James v. Honorable Olen Underwood, Honorable Patrick Sebesta & Fid. & Deposit Co. of Md., Richard Stephen Calkins
| Decision Date | 08 May 2014 |
| Docket Number | NO. 01-13-00277-CV,01-13-00277-CV |
| Parties | CAROLYN CALKINS JAMES, INDIVIDUALLY AND AS NEXT FRIEND OF HER ELDERLY MOTHER, MARY OLIVE CALKINS, Appellant v. HONORABLE OLEN UNDERWOOD, HONORABLE PATRICK SEBESTA AND FIDELITY AND DEPOSIT COMPANY OF MARYLAND, RICHARD STEPHEN CALKINS AS AGENT IN FACT FOR MARY OLIVE CALKINS AND MICHAEL EASTON, INDIVIDUALLY AND AS ASSIGNEE OF RICHARD STEPHEN CALKINS, Appellees |
| Court | Texas Court of Appeals |
Carolyn James and her brother Richard Steven Calkins are in a legal dispute over who has the right to manage the assets of their mother, Mary Calkins. Theircontroversy has spawned multiple lawsuits filed in various district and probate courts in at least two counties resulting in no less than 11 issued appellate decisions—thus far—from the First and Fourteenth Courts of Appeals.1 Michael Easton, an individual who is not related to James or Calkins, has repeatedly intervened, sued and been sued in the dispute between the siblings.2
In this latest iteration, James sued two judges who have presided over aspects of her on-going legal dispute with Calkins and Easton: Judge Underwood and Judge Sebesta. She also sued Judge Sebesta's surety, Fidelity and Deposit Company of Maryland. The judges filed a motion to dismiss James's claims based on the doctrines of judicial and sovereign immunity. Fidelity also filed a motion to dismiss based on its defenses that James lacked standing and capacity to sue and that the statute James relied on as an exception to judicial immunity did not apply. The trial court granted the motions to dismiss.
Michael Easton and James's brother, Calkins, intervened in the suit after the judges were dismissed but before Fidelity's dismissal. They requested sanctionsagainst James and her attorneys. After all defendants had been dismissed, Easton and James filed a notice of non-suit, allowing the judgment to become final.
James timely appealed the trial court's rulings granting dismissal of James's claims against all defendants. She asserts that the trial court erred in four regards: (1) denying James's special exception to the judges' and Fidelity's motions to dismiss; (2) granting dismissal to the judges on the theory of judicial immunity; (3) failing to permit a claim against Judge Sebesta to the extent of the judge's surety bond; and (4) granting dismissal to Fidelity on the theories of lack of standing and lack of capacity.
We affirm.
The underlying facts have been detailed in earlier appellate opinions;3 therefore, only those facts necessary for the resolution of the issues currently before the Court will be included here.4
James initiated proceedings to have a guardian appointed for her mother in 2008. Calkins fought the appointment. Easton, alleged to be the legal assistant of the attorney representing Calkins, intervened "pro se." Both Calkins and Easton sought to recuse the judge assigned to the probate case, Judge Mike Wood. Regional Presiding Judge Olen Underwood assigned judges to hear that and subsequent recusal motions filed by Calkins and Easton. Easton challenged—on procedural grounds—the orders denying recusal and, eventually, Judge Underwood issued an order granting recusal of Judge Wood. Subsequently, eight judges were assigned the probate matter, each of whom either were recused or informed Judge Underwood that they were "withdrawing or resigning from the cases." Judge Sebesta was the ninth judge assigned to the probate case. Fidelity and Deposit Company of Maryland is the surety for Judge Sebesta.
Judge Sebesta entered an order voiding prior orders, including the appointment of a temporary guardian over James's mother, based on a lack of in personam jurisdiction over the proposed ward, whom James had not properly served. James filed motions seeking to require Calkins and Easton to answer discovery in the probate matter, to dismiss Easton and Calkins's opposition to appointment of a guardian, and to require an accounting of funds removed from her mother's estate.
James filed suit against Judge Underwood and Judge Sebesta, alleging "constitutional due process violations." She included Fidelity in her suit, as surety for Judge Sebesta. James's petition asserts that she has sued in dual capacities: individually and as next friend of her mother.
All defendants answered and filed motions to dismiss. The judges' motion to dismiss was granted. Less than one month later, Easton and Calkins intervened in the case, requesting sanctions against James and her attorneys. A couple of months later, the trial court granted Fidelity's motion to dismiss. Easton and Calkins nonsuited their intervention. James appealed the dismissal of her claims against Judge Underwood, Judge Sebesta, and Fidelity.
