James v. State

Decision Date03 October 1983
Docket NumberNo. 2-483A104,2-483A104
Citation454 N.E.2d 1225
PartiesWilliam JAMES, Appellant (Defendant Below), v. STATE of Indiana, Appellee (Plaintiff Below).
CourtIndiana Appellate Court

Patrick A. Schuster, Kelly Leeman & Associates, Logansport, for appellant.

Linley E. Pearson, Atty. Gen. of Ind., Michael Gene Worden, Deputy Atty. Gen., Indianapolis, for appellee.

HOFFMAN, Judge.

On May 14, 1981, appellant William James was arrested and charged with operating a motor vehicle while intoxicated. One week later, James was arraigned with approximately twelve other individuals. Following a roll call, the court addressed the entire group and explained the purpose of arraignment proceedings. Continuing to address the whole group, the court carefully and painstakingly advised those charged of the following:

1. the right to be represented by a lawyer;

2. the fact that a defendant is presumed innocent until proven guilty;

3. the right to a speedy and public jury trial;

4. the right to confront and cross-examine witnesses;

5. a defendant's right to subpoena and present his own witnesses;

6. the privilege against self-incrimination;

7. that the State bears the burden of proving guilt beyond a reasonable doubt; and

8. the right to an appeal upon conviction.

The court went on to discuss the consequences of entering a guilty plea as follows:

"If there is a plea of guilty, there is no trial. And therefore, a person who pleads guilty is giving up these rights. There's no longer the right to appeal. There's no longer the right to remain silent or to require the state to prove it's [sic] case.

All of those are given up. A plea of guilty is a legally binding admission of the truth of the charge that has been filed. A person who pleads guilty will be required to testify against himself."

Following this thorough advisement of rights, the court individually polled each defendant. At this time James was advised of the specific charge entered against him and of the minimum and maximum penalties. After ascertaining that James understood his rights, the court accepted his guilty plea.

James now appeals from the denial of his petition for post-conviction relief by which he sought to withdraw his guilty plea.

James first alleges that the trial court failed to adequately inform him of his constitutional and statutory rights before accepting his guilty plea. Ind.Code Sec. 35-4.1-1-3 (Burns 1979 Repl.) 1 provides:

"Plea of guilty--Defendant advised by court.--

The court shall not accept a plea of guilty from the defendant without first addressing the defendant and

(a) Determining that he understands the nature of the charge against him;

(b) Informing him that by his plea of guilty he is admitting the truth of all facts alleged in the indictment or information or to an offense included thereunder and that upon entry of such plea the court shall proceed with judgment and sentence;

(c) Informing him that by his plea of guilty he waives his rights to a public and speedy trial by jury, to face the witnesses against him, to have compulsory process for obtaining witnesses in his favor and to require the state to prove his guilt beyond a reasonable doubt at a trial at which the defendant may not be compelled to testify against himself;

(d) Informing him of the maximum possible sentence and minimum sentence for the offense charged and of any possible increased sentence by reason of the fact of a prior conviction or convictions, and of any possibility of the imposition of consecutive sentences;

(e) Informing him that the court is not a party to any agreement which may have been made between the prosecutor and the defense and is not bound thereby."

The Supreme Court of Indiana has held that it is the duty of the trial court to strictly comply with the terms of this statute. German v. State, (1981) Ind., 428 N.E.2d 234. The German case further stated that:

"other cases, to the extent that they held that the statutory obligation of the trial judge to inform the defendant that a plea of guilty operates as a waiver or surrender of the above enumerated rights may be met by something short of a direct statement to that effect, are overruled."

428 N.E.2d at 237.

In spite of several subsequent attacks on this reading of the statute, the Supreme Court has consistently reaffirmed the rationale of German. See Davis v. State, (1983) Ind., 446 N.E.2d 1317; Early v. State, (1982) Ind., 442 N.E.2d 1071; Romine v. State, (1982) Ind., 431 N.E.2d 780.

In Early, supra, the Supreme Court held:

"In order for rights to be voluntarily waived, they must be known and understood at the time of the waiver. The waiver occurs simultaneously with the guilty plea; hence the judge must ascertain, and the record must reflect, that the defendant understands his rights and the effect of a guilty plea at that very moment. That is the critical time. What he knew or did not know at prior times, including the time when he signed the plea agreement, is immaterial except insofar as it may be an aid to the hearing judge and to us in determining what he comprehended and understood at the time the plea is given." (Original emphasis.)

442 N.E.2d at 1072.

Failure on the part of the trial court to comply with these standards will require reversal on appeal.

