James v. Upper Arlington City School Dist., C2-97-172.

• Decision Date: 15 December 1997
• Docket Number: No. C2-97-172.,C2-97-172.
• Parties: Joseph JAMES, et al., Plaintiffs, v. UPPER ARLINGTON CITY SCHOOL DISTRICT, et al., Defendants.
• Court: U.S. District Court — Southern District of Ohio

987 F.Supp. 1017

Joseph JAMES, et al., Plaintiffs, v. UPPER ARLINGTON CITY SCHOOL DISTRICT, et al., Defendants.

No. C2-97-172.

United States District Court, S.D. Ohio, Eastern Division.

December 15, 1997.

Peter W.D. Wright, Deltaville, VA, William M. Mattes, Dinsmore & Shohl, Columbus, OH, for Plaintiffs.

John Albert, Crabbe, Brown, Jones, Potts & Schmidt, Columbus, OH, for Defendants.

SARGUS, District Judge.

I.

This matter is before the Court on a Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings filed by Defendants, Upper Arlington City School District, et al.,¹ pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(c). Plaintiff, Joseph James, and his parents, oppose the motion, arguing that the facts alleged in the pleadings are in dispute, and, thus, summary disposition of the matter under Rule 12(c) is not appropriate. For the reasons that follow, however, Defendants' Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings is granted.

II.

The following facts have been elicited from the parties extensive pleadings,² and are viewed in a light most favorable to Plaintiffs, as nonmovants. All reasonable inferences have been drawn in favor of Plaintiffs.

Plaintiff, Joseph James, has a severe form of dyslexia. Dyslexia is a neurological disorder which affects an individual's ability to acquire basic language skills, including reading and writing. Joseph's physician, Dr. Sandra M. Stewart, made a preliminary diagnosis of dyslexia in July, 1985, just two months before the child entered Kindergarten at the Barrington Elementary School in the Upper Arlington School District.

Joseph's parents, Plaintiffs Nancy and Cameron James, provided the school with Dr. Stewart's report and discussed Joseph's learning disability with his classroom teacher as well as the building principal. Joseph's Kindergarten year was uneventful in terms of the relevant issues before this Court.

Before Joseph began his first grade year in 1986, the Barrington School informed the James that Joseph qualified for the Reading Recovery program.³ Mr. and Mrs. James consented to Joseph's participation in the program. The Reading Recovery program did not prove beneficial to Joseph, and the child did not progress in his reading skills. Following this unsuccessful year of Reading Recovery, Joseph was identified as a special education student, an evaluation was conducted, and an individualized education program ("IEP") was developed in June of 1987.

Barrington continued to use Reading Recovery as the primary means to teach Joseph to read. During his first, second, and third grade years, Joseph regressed in reading, writing and arithmetic. Joseph's parents became increasingly dissatisfied with the School District's approach to Joseph's learning disability. In October of 1989, during Joseph's fourth grade year, the Barrington School scheduled another IEP meeting. During this October 1989 IEP meeting, Plaintiffs "realized that Upper Arlington School District was either unable or unwilling to modify their existing program to meet Joe's unique needs and could not provide Joe with the services he required in order to learn how to read." (Complaint, ¶ 86.)

In November of 1989, Joseph's parents unilaterally withdrew him from Barrington Elementary School and placed him into Marburn Academy, a private special education school. Under a special program known as the Orton-Gillinham approach, Joseph experienced initial success during his fourth (1989-1990), fifth (1990-1991) and sixth grade years (1991-1992) at Marburn. Joseph then attended the Gow School in 1992-1993, which proved to be much less constructive. The parents then enrolled Joseph in the Kildonan School, in Amednia, New York, at the beginning of his eighth grade year (1995-1996), where he has remained a student, and is doing well.

Upper Arlington School District created Form EVF 215, a brochure entitled Information for Parents Regarding Special Education, in July 1982. (Complaint, Exhibit S, "Final Decision of Impartial Hearing Officer," Findings of Fact, at ¶ 6.) Section VI of Form EVF 215, entitled "Mediation, Impartial Due Process Hearing, and Appeals," provides in pertinent part:

An impartial due process hearing is a formal, administrative procedure that is held to resolve disagreements. Both you, and the school district have the right to request an impartial due process hearing at any time to resolve disagreements related to any school district proposal ... or the provision of a free appropriate public education to your child....

