James v. Sec'y, DOC, Case No. 3:10-cv-763-J-37TEM
| Decision Date | 19 March 2013 |
| Docket Number | Case No. 3:10-cv-763-J-37TEM |
| Parties | EUGENE B. JAMES, Petitioner, v. SECRETARY, DOC, et al., Respondents. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Middle District of Florida |
EUGENE B. JAMES, Petitioner,
v.
SECRETARY, DOC, et al., Respondents.
Case No. 3:10-cv-763-J-37TEM
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT MIDDLE DISTRICT OF FLORIDA JACKSONVILLE DIVISION
Dated: March 19, 2013
Petitioner filed a pro se Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (Petition) (Doc. #1) pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254 on August 22, 2010. He was granted leave to file an amended petition. Order (Doc. #13). The Amended Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (Amended Petition) (Doc. #14) challenges a 2007 state court (Duval County) conviction for sale, manufacture, deliver or possession of cocaine with the intent to sell, manufacture or deliver cocaine within 1000 feet of a convenience business and for sale of cannabis. Two grounds for habeas relief are raised, and the Court is mindful of its responsibility to address each ground, Clisby v. Jones, 960 F.2d 925, 936 (11th Cir. 1992); however, no evidentiary proceedings are required in this Court.
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Respondents filed a Response to Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (Response) (Doc. #16)1 on May 20, 2011, and an Appendix (Doc. #18) on June 7, 2011.2 Petitioner filed a Reply to Respondents' Response to Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (Doc. #19). See Order (Doc. #5). Initially, Respondents did not provide the Court with a copy of the transcript of the plea and sentencing proceeding. The Court directed Respondents to provide the Court with a copy of the transcript, see Order (Doc. #21); Order (Doc. #23), and they provided the Transcript (Tr.) on December 13, 2012 (Doc. #24).
The Court will analyze Petitioner's claims under 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d), as amended by the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act (AEDPA). "By its terms [28 U.S.C.] § 2254(d) bars relitigation of any claim 'adjudicated on the merits' in state court, subject only to th[re]e exceptions." Harrington v. Richter, 131 S.Ct. 770, 784 (2011). The exceptions are: (1) the state
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court's decision was contrary to clearly established federal law; or (2) there was an unreasonable application of clearly established federal law; or (3) the decision was based on an unreasonable determination of the facts. Id. at 785.
There is a presumption of correctness of state courts' factual findings unless rebutted with clear and convincing evidence. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(e)(1). This presumption applies to the factual determinations of both trial and appellate courts. See Bui v. Haley, 321 F.3d 1304, 1312 (11th Cir. 2003).
Petitioner claims he received the ineffective assistance of counsel in violation of the Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution. In order to prevail on this Sixth Amendment claim, he must satisfy the two-pronged test set forth in Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 688 (1984), requiring that he show both deficient performance (counsel's representation fell below an objective standard of reasonableness) and prejudice (there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel's unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have been different). In the context of an ineffective assistance challenge to the voluntariness of a guilty or no contest plea, a petitioner must show there is a "reasonable probability that, but for counsel's errors, he would not have pleaded guilty and would have insisted on going to trial." Hill v. Lockhart, 474 U.S. 52, 59 (1985).
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There are prerequisites to a federal habeas review. Last year, the Supreme Court of the United States discussed the doctrine of procedural default:
Federal habeas courts reviewing the constitutionality of a state prisoner's conviction and sentence are guided by rules designed to ensure that state-court judgments are accorded the finality and respect necessary to preserve the integrity of legal proceedings within our system of federalism. These rules include the doctrine of procedural default, under which a federal court will not review the merits of claims, including constitutional claims, that a state court declined to hear because the prisoner failed to abide by a state procedural rule. See, e.g., Coleman, supra, at 747-748, 111 S.Ct. 2546; Sykes, supra, at 84-85, 97 S.Ct. 2497. A state court's invocation of a procedural rule to deny a prisoner's claims precludes federal review of the claims if, among other requisites, the state procedural rule is a nonfederal ground adequate to support the judgment and the rule is firmly established and consistently followed. See, e.g., Walker v. Martin, 562 U.S. ----, ----, 131 S.Ct. 1120, 1127-1128, 179 L.Ed.2d 62 (2011); Beard v. Kindler, 558 U.S. ----, ----, 130 S.Ct. 612, 617-618, 175 L.Ed.2d 417 (2009). The doctrine barring procedurally defaulted claims from being heard is not without exceptions. A prisoner may obtain federal review of a defaulted claim by showing cause for the default and prejudice from a violation of federal law. See Coleman, 501 U.S., at 750, 111 S.Ct. 2546.
