James v. Or. Sandblasting & Coating, Inc.
| Decision Date | 04 December 2016 |
| Docket Number | No. 3:15-cv-01706-HZ,3:15-cv-01706-HZ |
| Court | U.S. District Court — District of Oregon |
| Parties | ANDREW W. JAMES, Plaintiff, v. OREGON SANDBLASTING & COATING, INC., Defendant. |
John D. Burgess
Carl Lee Post
Daniel J. Snyder
LAW OFFICES OF DANIEL SNYDER
1000 SW Broadway, Suite 2400
Portland, OR 97205
Attorneys for Plaintiff
Allyson S. Krueger
Alyssa R. Engelberg
DUNN CARNEY ALLEN HIGGINS & TONGUE, LLP
851 SW Sixth Avenue, Suite 1500
Portland, OR 97204
Attorneys for Defendant
Plaintiff Andrew W. James brings this employment discrimination case against his former employer, Defendant Oregon Sandblasting & Coating, Inc. Plaintiff alleges discrimination based on his disability and injured worker status, in violation of the Americans with Disabilities Act , 42 U.S.C. §§ 12101-12213 (ADA); Oregon Rehabilitation Act, Oregon Revised Statute §§ (O.R.S.) 659A.103-659A.145 (ORA); and O.R.S. 659A.040. Defendant moves for summary judgment on all claims. The Court grants Defendant's motion as to Plaintiff's hostile work environment claim and otherwise denies Defendant's motion.
In January of 2009, Defendant hired Plaintiff as a sandblaster. James Decl. ¶ 3, ECF 43. According to Kenton Cudd, Defendant's shop superintendent, Plaintiff was a good sandblaster, had good attendance, and had an "unremarkable" employment history with Defendant. Cudd Decl. ¶¶ 5-6, ECF 32. Plaintiff worked for Defendant until he resigned in April of 2014. James Decl. ¶ 20.
Plaintiff asserts that he is dyslexic and, as a result, he can barely read or write. James Decl. ¶ 2. He declares that he is able to write something down only if he is shown the letters and they are sufficiently spaced so that he can identify them and copy them. Id. He states that he cannot read street names on signs. Id. He has his children read messages to him and type messages on his behalf. Id.
On or about the same date that Plaintiff was hired, Plaintiff told Mr. Cudd that he is dyslexic and that he needed assistance reading and writing. Id. ¶ 3. Id. Plaintiff also informedLanita Franklin in Human Resources that he is dyslexic. Id at ¶ 4. Ms. Franklin helped Plaintiff fill out his initial paperwork. Id. Approximately six months after being hired, Plaintiff informed Jason Crawford, the son of Defendant's owner, that he is dyslexic and needed help filling out timecards and paperwork. Id. at ¶ 5.
At the beginning of each of Plaintiff's shifts, Mr. Cudd or Mark Constance provided Plaintiff with a "job sheet" of tasks that needed to be completed. Id. at ¶ 6. Plaintiff was also required to fill out a timecard. Id. Plaintiff could not read the job sheet or timecard. Id. Therefore, his coworkers assisted him with completing his timecard and his supervisor instructed him to just copy what was on the job sheet onto his timecard. Id.
In December of 2011 or January of 2012, Geoffrey Goldspink became Plaintiff's supervisor. Cudd Decl. ¶ 4. According to Plaintiff, Mr. Goldspink made derogatory comments about Plaintiff's dyslexia on a weekly basis. James Decl. ¶ 10. Specifically, Plaintiff declares that Mr. Goldspink accused Plaintiff of being lazy and mocked him due to his dyslexia. Id.
In approximately 2011, Plaintiff began requesting to be trained, and eventually transferred, to be a painter within Defendant's operations. Id. at ¶ 12. According to Plaintiff, painting was more desirable than sandblasting because the work was less physically demanding, it frequently occurred indoors, the pay was better, and the opportunities for advancement were better. Id.
In approximately October of 2012, Plaintiff received some training in painting. Id. at ¶ 16. However, around the same time, Mr. Goldspink said to him, Id. at ¶ 15. In approximately March of 2013, Mr. Goldspink stopped allowing Plaintiff to work on the paint side of the operation and he told Plaintiff, "You're the one who screwed yourself out of the paint department because you keep playing up your disability that you can't read." Id. at ¶ 17.
In May of 2013, Plaintiff injured his back at work. Id. at ¶ 18. Mr. Goldspink told him: Id. Because Plaintiff was afraid, he did not file a workers' compensation claim. Id.
