James v. Secretary, Department of Corrections

• Decision Date: 29 October 2020
• Docket Number: CASE NO. 19-CIV-61973-RAR
• Citation: 499 F.Supp.3d 1169
• Parties: Travis JAMES, Petitioner, v. SECRETARY, DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS, et al., Respondent.
• Court: U.S. District Court — Southern District of Florida

499 F.Supp.3d 1169

Travis JAMES, Petitioner,

v.SECRETARY, DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS, et al., Respondent.

CASE NO. 19-CIV-61973-RAR

United States District Court, S.D. Florida.

Signed October 29, 2020

Entered October 30, 2020

Travis James, Miami, FL, pro se.

James Joseph Carney, Attorney General Office, West Palm Beach, FL, for Respondent.

ORDER OF DISMISSAL

RODOLFO A. RUIZ II, UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

THIS CAUSE comes before the Court on Petitioner's pro se habeas corpus petition pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254 in which he challenges the state court judgment in Case No. 97-12050-CF10A. See Petition [ECF No. 1]. Rule 4 of the Rules Governing Section 2254 Cases authorizes courts to dismiss a habeas petition arising under § 2254 "[i]f it plainly appears from the petition and any attached exhibits that the petitioner is not entitled to relief in the district court[.]" See also 28 U.S.C. § 2243 (stating an order to show cause should issue "unless it appears from the application that the applicant or person detained is not entitled" to relief). Consistent with that authority, courts may sua sponte dismiss a § 2254 petition if the parties are afforded "notice of [the] decision and an opportunity to be heard in opposition." Paez v. Sec'y, Fla. Dep't of Corr. , 947 F.3d 649, 654 (11th Cir. 2020). Similarly, the Supreme Court has addressed a federal court's authority to sua sponte dismiss habeas petitions even after the State omits or erroneously concedes the issue of timeliness. See Day v. McDonough , 547 U.S. 198, 205, 210–11, 126 S.Ct. 1675, 164 L.Ed.2d 376 (2006).

Based on the foregoing authorities, and for the reasons stated herein, the Petition is DISMISSED as time-barred and the parties are hereby notified of their opportunity to present their positions regarding this Order.

BACKGROUND

A. Timeliness

Stated broadly, "a person in custody pursuant to the judgment of a State court" has a one-year period to file a habeas corpus petition. See 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1). That limitation period "runs from the latest of" the following dates:

(A) the date on which the judgment became final by the conclusion of direct review or the expiration of the time for seeking such review;

(B) the date on which the impediment to filing an application created by State action in violation of the Constitution or laws of the United States is removed, if the applicant was prevented from filing by such State action;

(C) the date on which the constitutional right asserted was initially recognized by the Supreme Court, if the right has been newly recognized by the Supreme Court and made retroactively applicable to cases on collateral review; or

(D) the date on which the factual predicate of the claim or claims presented could have been discovered through the exercise of due diligence.

28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1)(A)–(D).

B. Procedural History

Following a jury trial in Case No. 97-12050-CF10A, the State Circuit Court in and for Broward County, Florida, entered its judgment convicting Petitioner of (1) first-degree murder and (2) attempted robbery. See Respondent's First Set of Exhibits [ECF No. 10-1] at 2 ("Exhibits I"). On Count One, the murder conviction, the State Circuit Court imposed a sentence of life imprisonment. Id. at 3. As for Count Two, the robbery conviction, the State Circuit Court sentenced Petitioner to 30 years’ imprisonment. Id. at 4. Petitioner appealed. See James v. State , 843 So. 2d 933 (Fla. 4th DCA 2003). However, the Florida Fourth District Court of Appeal ("Fourth DCA") affirmed and later denied rehearing on May 15, 2003. See id.

According to Respondent, Petitioner filed a motion pursuant to Fla. R. Crim. P. 3.800, which resulted in Petitioner being resentenced on Count Two on August 18, 2004. See Response to Order to Show Cause [ECF No. 8] at 1 ("Response"). While the record does not contain the motion, Respondent provided the State Circuit Court's August 18, 2004 order, resentencing Petitioner on Count Two to 15 years’ imprisonment. See Exhibits I at 111–13. This order contains a designation that states, "Nunc Pro Tunc 9-22-99." Id. at 113; see also Petition at 1 (acknowledging September 2, 1999 as the date of the original judgment).

Petitioner, pursuant to the prison mailbox rule,¹ filed his initial motion for postconviction relief under Fla. R. Crim. P. 3.850 on March 23, 2006. See Exhibits I at 114–34. The State Circuit Court denied relief. See Respondent's Second Set of Exhibits [ECF No. 10-2] at 189 ("Exhibits II"). The Fourth DCA affirmed, see James v. State , 935 So. 2d 15 (Fla. 4th DCA 2006), and the resulting mandate issued on August 26, 2006. See Exhibits II at 190.

