James v. Wards Cove Packing Co.
| Decision Date | 08 April 2005 |
| Docket Number | No. C04-1409Z.,C04-1409Z. |
| Parties | Neal JAMES, Plaintiff, v. WARDS COVE PACKING COMPANY, a foreign corporation, F/V Ocean Maid, her tackle, gear, furniture, apparel, and equipment, Defendants. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Western District of Washington |
Schwabe Williamson & Wyatt, Seattle, WA, for Defendants.
Dann D. Sheffield, Dann D. Sheffield & Associates, Robert N. Windes, Moran Windes & Wong, Angela Wong, Moran Windes & Wong, Seattle, WA, for Plaintiff.
Plaintiff Neal James was employed by Defendant Wards Cove Packing ("Wards Cove") during the winter of 2002/2003. Ex. A to Madden Decl., docket no. 19, at 6-7 (James Dep.). On January 7, 2003, Plaintiff fell and was injured while disembarking from the F/V Ocean Maid. First Am. Compl., docket no. 27, at ¶ 16. At the time of the incident, Plaintiff was working at the Wards Cove facility on Lake Union in Seattle, Washington (the "Seattle Yard"). James Decl., docket no. 25, at ¶ 5. From November 2002 through January 2003, Plaintiff worked for Wards Cove as a welder. Steele Decl., docket no. 20, at ¶ 2. Plaintiff's duties included working on shore in the welding shop and performing repairs on Wards Cove vessels moored at the Seattle Yard. Id.
From November 2002 through January 2003, Plaintiff resided on the Wards Cove vessel F/V Ocean Maid, which was laid up for the winter and moored at the Seattle Yard. Id. at ¶ 5. The F/V Ocean Maid did not sail during the winter of 2002/2003, and was used solely as a dormitory for skilled, out-of-state workers such as the Plaintiff. Id. Wards Cove offered its employees the opportunity to reside on the F/V Ocean Maid in order to make winter jobs in Seattle more attractive to skilled workers coming from outside the Seattle area. Id. at ¶ 6-7.
During the winter of 2002/2003 Plaintiff James performed maintenance and repair work aboard Wards Cove's fleet of vessels.1 See James Decl., docket no. 25, at ¶ 5. Plaintiff's tasks included welding leaky fish tanks, handrails, and other vessel instrumentalities. Id. In addition, although the Wards Cove vessels on which Plaintiff worked were laid up for the winter, Plaintiff occasionally assisted in repositioning Wards Cove vessels in the Seattle Yard. Id. This included taking vessels out into Lake Union in order to turn them around, as well as handling lines. Id. Plaintiff acknowledges his shore-based employment, but claims that approximately 50% of his work was performed aboard various Wards Cove vessels. Id. Plaintiff also alleges that while working onboard Wards Cove vessels in the Seattle Yard he was "regularly exposed to the perils generated by pitching, rolling, and moving vessels." Id. at ¶ 6.
On January 7, 2003, at approximately 9:30 p.m., Plaintiff slipped and fell backwards while walking on the gangway from the F/V Ocean Maid to the dock. Id. at ¶ 8. At the time of his injury, Plaintiff was living aboard the F/V Ocean Maid and spent most nights aboard the vessel. Id. However, Plaintiff had not performed any tasks while working aboard the F/V Ocean Maid for nearly two months; Plaintiff's last work assignment aboard the F/V Ocean Maid was from November 12, 2002 through November 15, 2002. Id.
Summary judgment is appropriate where there is no genuine issue of material fact and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. FED. R. CIV. P. 56(C). The moving party bears the initial burden of demonstrating the absence of a genuine issue of material fact. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323, 106 S.Ct. 2548, 91 L.Ed.2d 265 (1986). Once the moving party has met this burden, the opposing party must show that there is a genuine issue of fact for trial. Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 586, 106 S.Ct. 1348, 89 L.Ed.2d 538 (1986). The opposing party must present significant and probative evidence to support its claim or defense. Intel Corp. v. Hartford Accident & Indem. Co., 952 F.2d 1551, 1558 (9th Cir.1991).
For purposes of this motion, reasonable doubts as to the existence of material facts are resolved against the moving party and inferences are drawn in the light most favorable to the opposing party. Addisu v. Fred Meyer, Inc., 198 F.3d 1130, 1134 (9th Cir.2000). However, while "[t]he inquiry into seaman status is of necessity fact specific," "summary judgment or a directed verdict is mandated where the facts and the law will reasonably support only one conclusion." Heise v. Fishing Company of Alaska, Inc., 79 F.3d 903, 905 (9th Cir.1996).