Initially, James asserts that the statute has not been followed because the trial court failed to individually inform him of all constitutional and statutory rights. However, he is unable to cite authority to support his theory that jointly informing defendants at arraignment is per se inadequate. Nor does the statute or the supporting cases require that one charged be individually apprised of all rights.

James correctly contends that the trial judge must "personally" advise defendants of all rights. However, this does not mean that judges must sit down with each and every individual arraigned and repeat all enumerated rights. Instead, this insures that it will be the trial judge himself, rather than the bailiff, prosecutor, or the defendant's own attorney who ultimately addresses defendants.

In the case at bar, the defendant was advised contemporaneously with twelve other persons similarly charged. However, he was personally polled on his plea and questioned on whether he understood his rights. Under these circumstances, the letter as well as the spirit of Ind.Code Sec. 35-4.1-1-3 have been observed, and no error committed.

James collaterally contends that the trial court failed to adequately inform him of the right to a speedy and public trial. The record indicates that the trial judge instructed all arraigned as follows:

"If there is a plea of not guilty the case will be set for trial. Trial will be held in this courtroom as a public matter, anybody can come in, the door will be open as it is this evening. It will not be immediately. I do not anticipate having a trial this evening. However, we will put it on as quickly as we can put it on the court's schedule, usally [sic] in a matter of several weeks."

Although this simple and direct statement does not follow the specific language of the statute, it does comply with the legal standard set out in Early, supra. Early states that:

"[a]lthough we will not hold the plea hearing judge to particular language in carrying out the mandate of the statute, if its simple language is utilized, together with simple questions, to ascertain that the defendant does, in fact, understand the meaning of each advisement and simple explanations, when necessary, defendants who plead guilty will not only be fully advised and competent to plead, but the record will also clearly reflect as much; and judicial time and effort can be conserved." (Emphasis added.)

442 N.E.2d at 1072.

Although Early indicates that use of the statutory language may be preferred, it appears that the trial court sufficiently informed James of his right to a speedy and public trial without employing magic words.

James next alleges that the trial court erred by failing to adequately ascertain whether his guilty plea was knowingly and voluntarily entered. Ind.Code Sec. 35-4.1-1-4(a) 2 provides:

"The court shall not accept a plea of guilty without first personally addressing the defendant and determining that the plea is voluntary. The court shall address the defendant and determine whether any promises, force or threats were used to obtain the plea."

According to James, this statute is mandatory to the same extent as Ind.Code Sec. 35-4.1-1-3. In support of this contention, he cites the case of Collins v. State, (1979) Ind.App., 394 N.E.2d 211. In Collins, the Court of Appeals held:

"... we find the language of Ind.Code 35-4.1-1-3 and Ind.Code 35-4.1-1-4 to be mandatory. Turman v....

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  • Richardson v. State, 41
    • United States
    • Maryland Court of Appeals
    • May 14, 2004
    ...of the rights and the concept of waiver, id. at 616, citing French v. State, 472 N.E.2d 210, 212 (Ind.App.1984); James v. State, 454 N.E.2d 1225, 1227 (Ind.App.1983), the court reviewed the evidence from which it concluded that the record in that case was inadequate to demonstrate a knowing......
  • Albright v. State
    • United States
    • Indiana Appellate Court
    • January 26, 1984
    ...412 N.E.2d 748; Hackett v. State, (1977) 266 Ind. 103, 360 N.E.2d 1000; 21A Am.Jur.2d Criminal Law Sec. 878; see also James v. State, (1983) Ind.App., 454 N.E.2d 1225 (right to public trial adequately conveyed by statement that "Trial will be held ... as a public matter, anybody can come in......
  • Snowe v. State
    • United States
    • Indiana Appellate Court
    • February 8, 1989
    ...plea. ... The record must indicate the defendant knew of and understood his rights when he entered his guilty plea. James v. State (1983), Ind.App., 454 N.E.2d 1225, 1227; Ewing, supra, 358 N.E.2d at 208. The trial court must determine for itself without surmise a defendant has been informe......
  • Mescher v. State, 02A03-9608-CR-308
    • United States
    • Indiana Appellate Court
    • October 20, 1997
    ...the trial court was deemed an acceptable procedure in French v. State, 472 N.E.2d 210, 212 (Ind.Ct.App.1984) and in James v. State, 454 N.E.2d 1225, 1227 (Ind.Ct.App.1983). However, the sine qua non of both cases was the personal interrogation of the defendant by the trial court to determin......
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