Subject-matter jurisdiction is essential for a court to have the authority to resolve a case. See Tex. Dep't of Transp. v. Jones, 8 S.W.3d 636, 638-39 (Tex. 1999); Mann v. Gabriel, No. 11-10-00265-CV, 2012 WL 2865811, at *2 (Tex. App.—Eastland July 12, 2012, no pet.) (mem. op.). Whether a trial court has subject-matter jurisdiction is a threshold inquiry that can be addressed by the court sua sponte and at any time. See In re G.S.G., 145 S.W.3d 351, 353 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2004, no pet.) (citing Tex. Ass'n of Bus. v. Tex. Air Control Bd., 852 S.W.2d 440, 443 (Tex. 1993)); Mann, 2012 WL 2865811, at *2. Whetherthe trial court has subject-matter jurisdiction is a question of law that we review de novo. Tex. Dep't of Parks & Wildlife v. Miranda, 133 S.W.3d 217, 226 (Tex. 2004); Tex. Natural Res. Conservation Comm'n v. IT-Davy, 74 S.W.3d 849, 855 (Tex. 2002).
The determination of whether a trial court has subject-matter jurisdiction begins with the pleadings. Miranda, 133 S.W.3d at 226. The plaintiff has the burden to plead facts affirmatively showing that the trial court has jurisdiction. Tex. Ass'n of Bus., 852 S.W.2d at 446. We construe the pleadings liberally in favor of the pleader, look to the pleader's intent, and accept as true the pleader's factual allegations. See Miranda, 133 S.W.3d at 226; City of Fort Worth v. Crockett, 142 S.W.3d 550, 552 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 2004, pet. denied). When a plaintiff fails to plead facts that establish jurisdiction, but the petition does not affirmatively demonstrate incurable jurisdictional defects, the issue is one of pleading sufficiency and the plaintiff should be afforded the opportunity to amend. See Peek v. Equip. Serv. Co. of San Antonio, 779 S.W.2d 802, 804-05 (Tex. 1989); Tex. Dep't of Corrections v. Herring, 513 S.W.2d 6, 9-10 (Tex. 1974). On the other hand, if the pleadings affirmatively negate the existence of jurisdiction, then a plea to the jurisdiction may be granted without allowing the plaintiff an opportunity to amend. See Peek, 779 S.W.2d at 804-05; Cnty. of Cameron v. Brown, 80 S.W.3d 549, 555 (Tex. 2002).
In her second issue, James argues that the trial court erred by dismissing her claims against Judges Underwood and Sebesta on the grounds of judicial immunity.
The judges' motion to dismiss alleged both judicial immunity and sovereign immunity. The order granting dismissal did not specify the basis for dismissal. If dismissal was proper under either theory, the trial court's judgment will be affirmed. See Guar. Cnty. Mut. Ins. Co. v. Reyna, 709 S.W.2d 647, 648 (Tex. 1986); In re Estate of Hutchins, 391 S.W.3d 578, 585 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2012, no pet.) Because we conclude that dismissal based on judicial immunity was proper, we do not reach the issue of sovereign immunity.
Immunity from suit deprives a trial court of subject-matter jurisdiction. Reata Constr. Corp. v. City of Dallas, 197 S.W.3d 371, 374 (Tex. 2006). The Supreme Court has stated repeatedly that "it is a general principle of the highest importance to the proper administration of justice that a judicial officer, in exercising the authority vested in him, shall be free to act upon his own convictions, without apprehension of personal consequences to himself." Bradley v. Fisher, 80 U.S. 335, 347 (1871); Mireles v. Waco, 502 U.S. 9, 10, 112 S. Ct. 286, 287 (1991); Stump v. Sparkman, 435 U.S. 349, 355, 98 S. Ct. 1099, 1104 (1978); see also Dallas Cnty. v. Halsey, 87 S.W.3d 552, 554 (Tex. 2002);Twilligear v. Carrell, 148 S.W.3d 502, 504 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2004, pet. denied). Thus, judges are afforded immunity from suit for their judicial conduct. See Mireles, 502 U.S. at 10, 112 S. Ct. at 287.
Judicial immunity provides immunity from suit, not just from the ultimate assessment of damages. See id., 502 U.S. at 11, 112 S. Ct. at 288; Halsey, 87 S.W.3d at 554. Accordingly, allegations of bad faith or malice will not overcome immunity, given that such allegations would require discovery and possibly trial to resolve. See Mireles, 502 U.S. at 11, 112 S. Ct. at 288; Pierson v. Ray, 386 U.S. 547, 554, 87 S. Ct. 1213, 1217-18 (1967). "Judges enjoy absolute judicial immunity from liability for judicial acts, no matter how erroneous the act or how evil the motive, unless the act is performed in the clear absence of all jurisdiction." Alpert v. Gerstner, 232 S.W.3d 117, 127 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2006, pet. denied) ).
There are two sets of circumstances in which immunity is overcome. First, a judge is not immune from liability for nonjudicial actions, described as actions not taken in the judge's judicial capacity. See Mireles, 502 U.S. at 11, 112 S. Ct. at 288; Twilligear, 148 S.W.3d at 504. Second, a judge is not immune from actions, even those judicial in nature, if taken in the "complete absence of all jurisdiction." Mireles, 502 U.S. at 12, 112 S. Ct. at 288.
The factors we...
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