James v. North Carolina
| Decision Date | 09 September 2011 |
| Docket Number | 3:08-cv-366-RJC |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Western District of North Carolina |
| Parties | JOHN AUSTIN JAMES, Petitioner, v. STATE OF NORTH CAROLINA, Respondent. |
THIS MATTER is before the Court upon Petitioner's amended Petition under 28 U.S.C. § 2254 for a Writ of Habeas Corpus (Doc. No. 3); Respondent's Motion for Summary Judgment (Doc. No. 6); Petitioner's Motion to Appoint Counsel (Doc. No. 13); and Petitioner's Motion for Summary Judgment (Doc. No. 14).
The following factual summary is taken, in part, from the North Carolina Court of Appeals's published opinion. State v. James, 182 N.C. App. 698 (2007). Petitioner was married and had six children, including at least one step-daughter. Id. at 700. On February 3, 2004, Petitioner's step-daughter told her maternal aunt, Doris Bradshaw, that Petitioner had sexually abused her over a period of six years, beginning when she was fourteen years old, and she feared that Petitioner was inflicting the same abuse upon her younger half-sister. Id. Petitioner's step-daughter spoke with her half-sister who confirmed that Petitioner was also sexually abusing her. Id. Ms. Bradshaw took Petitioner's step-daughter to the police department where she described the abuse to authorities. Id. Following an investigation, Petitioner was charged with fourteensexual offenses against his children. Id.
During his trial, Petitioner's step-daughter testified that he had abused her from 1994 until 2000, when she left his home; that the abuse occurred approximately 10 times per month and included sexual intercourse, oral sex, and inappropriate touching; that Petitioner required submission to his sexual demands in order for her to receive privileges like going to the movies with a cousin; and that Petitioner also coerced her to submit to him by telling her that there were Bible stories that involved daughters sleeping with their fathers, and by threatening to cheat on her mother with other women if she did not submit to him. Id. Petitioner's biological daughter testified that Petitioner had been abusing her for the past three years; and that he also conditioned her privileges upon her consent to his sexual demands. Id. at 701.
On April 19, 2004, a Mecklenburg County grand jury returned fourteen indictments charging Petitioner with committing sexual crimes against his daughters. (Doc. No. 8-2 at 4-17). A petit jury found Petitioner guilty of all counts on April 22, 2005. (Id. at 23-29). As to his step-daughter, the jury convicted him of one count of attempted rape, one count of second-degree rape, one count of second-degree sexual offense, and three counts of taking indecent liberties with a child. (Id.). As to his biological daughter, the jury convicted him of one count of second-degree rape, two counts of taking indecent liberties with a child, one count of felonious incest, one count of second-degree sexual offense, one count of committing a crime against nature, one count of statutory sexual offense, and one count of statutory rape. (Id.). The Superior Court of Mecklenburg County sentenced Petitioner to 69 to 81 years' imprisonment. (Id. at 30-39).
Petitioner timely appealed his cases to the North Carolina Court of Appeals where heargued that the trial court erred in admitting evidence from certain witnesses, including Ms. Bradshaw and Petitioner's biological daughter; the court erred in entering judgment for three separate counts of indecent liberties stemming from a single sexual assault against his step-daughter that occurred on one date in 1994; and that it erred by disavowing its authority to grant the jury's request to review certain testimony. James, 182 N.C. App. at 701-05. However, the North Carolina Court of Appeals rejected Petitioner's claims. Id. at 707. Petitioner did not seek any further direct review.
