James v. State, No. CR-04-0395 (AL 4/28/2006)

• Decision Date: 28 April 2006
• Docket Number: No. CR-04-0395.,CR-04-0395.
• Parties: Joe Nathan James, Jr. v. State of Alabama.
• Court: Alabama Supreme Court

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Joe Nathan James, Jr. v. State of Alabama.

No. CR-04-0395.

Court of Criminal Appeals of Alabama.

Decided April 28, 2006.

Appeal from Jefferson Circuit Court (CC-95-4747.60)

BASCHAB, Judge.

On June 16, 1999, the appellant, Joe Nathan James, Jr., was convicted of the capital offense of burglary-murder for the killing of Faith Hall.¹ See §13A-5-40(a)(4), Ala. Code 1975. By a vote of 12-0, the jury recommended that he be sentenced to death. On July 9, 1999, the trial court accepted the jury's recommendation and sentenced the appellant to death. We affirmed his conviction and sentence, see James v. State, 788 So. 2d 185 (Ala. Crim. App. 2000); the Alabama Supreme Court denied his petition for certiorari review; and the United States Supreme Court denied his petition for certiorari review, see James v. Alabama, 523 U.S. 1040, 121 S. Ct. 2005, 149 L. Ed. 2d 1007 (2001). This court issued a certificate of judgment on December 15, 2000.

On May 7, 2002, the appellant filed a Rule 32 petition, challenging his conviction and sentence, and he subsequently amended his petition. After the State responded, the circuit court conducted an evidentiary hearing and denied the petition. This appeal followed.

The appellant raises several arguments, including claims that his attorneys rendered ineffective assistance at trial and on direct appeal. In reviewing the circuit court's rulings on the appellant's arguments, we apply the following principles:

"`"[T]he plain error rule does not apply to Rule 32 proceedings, even if the case involves the death sentence." Thompson v. State, 615 So. 2d 129 (Ala. Cr. App. 1992).' Cade v. State, 629 So. 2d 38, 41 (Ala. Crim. App. 1993), cert. denied, , 114 S. Ct. 1579, 128 L. Ed. 2d 221 (1994).

"In addition, '[t]he procedural bars of Rule 32 apply with equal force to all cases, including those in which the death penalty has been imposed.' State v. Tarver, 629 So. 2d 14, 19 (Ala. Crim. App. 1993)."

Brownlee v. State, 666 So. 2d 91, 93 (Ala. Crim. App. 1995).

"To prevail on a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, the defendant must show (1) that his counsel's performance was deficient and (2) that he was prejudiced as a result of the deficient performance. Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 104 S. Ct. 2052, 80 L. Ed. 2d 674 (1984).

"`The appellant must show that his counsel's performance was unreasonable, considering all of the attendant circumstances.... "[A] court deciding an actual ineffectiveness claim must judge the reasonableness of counsel's challenged conduct on the facts of the particular case, viewed as of the time of counsel's conduct." Strickland, 466 U.S. at 690, 104 S. Ct. at 2066.' "Duren v. State, 590 So. 2d 360, 362 (Ala. Cr. App. 1990), aff'd, 590 So. 2d 369 (Ala. 1991), cert. denied, , 112 S. Ct. 1594, 118 L. Ed. 2d 310 (1992).

"When this court is reviewing a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, we indulge a strong presumption that counsel's conduct was appropriate and reasonable. Luke v. State, 484 So. 2d 531, 534 (Ala. Cr. App. 1985). The burden is on the appellant to show that his counsel's conduct was deficient. Luke.

"`Judicial scrutiny of counsel's performance must be highly deferential. It is all too tempting for a defendant to second-guess counsel's assistance after conviction or adverse sentence, and it is all too easy for a court, examining counsel's defense after it has proved unsuccessful, to conclude that a particular act or omission of counsel was unreasonable. A fair assessment of attorney performance requires that every effort be made to eliminate the distorting effects of hindsight, to reconstruct the circumstances of counsel's challenged conduct, and to evaluate the conduct from counsel's perspective at the time. Because of the difficulties inherent in making the evaluation, a court must indulge a strong presumption that counsel's conduct falls within the wide range of reasonable professional assistance; that is, the defendant must overcome the presumption that, under the circumstances, the challenged action "might be considered sound trial strategy." There are countless ways to provide effective assistance in any given case. Even the best criminal defense attorneys would not defend a particular client in the same way.'

"Strickland, 466 U.S. at 689, 104 S. Ct. at 2065-66. (Citations omitted.) Ex parte Lawley, 512 So. 2d 1370, 1372 (Ala. Cr. App. 1987).

"Initially we must determine whether counsel's performance was deficient. We must evaluate whether the action or inaction of counsel of which the petitioner complains was a strategic choice. 'Strategic choices made after a thorough investigation of relevant law and facts are virtually unchallengeable....' Lawley, 512 So. 2d at 1372. This court must avoid using 'hindsight' to evaluate the performance of counsel. We must evaluate all the circumstances surrounding the case at the time of counsel's actions before determining whether counsel rendered ineffective assistance. Falkner v. State, 586 So. 2d 39 (Ala. Cr. App. 1991)."

