeisha Murray and Crystal Hinton, observed the men from different vantage points as the appellant shot the victim a short time later while they were in the street. Both women testified at trial.
Murray, who did not know the men, lived near the corner where the shooting occurred. While studying that night, she heard the "loud" and "very aggressive" voice of a male whom she thought was on a cell phone. She looked outside but did not see anyone, and "the voice got low," so she returned to studying.
Later, Murray heard the same male voice along with a female voice, and someone said, Murray opened her door slightly and saw two men on the corner facing each other. She could tell the people were arguing and that the male she could hear "was more so the aggressor." Then she heard the woman's voice say, "Tre, stop," "Tre, chill," and "Cool and chill, Tre." Murray continued watching as one of the men, who was wearing a white shirt and dark jeans, reached from "behind on [his] . . . side." She saw a flash and heard what sounded "like a firework." The victim grabbed the left side of his chest, briefly walked toward the shooter, and then turned and ran away. The shooter followed the victim, and when both men were outside Murray's line of vision, she "hear[d] another [gun]shot."
Hinton was on the street nearby at the time of the shooting and provided more detail about what happened and why. She dated the appellant for at least two years, but he had broken up with her two weeks prior to the shooting. Between the breakup and the night of the murder, Hinton had been talking and texting with the appellant. She and the victim were also friends, and she continued to talk and text with him too. Hinton had "been hearing about drama" among the appellant, the victim, and a third man-a relative named Trevon. She reported, as a result, "that things were not all peachy keen with these three men" on the evening of September 22. According to Hinton, the appellant was "mad," and his anger was directed specifically at the victim because the victim had told Hinton "something . . . very personal" about the appellant.
Hinton was present in the area of the murder because soon after the appellant found out that the victim had told her the "very personal" thing that day, the appellant asked her to meet him "down the street" from the family residence. Hinton did as he asked, and sometime afterward, the appellant and the victim walked up Decatur Street together and passed Spaine Street, near where Hinton was parked. The victim continued up the street toward the store, while the appellant paced back and forth near the intersection. By Hinton's account, the appellant was on the phone with his new girlfriend, and Hinton described him as "angry at that situation, . . . separate from what was going on with" the victim.
A few minutes later, the victim rejoined the appellant on Decatur Street, and the appellant "confronted" him about what he had told Hinton. Hinton described the appellant as "livid" with the victim. The appellant pulled out a gun and fired three times at the victim from "[v]ery close" range, but the gun jammed, and no bullets were expelled. The appellant "manipulat[ed]" the gun and fired a fourth shot, this time hitting the victim in the chest. The victim ran away, and the appellant followed him. Once the men were out of view, Hinton heard a fifth gunshot. The shooting occurred no more than an hour and a half after the appellant learned that the victim had told Hinton a "very personal" thing about him.[3]
Immediately after the shooting, the appellant ran to Hinton's car, got in still holding the gun, and told her to make a U-turn rather than drive past the family residence. The two went to a convenience store on Midlothian Turnpike and afterward to a nearby hotel. Surveillance videos showed them at both locations with the appellant wearing a white shirt and long dark shorts.
The next morning, the appellant left the hotel, and Hinton went home. Later that day, Hinton picked up the appellant and they checked into a different hotel. Hinton told the appellant that she had to go home to tend to her child. After she went home, she drove to the Richmond Police Department and told Detective Patrick Mansfield that she witnessed the appellant shoot the victim. Hinton then lied to Mansfield about where the appellant was at that time, telling him that she did not know. After leaving the police station, she returned to the hotel and spent a second night with the appellant.
The following morning, Hinton received a text saying that a warrant had been issued for the appellant's arrest. She did not respond to the text and instead went to work. The appellant went with her, telling her "he didn't have anywhere to go." He remained outside in her car while she went inside. Hinton "panicked" and called 911. She "made up a lie saying that [the appellant] had kidnapped her" and then told police where they could find him.
At the time of the appellant's arrest outside Hinton's workplace, Chesterfield County police found a gun on the floorboard where he had been sitting. Forensic examination determined that two cartridge casings and a bullet fragment found at the scene of the victim's shooting were fired from that gun. Hinton testified that the appellant had that gun with him when he shot the victim and each time she saw him afterward.
Additional evidence linked the appellant to the gun. Archer testified that on the afternoon after the shooting, the extended family gathered at the family residence. When the appellant arrived at the gathering, family members "question[ed him] about the night before." The appellant got "real upset" and waved a firearm at everyone. Archer recognized the gun as one that he had previously seen the appellant carry because of "discoloration" on "the slide" and "a modified piece on the side." He also noted that while the appellant was wielding the gun, it "jammed on" him and he "[m]ov[ed] the slide" to try to "unjam it."
At trial, the appellant objected to the admission of two types of evidence. He sought to exclude evidence of the firearm found on the car floorboard by the seat he occupied at the time of his arrest in Chesterfield County. He also sought to exclude a surveillance camera video purporting to show the Richmond murder. The trial court denied the motions.
At the close of the Commonwealth's evidence and again at the close of all the evidence, the appellant made motions to strike. He argued that Murray's descriptions of the shooter and the victim were inconsistent and that Hinton's identification of him as the shooter was incredible because she was "thoroughly impeached." Defense counsel also argued that the facts did not support premeditation. After the trial court denied the motions, the jury convicted the appellant of first-degree murder and use of a firearm in the commission of a felony.
The appellant made a motion to set aside the verdict. He renewed his challenges to the admission of evidence about the firearm found at the time of his arrest. The appellant also renewed his request to exclude the surveillance video based on lack of authentication. Finally, he challenged the sufficiency of the evidence based on the credibility of Hinton, the only person who specifically identified him as the shooter. The trial court denied the motion to set aside the verdict. It then sentenced the appellant in accordance with the jury's verdict to thirty-one years for the murder and three years for the firearm offense with none of that time suspended.
The appellant challenges the admission of two categories of evidence. He also contests the sufficiency of the evidence to support his convictions.
The appellant contends that the trial court erred by admitting evidence of the firearm found during his arrest. He further asserts that a...
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