James v. State

• Decision Date: 17 June 1915
• Docket Number: 929
• Parties: JAMES v. STATE.
• Court: Alabama Supreme Court

69 So. 569

193 Ala. 55

JAMES v. STATE.

No. 929

Supreme Court of Alabama

June 17, 1915

On Rehearing, July 2, 1915

Appeal from Circuit Court, Cullman County; D.W. Speake, Judge.

George James was convicted of murder in the first degree, and he appeals. Affirmed, and application for rehearing denied.

Aside from the general issue, defendant also interposed the plea of not guilty by reason of insanity. Defendant was 18 years of age at the time of the killing, and the undisputed evidence shows that he entertained sentiments of hostility toward deceased, and that he killed him at night with a shotgun furtively fired through a window, while deceased was in his own home and seated in the midst of his family.

The state's witness Aaron testified on the cross-examination that defendant was at witness' house just before the murder; that he was drinking, and had a bottle of whisky, but he could not say he was drunk--he could walk straight, and he smelt whisky on his breath. The trial judge excluded defendant's question: "Did he offer you a drink?" The witness further stated that he had known defendant for 10 years, and that prior to the killing, and shortly before that occasion defendant passed him several times and looked like he had been drinking. The trial judge then excluded the following questions:

"What was his condition with reference to whether or not he had been drinking? "Had he not been drinking pretty heavily for several days prior to the killing?" "Tell the jury whether or not (just before the killing) in your opinion, the defendant was so much intoxicated as to be wholly unconscious of his acts." "And tell the jury, in your opinion, whether you considered him (at that time) mentally unbalanced."

The state's witness McCoy testified on cross-examination that he did not see defendant on the day of the killing, but had seen him frequently before that, and that he was well acquainted with the family of the mother of defendant, the Higgenbothams. The trial judge then excluded these questions:

"Insanity runs in the Higgenbotham family, doesn't it?" "The defendant's mother and sister were sent to the asylum, were they not?" "On other occasions, when he was drunk, was he so drunk as to be unconscious?"

Defendant's father testified for him that defendant had a spell of fever the year before, and also that he drank a good deal. The trial judge then excluded the following questions asked by defendant:

"Since that fever, has his mind been very strong or not?" "Since that fever, have you seen any acts of insanity?" "While in that condition [drinking]: (1) Is his reason dethroned? (2) Does he display any acts of insanity? (3) Is he responsible for what he does?"

Defendant's mother testified for him that she was present "Christmas a year ago" when he and his father had some trouble, and defendant was drunk, wild as a bear, and, further, that nobody could do anything with him like he is when he is drinking; affects his mind; don't know anybody." The judge excluded the expressions, "no one could do anything with him," and "affects his mind." The witness further stated that defendant nearly died the year before, and was in bed three weeks with a spell of fever. The court then excluded the following question asked by defendant: "What was the condition of his mind after he got up?" He also excluded questions as to whether insanity ran in witness' family, and whether his sister is not now insane, and confined in the lunatic asylum at Tuscaloosa.

The following charges were refused to defendant:

(1) "If you believe from the evidence that at the time the fatal shot was fired by defendant that his conduct and acts were such that he was so mentally unbalanced or insane that be did not know the consequences, then you should take such into consideration in determining your verdict."

(2) "If you believe from the evidence that although you believed beyond all reasonable doubt that defendant is guilty of murder in the first degree, yet if you believe from the evidence that defendant was so mentally unbalanced that he did not know the consequences of his act, you should find him not guilty."

(3) "Evidence that the accused was intoxicated at the time of the killing, if you find such evidence has been offered in this case, is admitted for your consideration as bearing on the question of premeditation and deliberation and if after a careful consideration of all the facts and circumstances in the case you have a reasonable doubt of defendant's guilt, you should find him, not guilty."

(4) "If you believe from the evidence that, at the time the alleged fatal shot was fired by defendant, he was drunk or mentally unbalanced to such an extent as to cause defendant to turn a deaf ear to reason, you should not convict defendant of murder in the first degree."

