James v. Cox, Civil Action 21-cv-12098-AK

• Court: United States District Courts. 1st Circuit. United States District Courts. 1st Circuit. District of Massachusetts
• Writing for the Court: HON. ANGEL KELLEY UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
• Parties: MONICA JOSEY JAMES, ARLINDA JOHNS, and TYRELLE HINSON, Plaintiffs, v. MICHAEL COX, DOMINIQUE MORGAN, TRAVIS REED MILLER, TANYA NGUYEN, and DAVID BOOTH a/k/a ZEPHYR WILLIAMS, Defendants.
• Docket Number: Civil Action 21-cv-12098-AK
• Decision Date: 22 July 2022

MONICA JOSEY JAMES, ARLINDA JOHNS, and TYRELLE HINSON, Plaintiffs,
v.
MICHAEL COX, DOMINIQUE MORGAN, TRAVIS REED MILLER, TANYA NGUYEN, and DAVID BOOTH a/k/a ZEPHYR WILLIAMS, Defendants.

Civil Action No. 21-cv-12098-AK

United States District Court, D. Massachusetts

July 22, 2022

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER

HON. ANGEL KELLEY UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

Plaintiffs Monica Josey James (“James”), Arlinda Johns (“Johns”), and Tyrelle Hinson (“Hinson”) bring this suit against Defendants Michael Cox (“Cox”), Dominique Morgan (“Morgan”), Travis Reed Miller (“Miller”), Tanya Nguyen (“Nguyen”), and David Booth, also known as Zephyr Williams (“Booth”), alleging race-based discrimination and retaliation in violation of 42 U.S.C. § 1981. The defendants have moved to dismiss the suit in its entirety. [Dkt. 15]. For the following reasons, the Court GRANTS the defendants' motion to dismiss.

I. Background

Unless otherwise noted, the facts are recited as alleged in the complaint. [See Dkt. 1 (“Complaint”)]. James, an African-American woman, began working for Black and Pink, a nonprofit “queer anarchist organization” encompassing “LGBTQ prisoners and ‘free world' allies who support each other through advocacy, education, direct service, and organizing” on March

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11, 2017. [Id. at ¶¶ 6, 9]. Johns, an African-American woman, became National Director at Black and Pink on August 17, 2017. [Id. at ¶ 7]. Hinson was the Office Manager of Black and Pink. [Id. at ¶ 8]. In June 2017, James began a brief relationship with Frank Place (“Place”), a white male involved in Black and Pink. [Id. at ¶ 33]. Approximately two weeks later, Place attempted to film James performing a sexual act on him without James's consent. [Id. at ¶ 34]. When James discovered the recording, she stopped the act, demanded Place delete any recordings and footage of her, and said she would report Place to the police if he attempted anything similar in the future. [Id.]. This interaction underlies the plaintiffs' claims.

Shortly after James and Place's altercation, Jason Lydon (“Lydon”), James's then-supervisor, approached James and asked her why Place was “not happy” with her. [Id. at ¶ 35]. After James explained what happened with Place, Lydon threatened James's job and told her to apologize to Place. [Id. at ¶ 37]. Lydon then shared information about James's personal affairs with other members of Black and Pink, inciting “violence and hostility against her.” [Id. at ¶ 43]. Cox joined Lydon's campaign against James, and, at various points, threatened James's job, described her as “aggressive,” and demanded she agree to be recorded during their interactions. [Id. at ¶¶ 46-52]. James complained about Cox's behavior to various people at Black and Pink, and Booth and Morgan initiated an investigation. [Id. at ¶¶ 53, 55]. The investigation concluded in October 2017, and, as part of its resolution, Booth and Morgan requested that James not contact Place and refrain from initiating legal proceedings. [Id. at ¶ 56]. On November 22, 2017, James filed for a harassment prevention order against Place, Cox, Miller, and another Black and Pink member, which Johns signed as a witness. [Id. at ¶ 77].

Johns defended James to others at Black and Pink, including Morgan, and claimed that the defendants were pursuing James because she “spoke out against their white boy” Place. [Id.

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at ¶ 81]. Johns also spoke out against Black and Pink's management structure, claiming that the defendants acted as de facto “shadow management” of the organization even though they were not registered with the state as board members. [Id. at ¶¶ 58, 62]. When Johns attempted to improve this perceived lapse in legal compliance, the defendants hindered her efforts and curtailed Johns's power as National Director so that they could continue to exercise their influence over Black and Pink. [Id. at ¶¶ 60-62]. On November 17, 2017, the defendants restricted Johns's access to login credentials and canceled contracts Johns had entered into on behalf of Black and Pink. [Id. at ¶¶ 72-73]. Johns then withdrew $50,000 from Black and Pink's bank account. [Id. at ¶ 74]. On November 18, 2017, Lydon and Cox removed Johns as an authorized party on the bank account, and Johns deposited Black and Pink checks in her possession into a bank account not affiliated with the organization. [Id. at ¶76]. James and Johns received emails on December 21, 2017, from Morgan, terminating their employment with Black and Pink. [Id. at ¶¶ 78-79].