Hallford v. State, 629 So. 2d 6, 8-9 (Ala. Crim. App. 1992).

"In determining whether a defendant has established his burden of showing that his counsel was ineffective, we are not required to address both considerations of the Strickland v. Washington test if the defendant makes an insufficient showing on one of the prongs. Id. at 697, 104 S. Ct. at 2069. In fact, the Court explained that '[i]f it is easier to dispose of an ineffectiveness claim on the ground of lack of sufficient prejudice, which we expect will often be so, that course should be followed.' Id. We defer to this guidance and address the 'prejudice' prong, for '[w]ith respect to the prejudice component, the lack of merit of [Thomas's] claim is even more stark.' Id. at 699, 104 S. Ct. at 2070."

Thomas v. State, 511 So. 2d 248, 255 (Ala. Crim. App. 1987) (footnote omitted).

"Furthermore, to render effective assistance, an attorney is not required to raise every conceivable constitutional claim available at trial and on appeal. Holladay v. State, 629 So. 2d 673 (Ala. Cr. App. 1992), cert. denied, 510 U.S. 1171, 114 S. Ct. 1208, 127 L. Ed. 2d 555 (1994); McCoy v. Lynaugh, 874 F.2d 954, 965-66 (5th Cir. 1989). Rather, counsel must be given some discretion in determining which claims possibly have merit, and thus a better chance of success, and which claims do not have merit, and thus have little chance of success. Heath v. State, 536 So. 2d 142 (Ala. Cr. App. 1988); Smith v. Murray, 477 U.S. 527, 106 S. Ct. 2661, 91 L. Ed. 2d 434 (1986); Engle v. Isaac, 456 U.S. 107, 102 S. Ct. 1558, 71 L. Ed. 2d 783 (1982)."

Davis v. State, 720 So. 2d 1006, 1014 (Ala. Crim. App. 1998). In addition,

"[t]he purpose of ineffectiveness review is not to grade counsel's performance. See Strickland [v. Washington], 104 S. Ct. [2052] at 2065 [(1984)]; see also White v. Singletary, 972 F.2d 1218, 1221 (11th Cir. 1992)('We are not interested in grading lawyers' performances; we are interested in whether the adversarial process at trial, in fact, worked adequately.'). We recognize that '[r]epresentation is an art, and an act or omission that is unprofessional in one case may be sound or even brilliant in another.' Strickland, 104 S. Ct. at 2067. Different lawyers have different gifts; this fact, as well as differing circumstances from case to case, means the range of what might be a reasonable approach at trial must be broad. To state the obvious: the trial lawyers, in every case, could have done something more or something different. So, omissions are inevitable. But, the issue is not what is possible or 'what is prudent or appropriate, but only what is constitutionally compelled.' Burger v. Kemp, 483 U.S. 776, 107 S. Ct. 3114, 3126, 97 L. Ed. 2d 638 (1987)."

Chandler v. United States, 218 F.3d 1305, 1313 (11th Cir. 2000) (footnote omitted). Finally,

"`"[w]here the judgment of the circuit court denying a petition for post-conviction relief is correct for any reason, it will be affirmed by this Court, even if the circuit court stated an incorrect reason for its denial."' Long v. State, 675 So. 2d 532, 533 (Ala. Cr. App. 1996) (quoting Swicegood v. State, 646 So. 2d 159, 160 (Ala. Cr. App. 1994))."

Sumlin v. State, 710 So. 2d 941, 943 (Ala. Crim. App. 1998).

The following facts, as set forth in the trial court's sentencing order, are helpful to an understanding of this case:

"The [appellant], a former boyfriend of the victim, Faith Hall, had been stalking and threatening Ms. Hall before her death. On the evening of August 15, 1994, as Ms. Hall and a friend returned to the friend's apartment, they saw the [appellant] following them in his vehicle. When they saw the [appellant] they began to run to the apartment.

"Despite their attempts to hold the front door closed, the [appellant] forced his way into the apartment. Ms. Hall began to scream, as the [appellant] came in with a pistol in his hand. When she couldn't calm him down, she began to run for the front door. The [appellant] shot at her, but missed. Ms. Hall turned and ran toward the bathroom as [appellant] followed and shot her in the head, chest, and abdomen. The [appellant] ran out the back door and left in his automobile. Ms. Hall died from her wounds. The [appellant] was arrested in California."

(A.S.C.R. 7.)²

I.

Throughout his brief, the appellant argues that his trial counsel rendered ineffective assistance during the guilt and penalty phases of his trial. After the jury recommended that he be sentenced to death, he filed a pro se motion for a new trial in which he raised ineffective-assistance-of-trial-counsel allegations. After the trial court sentenced the appellant to death, newly appointed appellate counsel filed a motion for a new trial and raised an ineffective-assistance-of-trial-counsel claim. Finally, he raised and this court addressed and rejected several ineffective-assistance-of-trial-counsel grounds on direct appeal. See James, ...