(5) "While defendant is required to prove that he was of unsound mind at the time of the homicide by the preponderance of the evidence, it is also true that upon the consideration of the testimony of the whole case, the state's as well as the defendant's, if any reasonable doubt remained in the minds of the jury, the verdict should be not guilty."

(6) "The legal presumption of sanity may become overcome by evidence tending to provide insanity of the accused, which is sufficient to raise a reasonable doubt of his sanity at the time of the commission of the act for which he is sought to be held accountable; but when that is done the presumption of sanity ceases, and the burden is upon the state, which is then required to prove his sanity, as an element necessary to constitute crime, beyond a reasonable doubt."

Daniel W. Troy and J. Talbert Letcher, both of Montgomery, P.M Brindley, of Hartsells, and C.L. Price, of New Decatur, for appellant.

W.L Martin, Atty. Gen., and J.P. Mudd, Asst. Atty. Gen., for the State.

SOMERVILLE J.

It was competent for the defendant to show that he was intoxicated to such a degree as to render him at the time of the killing incapable of understanding that he was committing a crime this for the purpose only of disproving the existence of the specific intent or mental state which is an essential ingredient of murder. Waldrop v. State, 185 Ala. 20, 64 So. 80; Walker v. State, 91 Ala. 76, 9 So. 87. But it was not competent for defendant's witnesses to testify that his intoxication produced that result, since that was a conclusion to be drawn by the jury from the evidence. Armor v. State, 63 Ala. 173.

The fact that defendant offered the witness Aaron a drink shortly before the killing was not material, and was properly excluded. And the mere fact that he had been drinking at other times had no tendency to show his incapacity to commit murder on the occasion in question; hence the questions to Aaron as to defendant's condition with reference to whether he was drinking on prior occasions were properly excluded. But the ruling was harmless in any case, as the witness had already testified that defendant looked like he was drinking. It may be that, had defendant offered to show that he had been "drinking pretty heavily for several days prior to the killing," with the explanation that he proposed to show fixed insanity as a result of long-continued drunken habits, this would have been competent as a link in such a chain of proof. But this purpose did not appear. Upon the predicate merely that defendant was drinking and acting queerly just before the killing, the trial judge properly refused to allow this witness to say whether he considered him "mentally unbalanced" at that time.

That defendant's mind had not been "very strong" since he had the fever the year before was obviously a mere opinion of the witness (defendant's father), and was of no probative value upon the issue of insanity vel non. Its exclusion was proper. Nor could the witness state that he had seen "acts of insanity" since the fever. He should have stated what acts of defendant he had seen, and then he might properly have given his opinion as to his insanity. Rembert v. Brown, 14 Ala. 360.

So it was not permissible for this witness to state that while defendant is drinking his reason is dethroned, or that he displays acts of insanity, or that he is not responsible for what he does. Heninburg v. State, 153 Ala. 13, 45 So. 246. Even if general results, thus drawn by the witness from other occasions, were relevant, these were conclusions to be drawn by the jury and not by the witness.

The fact that on another occasion when defendant was drunk nobody could do anything with him was clearly irrelevant, and was properly excluded.

We have examined with due care all of the excluded testimony offered by defendant to show incapacity to commit murder, or to support his plea of insanity. In every case it was properly excluded, either because it related to irrelevant occasions, or was inadmissible opinion, or because the witness giving his opinion omitted the necessary predicate of facts, or was not sufficiently qualified by observation and knowledge. Parrish v. State, 139 Ala. 28, 42, 36 So. 1012; Dominick v. Randolph, 124 Ala. 557, 564, 27 So. 481; Odom v. State, 174 Ala. 4, 56 So. 915; Heningburg v. State, 153 Ala. 13, 43 So. 246.

In this connection it is to be noted that insane conduct or mania resulting merely from present intoxication is not the insanity which excuses crime. Gunter v. State, 83 Ala. 96, 109, 8 So. 600; Parrish v. State, 139 Ala 47, 36 So. 1012; Buswell on Insanity, 449. All of the alleged abnormal conduct and conditions of defendant, offered to be shown by the several witnesses, were directly associated with present drunkenness, excepting only the instance of fever above referred to. So there was in fact no evidence before the court tending to show any fixed insanity, resulting from...