James v. Nashua School Dist.

• Decision Date: 27 July 1989
• Docket Number: Civ. No. 88-460-D.
• Citation: 720 F. Supp. 1053
• Parties: Clayton Russell JAMES; Mary Ellen James; Clayton E. James, Jr. v. NASHUA SCHOOL DISTRICT; City of Nashua, New Hampshire.
• Court: U.S. District Court — District of New Hampshire

720 F. Supp. 1053

Clayton Russell JAMES; Mary Ellen James; Clayton E. James, Jr. v. NASHUA SCHOOL DISTRICT; City of Nashua, New Hampshire.

Civ. No. 88-460-D.

United States District Court, D. New Hampshire.

July 27, 1989.

Matthew R. Carnevale, Jr., for plaintiffs.

Mark J. Bennett, Nashua, N.H., for defendants.

ORDER

DEVINE, Chief Judge.

In this action, plaintiffs ("the Jameses") seek $12,530 in attorney's fees from defendants Nashua School District and the City of Nashua ("defendants" or "Nashua") pursuant to the Education of the Handicapped Act ("EHA"), 20 U.S.C. § 1400, et seq. (1988). The Jameses contend that Nashua should pay the attorney's fees they incurred during a 1984 hearing before the New Hampshire Department of Education at which the Jameses successfully argued that defendants should provide residential placement for Clayton E. James, Jr. Jurisdiction is founded on 28 U.S.C. §§ 1331 (federal question) and 1343 (civil rights). Currently before the Court are defendants' motion for summary judgment, Rule 56, Fed.R.Civ.P., or to dismiss, Rule 12(b)(6), Fed.R.Civ.P., and plaintiffs' cross-motion for summary judgment.¹

Rule 56(c), Fed.R.Civ.P., provides that summary judgment "shall be rendered forthwith if the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law." The burden is upon the movant to establish the lack of a genuine and material factual issue, Finn v. Consolidated Rail Corp., 782 F.2d 13, 15 (1st Cir.1986), and the Court must view the record in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party, according such party all beneficial inferences to be discerned from the evidence. Ismert & Assoc. v. New England Mut. Life Ins. Co., 801 F.2d 536, 537 (1st Cir.1986). The nonmoving party cannot rely on mere allegations in support of its case, Rule 56(e), Fed.R.Civ.P., but must bring forth "sufficient evidence supporting the claimed factual dispute ... to require a jury or judge to resolve the parties' differing versions of the truth at trial." Hahn v. Sargent, 523 F.2d 461, 464 (1st Cir.1975), cert. denied, 425 U.S. 904, 96 S.Ct. 1495, 47 L.Ed.2d 754 (1976) (citing First Nat'l Bank of Ariz. v. Cities Serv. Co., 391 U.S. 253, 289, 88 S.Ct. 1575, 1592, 20 L.Ed.2d 569 (1968)).

I. Background

Clayton, the Jameses' educationally handicapped son, is now twenty years old. In 1978, Clayton began attending a day program at the Mount Hope School in Nashua, New Hampshire. In January 1983, the Jameses requested that the School District place Clayton in a residential program. The School District rejected their request. The Jameses subsequently moved for a hearing before the Department of Education. On July 25, 1984, the hearing officer determined that Clayton should be placed in a residential facility. Nashua did not appeal the hearing officer's decision, and the parties settled the matter with the consent of all involved. Clayton was placed in a residential program at defendants' expense. At that time, attorney's fees were not available to prevailing parties under EHA, Smith v. Robinson, 468 U.S. 992, 104 S.Ct. 3457, 82 L.Ed.2d 746 (1984), and the Jameses did not apply for such fees.

On August 5, 1986, however, Congress amended the Act, permitting parties that prevail in EHA claims to recover attorney's fees. See Handicapped Children's Protection Act of 1986 ("HCPA"), Pub.L. No. 99-372, 100 Stat. 796 (1986) (codified as amended at 20 U.S.C. § 1415). In relevant part, the amendment provides as follows:

In any action or proceeding brought under this subsection, the court, in its discretion, may award reasonable attorneys' fees as part of the costs to the parents or guardian of a handicapped child or youth who is the prevailing party.

20 U.S.C. § 1415(e)(4)(B). The Jameses did not apply for attorney's fees at that time.

In 1988 the Nashua School District reopened the James case, seeking to place Clayton in a day program. After reviewing the file, the Jameses' attorney discovered that they could be entitled to recover fees incurred in the earlier action.² On November 22, 1988, the Jameses filed the instant action for such fees. Nashua then filed the pending motion for summary judgment. Defendants assert four arguments in support of their motion. The Court discusses each of Nashua's arguments seriatim.