Defendant urges the Court to dismiss Plaintiff's Jones Act claims because Plaintiff is not a "seaman" under the Jones Act.2 "[A] seaman must have a connection to a vessel in navigation that is substantial in terms of both its duration and its nature." Heise, 79 F.3d at 906 (quoting Chandris, Inc. v. Latsis, 515 U.S. 347, 368-69, 115 S.Ct. 2172, 132 L.Ed.2d 314 (1995)). Under the appropriate inquiry
the total circumstances of an individual's employment must be weighed to determine whether he had a sufficient relation to the navigation of vessels and the perils attendant thereon ... The ultimate inquiry is whether the worker in question is a member of the vessel's crew or simply a land-based employee who happens to be working on the vessel at a given time.
Id. The requirement that a seaman be aboard the vessel "primarily to aid in navigation" was "jettison[ed]" by the Supreme Court in 1991. McDermott International, Inc. v. Wilander, 498 U.S. 337, 353, 111 S.Ct. 807, 112 L.Ed.2d 866 (1991). Jones Act remedies are available to traditional seamen who owe allegiance to a vessel at sea, but who do not aid in navigation. Id. at 354, 111 S.Ct. 807.
The Supreme Court has articulated the test for "seaman" status in two parts. First, "an employee's duties must `contribute to the function of the vessel or to the accomplishment of its mission.'" Chandris, 515 U.S. at 368, 115 S.Ct. 2172 (citing Wilander, 498 U.S. at 355, 111 S.Ct. 807). Jones Act protections extend only to maritime employees who do the ship's work. Id. The Supreme Court clarified that this threshold requirement was broad: "[a]ll who work at sea in the service of a ship" are eligible for seaman status. Id. (citing Wilander, 498 U.S. at 354, 111 S.Ct. 807) (emphasis added). Second, the employee must have a connection to a vessel in navigation, or to an identifiable group of such vessels, that is substantial in terms of both its duration and its nature. Chandris, 515 U.S. at 368, 115 S.Ct. 2172 () (quoting 1B A. JENNER, BENEDICT ON ADMIRALTY § 11a, pp. 2-10.1 to 2-11 (7th ed.1994)).
However, although the Court set forth the test in general terms, it "eschew[ed] the temptation to create detailed tests ... that tend to become ends in and of themselves." Id. at 369, 115 S.Ct. 2172. Instead, the Court stressed:
"the total circumstances of an individual's employment must be weighed to determine whether he had a sufficient relation to the navigation of vessels and the perils attendant thereon." ... [T]he ultimate inquiry is whether the worker in question is a member of the vessel's crew or simply a land-based employee who happens to be working on the vessel at a given time.
Id. at 370, 115 S.Ct. 2172. Plaintiff urges the Court to consider his eleven years with Wards Cove in evaluating his employment status, and argues that this Court should reject a "snapshot" test for seaman status. However, the Court can only look at the Plaintiff's present work assignment. Papai, 520 U.S. at 556, 117 S.Ct. 1535. "[T]he employee's prior work history with a particular employer may not affect the seaman inquiry if the employee was injured on a new assignment with the same employer, an assignment with different `essential duties' than his previous ones." Id. (emphasis added).
For purposes of Plaintiff's status as a Jones Act seaman, the Court cannot consider the fact that Plaintiff served as a deckhand and a lookout on previous trips to and from Alaska, and while employed by Wards Cove in Alaska. Those facts are not relevant to Plaintiff's assignment at the time of the incident. During the winter of 2002/2003 Plaintiff was employed as a shore-based welder, living aboard a Wards Cove vessel. It is only in the context of Plaintiff's assignment, with its attendant duties and tasks, that the Court may consider Plaintiff's status as a Jones Act seaman. Papai, 520 U.S. at 556, 117 S.Ct. 1535. Moreover, contrary to Plaintiff's suggestion, consideration of Plaintiff's assignment at the Wards Cove Seattle Yard is not a "snapshot" test for seaman status focusing merely on the instant of injury. Rather, it is full and complete consideration of the employment assignment at the time of the Plaintiff's injury.
The first part of the test requires that the employee's duties "contribute to the function of the vessel or to the accomplishment of its mission." Chandris, 515 U.S. at 368, 115 S.Ct. 2172. However, only those that "work at sea in the service of the ship" are eligible for Jones Act seaman status. Id. (emphasis added). Defendant urges the Court to find that Plaintiff is not a seamen because he did not work at sea in the service of the ship. Chandris, 515 U.S. at 368, 115 S.Ct. 2172.
The Ninth Circuit discussed work at sea in Heise, which parallels the facts in this case:
The requirement that a seaman work at sea in the service of a ship embodies the first basic principle of the definition of `seaman' ...: Seamen do not include land-based workers. Thus, land-based maritime workers injured while on a vessel in navigation remain...
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