James v. Vornlocker
| Decision Date | 31 August 2022 |
| Docket Number | 3:19 Civ. 13690 |
| Parties | PATRICE JAMES, Plaintiff, v. ROBERT VORNLOCKER, JR., et al., Defendants. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — District of New Jersey |
Plaintiff Patrice James bought two lots and built a house in Franklin Township, located in Somerset, New Jersey, but after years of construction trouble, failed inspections, and disputes with Township officials, banks foreclosed on her house and land. James sued the Township, as well as Township officials Robert Vornlocker, Vincent Lupo, Carl Hauck, Richard Carabelli, and Louis N. Rainone, alleging violations of various federal and state laws relating to alleged discrimination and taking of property. Defendants now move for summary judgment. For the reasons detailed below, the Court will grant Defendants' motion.
BACKGROUND[1]
Prior to outlining the pertinent facts in this matter, the Court must first briefly address which facts are undisputed on this record. Local Civil Rule 56.1(a) provides that opponents of summary judgment must furnish “a responsive statement of material facts, addressing each paragraph of the movant's statement, indicating agreement or disagreement and, if not agreed, stating each material fact in dispute and citing to the affidavits and other documents submitted in connection with the motion[.]” Local Civil Rule 56.1(a) (emphasis added). Thus, where a fact stated in a movant's Rule 56.1 Statement is supported by evidence, the Court finds such fact to be true where the nonmovant merely denies it: (1) with a conclusory statement, (2) without evidentiary support, or (3) with the recitation of additional facts but without actually contesting the asserted proposition. See, e.g. Marsh v. GGB, LLC, 455 F.Supp.3d 113, 119 n.2 (D.N.J. 2020); V.C. ex rel. Costello v. Target Corp., 454 F.Supp.3d 415, 419 n.4 (D.N.J. 2020); Read v. Profeta, 397 F.Supp.3d 597, 612 n.3 (D.N.J. 2019); Barker v. Our Lady of Mount Carmel Sch., 2016 WL 4571388, at *1 n.1 (D.N.J. Sep. 1, 2016).
In her Rule 56.1 statement, Plaintiff admits all but 23 statements in Defendants' 176-paragraph submission. (See generally Pl. 56.1). And where Plaintiff does dispute a statement, her 23 objections merely consist of a conclusory declaration that Defendants' conduct was improper, add extraneous facts without actually contesting Defendants' statement, or advance legal conclusions disguised as statements of fact.[2] (Pl. 56.1 ¶¶ 6-7, 11, 34, 40 44, 46, 63, 73-77, 146, 148, 150-52, 155, 164, 167, 169-70). See, e.g., V.C., 454 F.Supp.3d at 419 n.4; Read, 397 F.Supp.3d at 612 n.3; accord Ill. Nat'l Ins. Co. v. Wyndham Worldwide Ops., Inc., 85 F.Supp.3d 785, 792 (D.N.J. 2015) (“Statements that ‘blur[ ] the line between fact and opinion' and include ‘arguments cloaked as undisputed facts' are improper under [Local] Rule [56.1] and will not be considered by the court.”
(quoting N.J. Auto. Ins. Plan v. Sciarra, 103 F.Supp.2d 388, 395 n.4 (D.N.J. 1998)). Furthermore, for 20 of her 23 objections, Plaintiff fails to support her contentions with “affidavits [or] other documents submitted in connection with the motion[.]” Local Civil Rule 56.1(a). (Pl. 56.1 ¶¶ 6-7, 11, 34, 40, 44, 46, 63, 75-77, 146, 148, 150-52, 155, 167, 169-70).[3]
As such, even where Plaintiff objects to Defendants' Rule 56.1 statements, she fails to create a dispute. Accordingly, the Court deems Defendants' statements to be undisputed, but nevertheless notes objections below where appropriate. See Local Civil Rule 56.1(a); see also Read, 397 F.Supp.3d at 611, 612 n.3; Barker, 2016 WL 4571388, at *1 n.1. And because a failure to dispute a statement of material facts “is not alone a sufficient basis for the entry of a summary judgment,” the Court independently reviews the record to ensure Defendants have carried their burden of proof under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56(e). Anchorage Assocs. v. V.I. Bd. of Tax Rev., 922 F.2d 168, 175 (3d Cir. 1990).[4]
1. The Parties
Plaintiff identifies herself as a black woman who is a principal property manager for the Port Authority of New York and New Jersey. (Def. 56.1 ¶ 4; James Dep. 12:5-7, 121:12-13). In 2007, she bought land in Franklin Township on which she built a home. (Def. 56.1 ¶¶ 1-3). After experiencing financial and construction trouble, and difficulties satisfying various local and state regulations, Plaintiff sued Franklin Township, as well as Township Manager Robert Vornlocker, Construction Manager Vincent Lupo, Public Works Engineer Carl Hauck, Tax Assessor Richard Carabelli, and Township Attorney Louis N. Rainone (the “Individual Defendants,” and collectively with Franklin Township, “Defendants”), alleging race and sex discrimination in connection with various disputes over Plaintiff's property. (See FAC 4-14).[5]
2. Plaintiff's Construction Difficulties
In 2007, Plaintiff bought two adjacent lots in Franklin Township with plans to subdivide the property into three lots and build houses on each of the lots. (Def. 56.1 ¶¶ 1-2). The claims in this litigation arise from difficulties surrounding the construction of-and subsequent dispute over obtaining a certificate of occupancy (“CO”) for-the first of these houses, where Plaintiff has lived since its construction. (See id. at ¶¶ 3, 6-7; see also FAC 3-4).
