James v. State, 47995

Decision Date23 July 1976
Docket NumberNo. 47995,47995
Citation553 P.2d 345,220 Kan. 284
PartiesBob JAMES, Appellant, v. STATE of Kansas, Appellee.
CourtKansas Supreme Court
MEMORANDUM OPINION

PER CURIAM.

This is an appeal by Bob James (petitioner-appellant) from the trial court's denial of an evidentiary hearing pursuant to K.S.A. 60-1507 following sentencing and imprisonment after a plea of guilty was entered to a charge of indecent liberties with a child under fifteen. (K.S.A. 38-711 (Corrick).) The sentence was increased to a term of fifteen years to life under the habitual criminal act, K.S.A. 21-107a, now repealed but controlling in the present case.

In his motion the petitioner presents two grounds for post-conviction relief: (1) That two of the three prior convictions which the trial court used in imposing the habitual criminal sentence were constitutionally faulty in that they were obtained without the assistance of counsel; and (2) that the record of the proceedings upon arraignment and acceptance of his plea of guilty does not meet constitutional standards.

The trial court did not appoint counsel and summarily denied an evidentiary hearing. The petitioner has appealed. While the petitioner asked for an evidentiary hearing he does not suggest what, if any, evidence or witnesses might support his claims. On this state of the record the sole question for determination is the sufficiency of the record in question.

On the first point, the three prior convictions presented to the court to invoke the habitual criminal act were: (a) an Oregon conviction in 1950 for contributing to the delinquency of a nine-year-old female; (b) an Oklahoma conviction in 1963 for burglary; and (c) a Washington conviction in 1968 for taking indecent liberties with a six-year-old female.

We have no difficulty in finding that the burglary conviction in Oklahoma could not be used to enhance the criminal sentence because the record is silent as to the defendant's representation by counsel, the recital being only that the defendant was personally present. (Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335, 83 S.Ct. 792, 9 L.Ed.2d 799, 93 A.L.R.2d 733; and Burgett v. Texas, 389 U.S. 109, 88 S.Ct. 258, 19 L.Ed.2d 319.) As to the Washington conviction, the record clearly recited representation by counsel and the legality of the conviction is not questioned.

That leaves only the 1950 Oregon conviction subject to our scrutiny in the light of the United States Supreme Court decisions cited above, and our own precedents. If the record of the Oregon conviction is valid, then the sentence by the Kansas court of fifteen years to life is valid at it is supported by two prior felony convictions as required by K.S.A. 21-107a. If the record of the Oregon conviction is constitutionally insufficient, then there would reman only one valid prior conviction to support the habitual criminal treatment and the petitioner would have to be resentenced for a shorter term.

The Oregon conviction record does not show representation by counsel, but it does show a waiver of such representation which is sufficient to meet due process standards. The record recites the petitioner waived preliminary hearing and was bound over 'for action by the grand jury.' He thereafter expressed a desire 'to waive action by the grand jury and permit the district attorney to file an information upon the charge and then to have the matter heard and disposed of without further delay.' The record of the petitioner's appearance in the Oregon District Court shows the following:

'Upon the appearance of the said defendant before the court at this time, and under the circumstances above set out, in answer to questions by the court the said defendant stated he had not consulted an attorney and did not desire to do so and waived his right to have an attorney to advise him in regard to this charge. The defendant was then asked if he fully understood the meaning of the waiver of the indictment by the grand jury which he had signed, to which be replied that he did fully understand that he waived the action by the grand jury and then (and) there consented to being charged on information by the district attorney, whereupon the waiver of indictment was filed and an order made and entered, herein permitting instruction and directing the district attorney to file his information in this case, whereupon the said information was filed and read to the defendant by the clerk of this court, and the defendant was then and there advised that he could take time in which to enter his plea to the said information and the said defendant then and there waived further time and consented to enter a plea without delay, whereupon the court asked the defendant what his...

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10 cases
  • State v. Valladarez
    • United States
    • Kansas Supreme Court
    • May 8, 2009
    ...to defendant waiving preliminary hearing and during the arraignment stipulating to a factual basis for the plea); James v. State, 220 Kan. 284, 287, 553 P.2d 345 (1976) (stating that "proceedings in this case upon arraignment and the receiving of petitioner's plea of guilty measured up in a......
  • State v. Moses, 94,113.
    • United States
    • Kansas Supreme Court
    • February 3, 2006
    ...whether failure to strictly follow 22-3210 is reversible error. See, e.g., Noble v. State, 240 Kan. at 164, 727 P.2d 473; James v. State, 220 Kan. at 287, 553 P.2d 345; Trotter v. State, 218 Kan. at 269, 543 P.2d 1023; see also State v. Byrd, 203 Kan. at 52, 453 P.2d 22 ("An analysis of our......
  • Noble v. State
    • United States
    • Kansas Supreme Court
    • October 31, 1986
    ...218 Kan. at 269, 543 P.2d 1023. Strict compliance is not mandatory if the purpose of the rule is otherwise served. James v. State, 220 Kan. 284, 287, 553 P.2d 345 (1976). Here, the defendant entered his guilty pleas at the time of arraignment. The arraigning court did not inform the defenda......
  • Cox v. State
    • United States
    • Kansas Court of Appeals
    • October 18, 1991
    ...to determine that there was a factual basis for the plea. See Noble v. State, 240 Kan. 162, 170, 727 P.2d 473 (1986); James v. State, 220 Kan. 284, 287, 553 P.2d 345 (1976); Widener v. State, 210 Kan. 234, 499 P.2d 1123 The appellant raises some additional issues in his supplemental brief w......
  • Request a trial to view additional results
1 books & journal articles
  • Habeas Corpus in Kansas the Great Writ Affords Postconviction Relief at K.s.a. 60.1507
    • United States
    • Kansas Bar Association KBA Bar Journal No. 67-02, February 1998
    • Invalid date
    ...at 606. [FN61]. Parker v. State, 247 Kan. 214, 795 P.2d 68 (1990). [FN62]. Andrews, 11 Kan. App. 2d at 324-25. [FN63]. James v. State, 220 Kan. 284, 285-86, 553 P.2d 345 (1976). [FN64]. 220 Kan. at 286. [FN65]. Johnson v. State, 4 Kan. App. 2d 573, 574, 608 P.2d 1044 (1980). [FN66]. 4 Kan. ......

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