On April 14, 1987, Nancy James signed a form entitled Parent Response for Evaluation, which states "My rights have been discussed with me and I have received (1) Request for Evaluation Letter, (2) Proposed Evaluation Form and (3) Information for Parents Regarding Special Education. (Complaint, Exhibit S, "Final Decision of Impartial Hearing Officer," Findings of Fact, at ¶ 7.)

Plaintiffs did not request a due process hearing until May 13, 1996, a full six and one-half (6½) years after his parents had removed Joseph from the Upper Arlington School District in November of 1989. In their 1996 request for a due process hearing, Plaintiffs put the School District on notice that they desired retrospective and prospective reimbursement for Joseph's tuition during the 1993-94, 1994-95, 1995-96, and 1996-97 academic years pursuant to Individuals with Disabilities Education Act, 20 U.S.C. § 1400 et seq. At the administrative level, the School District filed a motion to dismiss/or for summary judgment. The Administrative Hearing Officer granted the School District's motion on the grounds that the parents unilaterally withdrew their son from the Barrington School without exhausting or initiating due process procedures. This decision was affirmed administratively.

Plaintiffs filed their complaint against the Upper Arlington School District and the Board of Education, along with its superintendent and board members, primarily as an appeal of the administrative decisions. In this appeal, Plaintiffs also seek redress for alleged violations of § 504 of the Rehabilitation Act, 29 U.S.C. § 794, and for purported due process violations in contravention of 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Defendants filed their answer, and subsequently moved for judgment on the pleadings.

III.

Defendants bring the instant motion under Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(c) which provides that, "after the pleadings are closed but within such time as not to delay the trial, any party may move for judgment on the pleadings." Judgment may be granted under Rule 12(c) where the movants clearly establish that no material issue of fact remains to be resolved and that they are entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Beal v. Missouri Pacific R.R., 312 U.S. 45, 61 S.Ct. 418, 85 L.Ed. 577 (1941); 5 Charles A. Wright & Arthur R. Miller, Federal Practice and Procedure (hereinafter Wright & Miller) § 1368, p. 518. For purposes of this motion, all well-pleaded material allegations of the pleadings of the opposing party must be taken as true, while all contravening assertions in the movants' pleadings are taken as false. Given this standard, the motion may be granted only if the moving party is nevertheless clearly entitled to judgment. Southern Ohio Bank v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 479 F.2d 478 (6th Cir.1973); 5 Charles A. Wright & Arthur R. Miller, § 1368, p. 520.

The rule itself provides for a conversion procedure whereby the motion for judgment on the pleadings may be deemed a rule 56 summary judgment motion where matters outside the pleadings are presented to and not excluded by the court; however, it is within the court's discretion whether to accept extraneous matter on a 12(c) motion and treat it as one for summary judgment. See, e.g., A.S. Abell Company v. Baltimore Typographical Union No. 12, 338 F.2d 190 (4th Cir.1964); 5 Charles A. Wright & Arthur R. Miller, § 1371, p. 705. In the instant situation, the Court declines to consider matters outside the pleadings, given the conclusion that the issue is one of law which can be resolved on the pleadings, and consequently, the standards governing Rule 12(c) are applicable.

IV.

A. Individuals with Disabilities Education Act

This dispute involves Plaintiffs' request for reimbursement for the substantial funds they have spent in private school tuition after Joseph was removed from the Barrington School in the Upper Arlington School District in November of 1989. Plaintiffs aver that they have invested over $150,000 for Joseph's education in private schools.⁴ (Complaint, Exhibit B, Due Process Request, p. 9.) Plaintiffs contend that they never were advised by the School District that their child had a right to a continuum of special education placements, including private school special education placement. As such, Plaintiffs contend that they are entitled to reimbursement, even though they failed to initiate the administrative due process proceedings until 6½ years after they withdrew their child from Barrington.

1. GENERALLY

In exchange for federal funds, the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act, 20 U.S.C. § 1400, et seq., ("IDEA") requires states to identify, locate, and evaluate "all children residing in the State who are disabled ... and who are in need of special education and related services...." 20 U.S.C. § 1412(2)(C). The IDEA requires states to provide children with special needs and disabilities a "free and appropriate education." 20 U.S.C. § 1401(a)(18). The IDEA defines a "free and appropriate education" ("FEPA") as special education and related services that —

(A) have been provided at public expense, under public supervision and direction, and without charge,

(B) meet the standards of the State educational agency,

(C) include an appropriate preschool, elementary, or secondary school education in the State involved, and

(D) are provided in conformity with the individualized education program ("IEP") required under section 1414(a)(5) of this title.

20 U.S.C. § 1410(a)(18). The school has a...