James v. State, No. 1275S385

• Docket Nº: No. 1275S385
• Citation: 265 Ind. 384, 354 N.E.2d 236
• Case Date: September 22, 1976
• Court: Supreme Court of Indiana

Page 236

354 N.E.2d 236 265 Ind. 384 Sam JAMES, Jr., Appellant,
v.
STATE of Indiana, Appellee. No. 1275S385. Supreme Court of Indiana. Sept. 22, 1976.

Page 238

[265 Ind. 385] Anthony V. Luber, South Bend, for appellant.

Theodore L. Sendak, Atty. Gen., Arthur Thaddeus Perry, Deputy Atty. Gen., Indianapolis, for appellee.

DEBRULER, Justice.

Defendant-appellant, Sam James, Jr., was convicted of first degree murder, Ind. Code § 35--13--4--1, after a trial by jury, and was sentenced to life imprisonment. He claims that the trial court erred in six respects:

(1) The trial court admitted over objection State's exhibit 1, a photograph of the victim's body.

(2) The trial court gave State's Instruction No. 3, defining the elements of the offense of first degree murder.

(3) The trial court gave State's Instruction No. 5, concerning the jury's consideration of the evidence.

(4) The trial court gave State's Instruction No. 6, charging the jurors that they might consider flight as a circumstance showing guilt.

(5) The trial court gave State's Instruction No. 8 concerning the availability of voluntary intoxication as a defense.

(6) The verdict is alleged to be unsupported by sufficient evidence of premeditation and sanity.

The evidence received by the jury upon which it might reasonably have relied in reaching its verdict disclosed that appellant was married to the victim Connie James and lived [265 Ind. 386] with her and their children. He had been a security guard for Notre Dame University, but on November 3, 1973, he argued with his supervisor and was first fired, then reinstated on a probationary basis. Around this time appellant and his wife had arguments concerning appellant's adequacy as a provider and his wife's intention to work.

On the evening of November 6, 1973, appellant and his wife were in their bedroom arguing; their eighteen year old daughter Patti was also present in the room. He had a gun in a holster on the bed. After his wife agreed with appellant's assertion that they no longer loved each other, appellant drew the gun. Patti tried to hold appellant, heard a shot, and saw her mother fall with blood on her. Appellant's son Sam, fourteen, had shortly before heard appellant threaten to shoot his wife if she would

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not 'hold still.' Sam heard the gunshot and heard appellant first tell Patti that the victim had only fainted, then say 'She's really dead.'

After the shooting appellant took his gun, such money as he could find around the house, and left. He told Floyd Ebersole, a friend, that he had done 'something bad;' he had accidentally shot his wife. He asked Ebersole to 'give him a half-hour to run' before notifying the police. Appellant appeared at the home of another friend, Robert Kinas, and told Kinas that Patti had shot her mother. He asked to trade guns with Kinas.

Appellant was arrested on November 7, 1973, in Crittenden County, Arkansas, by the local sheriff. He told the sheriff, after being warned of his rights, that his gun had gone off during a scuffle with his wife, shooting her, and that he had disposed of the gun in a river.

Appellant was returned to St. Joseph County where he plead not guilty to an indictment for first degree murder and raised the defense of insanity. At trial several family friends and the family's pastor testified as to factors tending to show that appellant was under stress, was taking various medications, and was acting 'out of the ordinary.' Father Maley, [265 Ind. 387] the pastor, had suggested that appellant see a psychiatrist, on the day of the shooting.

Two practicing psychiatrists, Doctor Urruti and Doctor Harris, were appointed by the court to examine appellant. Dr. Urruti testified that the version of the episode related by appellant would lead him to believe that appellant acted in an 'alcoholic blackout,' a physiological condition caused by chronic alcoholism in which appellant could have acted without being consciously aware of his actions. Dr. Urruti testified that this condition was not exacerbated by emotional stress. Dr. Urruti did not find appellant to be otherwise suffering from any mental disease or defect. Dr. Harris did not find appellant to be subject to any mental disease or defect which resulted in 'his lacking substantial capacity to either appreciate the wrongfulness of his conduct or to conform his conduct to the requirements of the law at that time.' The jury returned a verdict of guilty to the indictment.

Appellant first contends that State's exhibit 1, a single black and white photograph of the victim's body, showing blood on her neck and clothing, should not have been admitted because 'the gruesome nature of the picture was calculated to arouse the passions of the jury against the accused and served no other legitimate purpose.'

We do not agree. In Patterson v. State, (1975) Ind., 324 N.E.2d 482, we recognized that:

'(c)onsiderable latitude is permitted to the trial judge in determining the admissibility of such evidence, when a fair conflict appears between the State's right to present relevant evidence and the defendant's right to be protected from prejudice likely to be engendered from morbid and shocking displays.' 324 N.E.2d at 486.

Here, as in Patterson, the photograph was 'relevant and competent . . . to assist the jurors in orienting themselves in and understanding other evidence.' Id. The photograph showed the identity of the victim, the location of the wound, and the position of her body. It was therefore useful to the jury notwithstanding the existence of verbal testimony on the same points.

[265 Ind. 388] Appellant urges error in the giving of State's Instruction No. 3 which reads:

'The elements which distinguish the crimes with which the defendant is charged in this case are as follows:

To be murder in the first degree it must be established by the evidence, beyond a...