Plaintiff's difficulties grew out of an overly ambitious construction project. Although she had no direct experience with construction or home-building, she declined to hire a construction company or general contractor for the construction of her home. (Def. 56.1 ¶¶ 56-57). Instead, Plaintiff opted to serve as her own general contractor (id. at ¶¶ 56-62), consulted colleagues at the Port Authority as needed on an informal basis (id. at ¶¶ 63-64), and had family members do “a lot of the work” to keep the cost of construction down. (id. at ¶ 14).
But for myriad reasons, Plaintiff's plan to complete the construction herself quickly ran into trouble. For one, there were wetlands on her property, and she faced repeated delays, stop work orders, and violations arising out of her improper dumping and failure to comply with other wetlands-related requirements of the New Jersey Department of Environmental Protection (“NJDEP”). (See Def. 56.1 ¶¶ 65-79, 128-36, 138-41). These requirements included putting in dry wells to handle increased runoff from the house she built-a requirement Plaintiff disputed and continues to dispute to this day-which caused a significant delay and financial outlay to resolve. (Id. at ¶¶ 73-79).
For another, the construction required various building and zoning approvals that Plaintiff had difficulty securing. For example, it took roughly two years for the Township Planning Board to approve Plaintiff's proposed subdivision and issue zoning and construction permits, because Plaintiff required seven compliance reviews to finally satisfy at least thirteen of the fourteen compliance areas. (See Def. 56.1 ¶¶ 80-96).
Once Plaintiff secured necessary permits and approvals, she experienced further delays as a result of failed inspections and code violations. Township records reflect that between 2010 and 2013, Plaintiff requested 127 inspections, cancelled 31 inspection requests, and failed 44 inspections. (Def. 56.1 ¶¶ 117-19).[6] The Township carried out approximately 70 inspections on the interior construction alone. (Id. at ¶ 97). The record is replete with documentation explaining and substantiating the numerous reasons for Plaintiff's many failed inspections, including for deficient plumbing and electrical work (id. at ¶ 121), failure to connect a gas pipe to the furnace (id. at ¶¶ 104-05), and failure to install dry wells (id. at ¶ 114). (See also id. at ¶¶ 98-114 (detailing failed inspections); Lupo Decl., Ex. 1 (); cf. Lupo Decl. ¶ 7 ()).
On top of these permitting and inspection difficulties, Plaintiff also received three stop work orders, “one for a soil disturbance violation, one for a potential wetlands/soil export issue, and another one for moving soil onto an adjacent property without a permit.” (Def. 56.1 ¶ 123). These stop work orders required the involvement of the NJDEP, as they implicated the wetlands on and adjacent to Plaintiff's property (see id. at ¶¶ 128-29, 133-140), and required remediation, resulting in additional delays (see id. at ¶¶ 127, 132, 139-40). In total, Plaintiff claims the stop work orders delayed her by sixto-eight months, though she testified that she continued construction even while subject to a stop work order. (Id. at ¶¶ 141-42).
Despite Plaintiff's many failed inspections, stop work orders, fines, and violations, the record contains no evidence of a formal appeal of any of these adverse decisions. (Lupo Decl. ¶ 17; see id. at ¶¶ 11-13, 16 (detailing proper procedure for appealing stop work orders, fines, construction violations, and failed inspections).
3. Plaintiff's Financial Difficulties
Plaintiff had planned to construct homes on the property she purchased and then to refinance the homes to pay off the original mortgage. (Def. 56.1 ¶ 11). But when she ran into trouble completing the construction quickly, she faced serious financial challenges. (Id. at ¶ 32). So, over the following years, she obtained additional construction mortgages, refinanced her mortgages numerous times, obtained several private, high-interest loans, and received myriad extensions on those loan and mortgage payments. (See id. at ¶¶ 15-41).
To qualify for some of these loans and refinancing opportunities, Plaintiff had to shuffle ownership of the land among various people and...
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