A. Prevailing Party

Nashua contends that the Jameses were not "prevailing parties" at the administrative hearing and therefore do not qualify for attorney's fees under EHA. After the 1984 hearing, the hearing officer directed the Nashua School District to place Clayton in one of two "recommended" residential schools. The Jameses ultimately secured residential placement for their son, although he was not placed in one of the two "recommended" residential schools. See Affidavit of Gail Barringer at ¶ 8. Thus, although the Jameses succeeded in placing their son in a residential facility, defendants argue that they did not "prevail" as that term is defined in the EHA.

The legislative history of EHA makes it clear that the Court must interpret the term "prevailing party" in a manner "consistent with the United States Supreme Court's decision in Hensley v. Eckerhart, 461 U.S. 424, 440, 103 S.Ct. 1933, 1943, 76 L.Ed.2d 40 (1983)." S.Rep. No. 112, 99th Cong., 2d Sess. 13-14, reprinted in 1986 U.S.Code Cong. & Admin.News 1798, 1803. Hensley states that in order to be declared a prevailing party, a claimant must "`succeed on any significant issue in litigation which achieves some of the benefit the parties sought in bringing suit.'" Id., 461 U.S. at 433, 103 S.Ct. at 1939 (quoting Nadeau v. Helgemoe, 581 F.2d 275, 278-79 (1st Cir.1978)). Hensley describes the requirement as "a generous formulation that brings the plaintiff only across the statutory threshold." Id. As the Supreme Court noted, "the result is what matters." Id. 461 U.S. at 435, 103 S.Ct. at 1940. The Court finds that the Jameses succeeded on a "significant issue" in the litigation because Clayton was placed in a residential facility. Accordingly, the defendants' contention that plaintiffs were not "prevailing parties" must fail.

B. Statute of Limitations

The Jameses filed the instant claim for attorney's fees on November 22, 1988, two years and 109 days after the cause of action accrued.³ Defendants argue that because the Jameses' claim is subject to either a 180-day or a one-year statute of limitations, it is untimely. The Court disagrees.

Although EHA provides for attorney's fees under section 1415(e)(4)(B), the statute does not specify a limitation period. "When Congress has not established a time limitation for a federal cause of action, the settled practice has been to adopt a local time limitation as federal law if it is not inconsistent with federal law or policy to do so." Wilson v. Garcia, 471 U.S. 261, 266-67, 105 S.Ct. 1938, 1942, 85 L.Ed.2d 254 (1985). In selecting the proper state statute of limitations, "we must characterize the essence of the claim in the pending case and decide which state statute provides the most appropriate limiting principle." Id. at 268, 105 S.Ct. at 1942. "In determining whether a state-created cause of action is sufficiently analogous to the cause of action created by the EHA ... courts compare the scope of judicial review permitted under state law to the scope of judicial review provided in the EHA...." Schimmel by Schimmel v. Spillane, 819 F.2d 477, 481 (4th Cir.1987).

Defendants contend that the Court should apply the limitations periods contained in New Hampshire Revised Statutes Annotated ("RSA") 354-A:9 III (180 days) or RSA 275:41 (one year). Because the scope of judicial review under both statutes is narrower than that under the EHA, the Court finds that neither statute supplies an appropriate limiting principle to apply in the case at hand.

RSA 354-A:9 sets forth the procedures under which a person brings a complaint to the New Hampshire Human Rights Commission. Section III requires a complainant to file his/her complaint "within 180 days after the alleged act of discrimination." RSA 354-A:10, which outlines the scope of judicial review for RSA 354-A:9, states: "The review shall be heard on the record...." 354-A:10 IV. In contrast, the review of the district court under EHA is broad: "In any action brought under this paragraph the court shall receive the records of the administrative proceedings, shall hear additional evidence at the request of a party, and, basing its decision on the preponderance of the evidence, shall grant such relief as the court determines is appropriate." 20 U.S.C. § 1415(e)(2). "When the scope of review provided under state law is narrower than the scope of review provided in the EHA, some courts including this Court have concluded that the state cause of action is not sufficiently analogous to the cause of action created by the EHA to permit application of the state statute of limitations." Schimmel, supra, 819 F.2d at 481; see also Edward B. v. Brunelle, 662 F.Supp. 1025, 1032 (D.N.H. 1986) (30-day New Hampshire statute of limitations not applicable to action under EHA because judicial review under the New Hampshire statute does not provide for the introduction of evidence in addition to the administrative record).

"State statutes of limitations designed to govern judicial proceedings in which the court merely reviews the administrative record to determine if the agency decision is supported by substantial evidence should not be applied to federal proceedings in which the court is empowered to make an independent determination based on evidence not found in the administrative record." Monahan v. Nebraska, 491 F.Supp. 1074, 1085 (D.Neb.1980) (emphasis added), modified on other grounds, 645 F.2d 592 (8th Cir.1981), cert. denied, 460 U.S. 1012, 103 S.Ct. 1252, 75 L.Ed.2d 481 (1983)....