Hinson, an African-American man, who had volunteered with Black and Pink since 2008, was unknowingly listed as a board member with voting powers for several years prior to being informed of that status in September 2017. [Id. at ¶¶ 94, 97-98]. He became Office Manager in 2016. [Id. at ¶ 93]. On several occasions, Hinson opposed Lydon's treatment of James after the incident with Place and spoke out against Johns's termination, voicing his belief that the motivations behind these actions were racist. [Id. at ¶¶ 96, 99-101]. Hinson received a termination email from Morgan on January 28, 2017. [Id. at ¶ 103].

On May 20, 2019, the plaintiffs filed a lawsuit against the defendants in this litigation, Black and Pink, and other individuals associated with Black and Pink (including Lydon) in the Northern District of Illinois, asserting claims for hostile work environment and retaliation

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pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1981 (the “Illinois Suit”). [Id. at 2 n.1]; see generally James v. Lydon, 19-cv-03366 (N.D. Ill.). The defendants named in the suit pending before this Court were dismissed from the Illinois Suit for lack of personal jurisdiction on February 11, 2020. [Complaint at 2 n.1]; see James v. Lydon, 19-cv-03366, 2020 WL 704795 (N.D. Ill. Feb. 11, 2020). The plaintiffs continued to litigate in Illinois. That court then dismissed some of the claims against the remaining defendants, James v. Lydon, 19-cv-03366, 2020 WL 3192286 (N.D. Ill. June 15, 2020), and ultimately granted summary judgment in the defendants' favor, James v. Lydon, 19-cv-03366, 2022 WL 523121 (N.D. Ill. Feb. 22, 2022). The plaintiffs filed the action pending before this Court on December 20, 2021, nearly two years after the defendants here were dismissed from the Illinois Suit.

The plaintiffs bring five claims against the defendants. First, James alleges that the defendants created a hostile work environment because “she is an African American transgender woman and she spoke out against the racially discriminatory culture and practice at Black & Pink” and because she “defended herself against the sexual misconduct committed” by Place (“Count I”). [Complaint at ¶ 106]. Second, Johns claims that the defendants created a hostile work environment because she is “an African American woman” who “spoke out against the racially and legally offensive organization structure of” Black and Pink and the “racial targeting and discriminatory treatment” of James (“Count II”). [Id. at ¶¶ 115, 118]. Third, James avers that the defendants retaliated against her after she opposed the discrimination she faced (“Count III”). [Id. at ¶ 123]. Fourth, Johns alleges the defendants retaliated against her after she spoke out against the “racial targetting [sic], harassment, and discriminatory treatment” of James (“Count IV”). Fifth, Hinson contends the defendants retaliated against him after he opposed

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their discriminatory treatment of James and Johns (“Count V”). [Id. at ¶ 131]. The defendants have moved to dismiss all five claims.

II. Legal Standard

To survive a motion to dismiss under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), a complaint must allege sufficient facts to state a claim for relief that is “plausible on its face” and actionable as a matter of law. Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)). Reading the complaint “as a whole,” the Court must conduct a two-step, context-specific inquiry. Garda-Catalan v. United States, 734 F.3d 100, 103 (1st Cir. 2013). First, the Court must perform a close reading of the complaint to distinguish factual allegations from conclusory legal statements. Id. Factual allegations must be accepted as true, while legal conclusions are not entitled to credit. Id. A court may not disregard properly pleaded factual allegations even if actual proof of those facts is improbable. Ocasio-Hernandez v. Fortuno-Burset, 640 F.3d 1, 12 (1st Cir. 2011). Second, the Court must determine whether the factual allegations present a “reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Haley v. City of Bos., 657 F.3d 39, 46 (1st Cir. 2011) (citation omitted). Dismissal is appropriate when the complaint fails to allege a “plausible entitlement to relief.” Rodriguez-Ortiz v. Margo Caribe, Inc., 490 F.3d 92, 95 (1st Cir. 2007) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 559 (2007)). When resolving a motion to dismiss under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), the Court is generally limited to “the complaint, documents attached to it, and documents expressly incorporated into it,” Foley v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A., 772 F.3d 63, 71-72 (1st Cir. 2014), though the Court may also consider “official public records,” Bingham v. Massachusetts, 616 F.3d 1, 3 n.1 (1st Cir. 2010) (citation omitted) (noting that “earlier judicial opinions addressing prior, related claims” fall under this “narrow exception”).

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III. Discussion

The plaintiffs, all of whom are African American, bring their hostile work environment and retaliation claims pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1981. Section 1981 provides, in relevant part, that all “persons within the jurisdiction of the United States shall have the same right . . . to make and enforce contracts . . . and to the full and equal benefit of all laws and proceedings . . . as is enjoyed by white citizens.” 42 U.S.C. § 1981. The defendants argue that the doctrine of claim...