On January 29, 2008, Petitioner filed a Motion for Appropriate Relief ("MAR") arguing for the first time that the trial court violated his rights to due process under the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments by allowing the State to introduce testimony from Ms. Bradshaw concerning matters that were uncharged and unrelated to his offenses; that it violated his right to due process under the Fifth Amendment by allowing his step-daughter to testify about another uncharged sexual assault that he reportedly committed against her; and that it violated his Fifth Amendment right to be free from double jeopardy by allowing the prosecution to proceed under eight indictments and obtain eight separate convictions and sentences for a single sexual assault upon his biological daughter, and by allowing the prosecution to proceed under six indictments and obtain six separate convictions and sentences for a single sexual assault upon his step-daughter. (Doc. No. 8-6 at 5-19). However, on February 29, 2008, the Superior Court of Mecklenburg County entered a summary Order denying Petitioner's MAR on the grounds that "identical issues could have been raised on appeal or were resolved against him by the North Carolina Court of Appeals in a decision rendered on April 27, 2007." (Doc. No. 8-7). Petitioner then sought review of the MAR Court's decision; however, the North Carolina Court of Appeals denied his certiorari petition on April 18, 2008. (Doc. Nos. 8-8 and 8-10).
Petitioner filed the instant § 2254 Petition (Doc. No. 1) on August 12, 2008, and amended it on September 18, 2008 (Doc. No. 3). By his amended pleading, Petitioner re-alleges the claims that he raised in his MAR, namely, that the trial court violated his Fifth and Fourteenth Amendment rights to due process by allowing the state to introduce testimony from Ms. Bradshaw concerning certain unrelated matters, it violated his right to due process under the Fifth Amendment by allowing his step-daughter to testify about an uncharged sexual assault, and it subjected him to double jeopardy in violation of the Fifth Amendment by allowing the prosecution to proceed under a total of fourteen indictments and to obtain fourteen separate convictions and sentences for only two instances of sexual assault committed upon his two daughters. (Doc. No. 3 at 5-11).
Summary judgment shall be granted "if the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." FED. R. CIV. P. 56(a). The movant has the "initial responsibility of informing the district court of the basis for its motion, and identifying those portions of the pleadings, depositions, and answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with affidavits, if any, which it believes demonstrate the absence of a genuine issue of material fact." Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323 (1986) (internal citations omitted).
Once this initial burden is met, the burden shifts to the nonmoving party. The nonmov-ing party "must set forth specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial." Id. at 322 n.3. The nonmoving party may not rely upon mere allegations or denials of allegations in hispleadings to defeat a motion for summary judgment. Id. at 324. The nonmoving party must present sufficient evidence from which "a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the non-moving party." Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986); see also Sylvia Dev. Corp. v. Calvert Cnty., 48 F.3d 810, 818 (4th Cir. 1995).
When ruling on a summary judgment motion, a court must view the evidence and any inferences from the evidence in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party. Anderson, 477 U.S. at 255. "'Where the record taken as a whole could not lead a rational trier of fact to find for the nonmoving party, there is no genuine issue for trial.'" Ricci v. DeStefano, 129 S. Ct. 2658, 2677 (2009) (quoting Matsushita v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 587 (1986)).
In addition to the summary judgment standard set forth above, the Court must consider this Petition under the particular standards governing the review of habeas corpus petitions. First, 28 U.S.C. § 2254 requires a petitioner to exhaust the remedies available to him in the state courts before filing a writ of habeas corpus in the federal courts. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(b)(1)(A). Section 2254's exhaustion requirement demands that a petitioner give "the state courts one full opportunity to resolve any constitutional issues by invoking one complete round of the State's established appellate review process." Larry v. Branker, 552 F.3d 356, 366 (4th Cir. 2009) (quoting O'Sullivan v. Boerckel, 526 U.S. 838, 845 (1999)). This "one full opportunity" includes filing petitions for discretionary review when that review is part of the ordinary appellate procedure in the state. See id. In North Carolina, a petitioner may satisfy § 2254's exhaustion requirement by directly appealing his conviction to the North Carolina Court of Appeals and then petitioning the North Carolina Supreme Court for discretionary review, or by filing a state post-conviction proceeding in the trial court division and then petitioning the NorthCarolina Court of Appeals for a writ of certiorari. See N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 7A-31, 15A-1422.
Second, 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d) provides that:
28 U.S.C. § 2254(d); see also Tice v. Johnson, 647 F.3d 87, 103 (4th Cir. 2011).
A claim is considered "adjudicated on the merits" when it was "substantively reviewed and...
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