Five years later, Petitioner filed a petition for writ of habeas corpus in the State Circuit Court. See Exhibits II at 191–204. The State Circuit Court denied relief on December 13, 2011. Id. at 208. Respondent asserts Petitioner did not appeal that order. See Response at 2. And there is nothing in the record or in Petitioner's filings suggesting to the contrary. See generally Petition; Exhibits I; Exhibits II; Petitioner's Reply [ECF No. 11] ("Reply").

Following the Supreme Court's decision in Miller v. Alabama , 567 U.S. 460, 132 S.Ct. 2455, 183 L.Ed.2d 407 (2012),² Petitioner filed a motion for postconviction relief pursuant to Fla. R. Crim. P. 3.800 and 3.850. See Exhibits II at 209–10. In that motion, Petitioner moved the State Circuit Court to commence "a new sentencing hearing on the grounds that his sentence[ ] of life in prison without the possibility of parole are in violation of the Eight[h] And Fourteenth Amendments of the United States Constitution." Id. at 209. The State Circuit Court denied relief. Id. at 215–16. On appeal, the Fourth DCA "reverse[d] the trial court's order denying [Petitioner's] motion for postconviction relief and remand[ed] th[e] matter for further proceedings consistent with Falcon v. State , 162 So. 3d 954 (Fla. 2015), and Horsley v. State , 160 So. 3d 393 (Fla. 2015)." James v. State , 183 So. 3d 1110, 1110 (Fla. 4th DCA 2015).

The State Circuit Court, following a resentencing hearing, lowered Petitioner's sentence on Count One, the murder conviction, to 55 years’ imprisonment. See Exhibits II at 217–21. The sentencing order contains a designation that it is "Nunc Pro Tunc 9-22-99." Id. at 219; see also Petition at 1 (acknowledging September 2, 1999 as the date of the original judgment). Again, Petitioner appealed. See James v. State , 258 So. 3d 468 (Fla. 4th DCA 2018). Although Petitioner "raise[d] multiple issues on appeal," the Fourth DCA "affirm[ed] without comment with one ministerial exception. " Id. at 468 (emphasis added). Specifically, the Fourth DCA held Petitioner "is entitled to sentence review after 25 years" and, therefore, the Fourth DCA "remand[ed] for the entry of a written order" reflecting the "ministerial sentence correction " that Petitioner "need not be present" for. Id. at 469 (emphasis added).

After the mandate issued, see Exhibits II at 251, the State Circuit Court entered a written order on December 18, 2018, providing that Petitioner "shall have a sentence review after 25 years." Id. at 253. Petitioner filed his Petition in this Court on August 1, 2019. See Petition at 8.

ANALYSIS

At the inception of this case, U.S. Magistrate Judge Lisette Reid entered an order to show cause. See Order to Show Cause [ECF No. 4]. Respondent, in its Response to the Order to Show Cause, contended that "[t]he petition should be considered untimely." See Response at 3. At the same time, Respondent "disagree[d] with, but acknowledge[d]" that Ferreira v. Sec'y, Fla. Dep't of Corr. , 494 F.3d 1286 (11th Cir. 2007) likely rendered the Petition timely in this circuit because "less than [one] year passed between the [Petitioner's] resentencing for first degree murder and the filing of the [instant] federal petition." See Response at 3.

As it turns out, Respondent was correct—the Petition is untimely, albeit for reasons other than what Respondent argued in its Response. In order to fully explain the untimely nature of the Petition, a brief discussion of Ferreira and related developments in this circuit is warranted.

In Ferreira , the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit held that "AEDPA's statute of limitations begins to run from the date both the conviction and the sentence the petitioner is serving at the time he files his application become final because judgment is based on both the conviction and the sentence." See Ferreira , 494 F.3d at 1293 (emphasis in original).³ Thus, Mr. Ferreira's resentencing proceeding "triggered the running of AEDPA's statute of limitations [even though his] habeas petition only challenge[d] the original [and underlying] 1997 conviction." See id. at 1292–93. In doing so, the Eleventh Circuit "indicated, where a resentencing [proceeding] results in a new judgment , the new judgment restarts the statute of limitations." Thompson v. Fla. Dep't of Corr. , 606 F. App'x 495, 502 (11th Cir. 2015) (discussing Ferreira ) (emphasis added).

In a similar vein, pursuant to the Supreme Court's decision in Magwood , "where ... there is a new judgment intervening between the [ ] habeas petitions, an application challenging the resulting new judgment is not second or successive" for purposes of the restrictions on second or successive habeas petitions. See Magwood v. Patterson , 561 U.S. 320, 341–42, 130 S.Ct. 2788, 177 L.Ed.2d 592 (2010) (cleaned up) (emphasis added). Based on that reasoning, the Eleventh Circuit later concluded that a habeas petition "challeng[ing] a new judgment ... is not second or successive, regardless of whether its claims challenge the sentence or the underlying conviction." See Insignares v. Sec'y, Fla. Dep't of Corr. , 755 F.3d 1273, 1281 (11th Cir. 2014) (cleaned up) (emphasis added).

Even so, "not all post-judgment changes or corrections to a sentence" will qualify as a "new judgment for purposes of § 2244(d)(1)(A)." Thompson , 606 F. App'x at 502 n.8 (citations omitted); see also...