In October of 2013, Plaintiff injured both of his shoulders at work. Once again, he reported the injury to Mr. Goldspink. Id. at ¶ 19. Mr. Goldspink said, "we have too many workman's comp claims," and Defendant's insurance premiums would increase if any more claims were filed. Id. Mr. Goldspink also said to Plaintiff: Id. Because of Mr. Goldspink's threat, Plaintiff did not report the injury to anyone else or file a claim. Id.
By April of 2014, Plaintiff was not able to tolerate the pain of his injuries anymore. Id. at ¶ 20. Because Mr. Goldspink had told him that he would be fired if he reported his injuries, Plaintiff felt that he had no choice but to resign from his position. Id. at ¶ 21.
Summary judgment is appropriate if there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). The moving party bears the initial responsibility of informing the court of the basis of its motion, andidentifying those portions of "'the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any,' which it believes demonstrate the absence of a genuine issue of material fact." Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323 (1986) (quoting Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c)).
Once the moving party meets its initial burden of demonstrating the absence of a genuine issue of material fact, the burden then shifts to the nonmoving party to present "specific facts" showing a "genuine issue for trial." Fed. Trade Comm'n v. Stefanchik, 559 F.3d 924, 927-28 (9th Cir. 2009) (internal quotation marks omitted). The nonmoving party must go beyond the pleadings and designate facts showing an issue for trial. Bias v. Moynihan, 508 F.3d 1212, 1218 (9th Cir. 2007) (citing Celotex, 477 U.S. at 324).
The substantive law governing a claim determines whether a fact is material. Suever v. Connell, 579 F.3d 1047, 1056 (9th Cir. 2009). The court draws inferences from the facts in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party. Earl v. Nielsen Media Research, Inc., 658 F.3d 1108, 1112 (9th Cir. 2011). If the factual context makes the nonmoving party's claim as to the existence of a material issue of fact implausible, that party must come forward with more persuasive evidence to support his claim than would otherwise be necessary. Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 587 (1986).
Plaintiff alleges that he faced discrimination due to his disability and his injured worker status. Plaintiff brings four claims: (1) discrimination in violation of the ADA; (2) retaliation in violation of the ADA; (3) discrimination in violation of the ORA; and (4) injured workerdiscrimination and retaliation in violation of O.R.S. 659A.040. Defendant moves for summary judgment on all claims.
Defendant raises numerous objections to evidence that Plaintiff relies on in opposing Defendant's motion. Relevant objections are discussed below, in the context of the particular issue in which the evidence is relied upon. All other evidentiary objections are denied as moot.
The ADA and the ORA prohibit discriminating against qualified individuals on the basis of disability in the terms and conditions of their employment. 42 U.S.C. § 12112(a); O.R.S. 659A.112(1). The standards for analyzing the federal and state claims are the same. O.R.S. 659A.139 (); Snead v. Metro. Prop. & Cas. Ins. Co., 237 F.3d 1080, 1087 (9th Cir. 2001); Henderson v. Jantzen, Inc., 79 Or. App. 654, 657, 719 P.2d 1322, 1324 (1986). Therefore, the Court uses the same analysis for Plaintiff's federal and state law disability discrimination claims.
Plaintiff brings three claims under the ADA and the ORA in which he asserts various legal theories for relief: hostile work environment, discrimination on the basis of a disability, disparate treatment, failure to accommodate, failure to engage in the interactive process, and retaliation. Defendant challenges all of Plaintiff's theories. The Court first addresses the issues raised by Defendant that apply to all of Plaintiff's theories for relief and then addresses each theory separately, to the extent necessary.
Disability, with respect to an individual, is defined in the ADA as (1) a physical or mental impairment that substantially limits one or more major life activities of such individual; (2) a record of such an impairment; or (3) being regarded as having such an impairment. 42 U.S.C. § 12102(1). The definition of disability is to be broadly construed. 42 U.S.C. § 12102(4)(A).
Plaintiff contends that he is dyslexic and, thus, is disabled. Alternatively, he asserts that he has a record of a disability or was regarded by Defendant as disabled. Defendant challenges each of Plaintiff's alternative theories for claiming he is disabled.
Plaintiff asserts that his dyslexia impairment limits his major life activity of reading. James Decl. ¶ 2, ECF 43. In his declaration, Plaintiff...
To continue reading
Request your trial