Martinez v. Ryan, 132 S.Ct. 1309, 1316 (2012).
In addition, the Supreme Court, in addressing the question of exhaustion, explained:
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Before seeking a federal writ of habeas corpus, a state prisoner must exhaust available state remedies, 28 U.S.C. § 2254(b)(1), thereby giving the State the "'opportunity to pass upon and correct' alleged violations of its prisoners' federal rights." Duncan v. Henry, 513 U.S. 364, 365, 115 S.Ct. 887, 130 L.Ed.2d 865 (1995) (per curiam) (quoting Picard v. Connor, 404 U.S. 270, 275, 92 S.Ct. 509, 30 L.Ed.2d 438 (1971) (citation omitted)). To provide the State with the necessary "opportunity," the prisoner must "fairly present" his claim in each appropriate state court (including a state supreme court with powers of discretionary review), thereby alerting that court to the federal nature of the claim. Duncan, supra, at 365-366, 115 S.Ct. 887; O'Sullivan v. Boerckel, 526 U.S. 838, 845, 119 S.Ct. 1728, 144 L.Ed.2d 1 (1999).
Baldwin v. Reese, 541 U.S. 27, 29 (2004) (emphasis added). In Baldwin, the Supreme Court recognized a variety of ways a federal constitutional issue could be fairly presented to the state court: by citing the federal source of law, by citing a case deciding the claim on federal grounds, or by labeling the claim "federal." Id. at 32.
Again, procedural defaults may be excused under certain circumstances: "[n]otwithstanding that a claim has been procedurally defaulted, a federal court may still consider the claim if a state habeas petitioner can show either (1) cause for and actual prejudice from the default; or (2) a fundamental miscarriage of justice." Id. at 890 (citations omitted). In order for Petitioner to establish cause,
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the procedural default "must result from some objective factor external to the defense that prevented [him] from raising the claim and which cannot be fairly attributable to his own conduct." McCoy v. Newsome, 953 F.2d 1252, 1258 (11th Cir. 1992) (quoting Carrier, 477 U.S. at 488, 106 S.Ct. 2639). Under the prejudice prong, [a petitioner] must show that "the errors at trial actually and substantially disadvantaged his defense so that he was denied fundamental fairness." Id. at 1261 (quoting Carrier, 477 U.S. at 494, 106 S.Ct. 2639).
Wright v. Hopper, 169 F.3d 695, 706 (11th Cir.), cert. denied, 528 U.S. 934 (1999). However, "[i]nadequate assistance of counsel at initial-review collateral proceedings may establish cause for a prisoner's procedural default of a claim of ineffective assistance at trial." Martinez v. Ryan, 132 S.Ct. at 1315.
"[A] federal court may also grant a habeas petition on a procedurally defaulted claim, without a showing of cause or prejudice, to correct a fundamental miscarriage of justice." Fortenberry v. Haley, 297 F.3d 1213, 1222 (11th Cir. 2002) (per curiam) (citation omitted), cert. denied, 538 U.S. 947 (2003). The fundamental miscarriage of justice exception is only available in extraordinary cases upon a showing of "'actual' innocence" rather than mere "'legal' innocence." Johnson v. Alabama, 256 F.3d 1156, 1171 (11th Cir. 2001) (citations omitted), cert. denied, 535 U.S. 926 (2002).
Upon review of the record, the following transpired. Petitioner was charged by information with sale, manufacture,
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deliver or possess with intent to sell, manufacture or deliver cocaine within 1000 feet of a convenience business; sale of cannabis; and resisting an officer without violence to his or her person. Ex. B. The Arrest Report states the following:
On 09-26-2007, at 1820, JSO Detectives Mitchell #6530 and Narcisse were posing as drug buyers in the 4900 block of Soutel Dr. They were driving east on Soutel Dr. when the suspect, Mr. James, flagged them down. He was standing in front of Harry's Food Mart, a convenience store....
Upon making contact, Mr. James agreed to sell crack cocaine and marijuana for $40.00 in JSO funds. Mr. James told the detectives to stay where they were and he would return with the drugs. After waiting about 7-8 minutes Mr. James returned. He sold the detectives two bags of marijuana and one crack "rock" for $40.00 in JSO funds. The prearranged take-down signal was given. As uniformed officers approached, Mr. James ran across Soutel Dr., ignoring several loud commands to stop. He ran behind a house and reversed his course three times before being cornered by Officers
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