Jamie G. v. Dep’t of Children and Families

• Court: Connecticut Supreme Court
• Writing for the Court: MULLINS, C. J.
• Citation: Jamie G. v. Dep’t of Children and Families, 339 A.3d 598, 352 Conn. 736 (Conn. 2025)
• Docket Number: SC 20997
• Decision Date: 05 August 2025
• Parties: JAMIE G., Administrator (Estate of Toni G.) v. DEPARTMENT OF CHILDREN AND FAMILIES
• topic: Civil Rights,Administrative Law,Personal Injury Law,Public Sector Law

339 A.3d 598

352 Conn. 736

JAMIE G., Administrator (Estate of Toni G.)

v.DEPARTMENT OF CHILDREN AND FAMILIES^*

(SC 20997)

Supreme Court of Connecticut.

Argued January 30, 2025

Officially Released August 5, 2025

Stephanie Z. Roberge, New Haven, for the appellant (plaintiff).

Robert J. Deichert, assistant attorney general, with whom were Thadius L. Bochain, assistant attorney general, and, on the brief, William Tong, attorney general, and Carolyn Signorelli and Christopher Groleau, assistant attorneys general, for the appellee (defendant).

Mullins, C. J., and McDonald, Ecker, Alexander and Dannehy, Js.

MULLINS, C. J.

₇₃₉This case arises from a tragic accident in which four year old Toni G. drowned after the Probate Court had vested her temporary custody in her maternal relatives. To assist it in determining whether to grant a full transfer of guardianship to those relatives, the Probate Court commissioned the defendant, the Department of Children and Families (DCF), to conduct a study of their home and to produce a report of its findings. DCF did so and submitted the report to the Probate Court. Before that court could hold a hearing to determine whether to transfer guardianship, however, Toni died. Her estate sought permission to bring the present action, which alleges that the negligence of DCF social workers, in investigating Toni’s living situation and advising the Probate Court that the maternal relatives’ home was a suitable placement for Toni, was a proximate cause of her death. After a hearing, the claims commissioner waived the state’s sovereign immunity and authorized the estate to sue the state.

The primary issue presented on appeal is whether the claims commissioner’s authorization to sue the state under General Statutes § 4-160 (a) and (h)¹ not only waives the state’s sovereign immunity, but also abrogates the common law to preclude the state from raising a claim of judicial or quasi-judicial immunity.² We agree with the trial court that a waiver of sovereign immunity under that statute does not bar the state from raising a ₇₄₀jurisdictional claim of absolute quasi-judicial immunity before that court. As we will explain, we are compelled to construe narrowly legislative waivers of sovereign immunity, and we will interpret a statute to have abrogated the common law only when the statutory language evidences a clear intent to do so. The latter principle applies with particular force to purported encroachments on common-law judicial and quasi-judicial immunities, the abrogation of which would raise serious separation of powers issues. Because we perceive in § 4-160 no clear and unequivocal legislative intent to abrogate DCF’s quasi-judicial immunity, we reject the plaintiff’s contention that the claims commissioner waived that immunity. Nevertheless, we remand the case for further proceedings because some of the allegations in the complaint appear to exceed the scope of that immunity.

I

The following relevant facts are alleged in the complaint or are uncontroverted.³ Toni was born in April, 2008, to her father, the plaintiff, Jamie G., who brought the present action as administrator of her estate, and her mother, Ashley. Toni’s brother, Dominic, was born in 2010.

Throughout Toni’s short life, DCF had repeated involvements with the family. Only one allegation of neglect was substantiated, arising from a June, 2010 domestic violence incident between the plaintiff and Ashley. Nevertheless, DCF provided the children treatment and other services for a total of approximately ten months between 2008 and late 2010, when Ashley relocated the children to the home of her birth mother in Massachusetts. DCF made a referral to its Massachusetts counterpart and closed the case. DCF claims to ₇₄₁have received no new allegations of neglect after October, 2010.

In 2011, Ashley and her children returned to Connecticut. On June 7, 2011, Ashley’s adoptive sister, April, and her adoptive mother, Lorri, filed a petition with the Probate Court, seeking custody of the children and removal of the plaintiff and Ashley as guardians. They also asked the court to grant them temporary custody of the children. The petitioners alleged that Ashley was homeless and unable to care for her children, that she was “trying to run from the law” or expected to be arrested imminently, that she had asked them “to take” the children, and that she load “no intentions of taking [her] children back.” They indicated that the plaintiff was incarcerated and, therefore, unable to care for the children.

On the basis of these representations, on June 8, 2011, the Probate Court granted immediate, temporary custody of the children to April and Lorri. However, the court found that it had insufficient information to determine the best interests of the children with respect to ongoing custody and guardianship. The court appointed an attorney for the children and, pursuant to General Statutes § 45a-619,⁴ ordered DCF to conduct an investigation and to submit a report.

₇₄₂The children’s legal status remained in limbo throughout the following year.⁵ In December, 2011, DCF submitted a report to the Probate Court, signed by a DCF social worker, her supervisor, and the DCF program manager, summarizing the investigation and recommendations. At that time, DCF referred only to April as the proposed guardian.

In its report, DCF did not find any new allegations of abuse or neglect while the children were in April’s care. But DCF did express some concerns regarding April’s then current housing situation. Although April and her own children had been living independently, in September, 2011, they moved in with April’s parents, Lorri and George. In addition, although April initially denied it, she later admitted that her boyfriend, Christopher, also had moved into the family home in Plymouth (family home). George, Lorri, and Christopher each had significant child protective histories.

Ultimately, DCF found that, by virtue of the plaintiff’s incarceration, he had failed to maintain a reasonable degree of responsibility for the children, and that, for various reasons, Ashley also had “failed to provide the care, guidance, or control necessary for her children’s physical, educational and emotional well-being ….” Accordingly, DCF concluded that neither parent was an appropriate caretaker.

DCF further concluded that both children had “special needs due to developmental delays … [and that they were] in need of a stable, safe and appropriate home and caretaker, as well as consistency in their lives, in order for them to get the services that they need.” DCF deemed April to be an appropriate caretaker because, among other things, she “has ensured ₇₄₃that the … mental health, physical and medical, as well as educational, needs [of Toni and Dominic] are being evaluated and addressed.… [She appears] to love and care for the children very much and to have a strong bond [with] them. [She] also appear[s] to be very proactive in regard to the children’s needs and [is] making sure that the children are evaluated appropriately for their needs and are involved in the appropriate services.…” Accordingly, despite its concerns about the housing situation, DCF recommended that the parents be removed as guardians and that April be appointed as guardian for both children.

The Probate Court, having received DCF’s report and recommendations in December, 2011, scheduled a hearing on the petition for February 7, 2012. That hearing was rescheduled to March, 2012, because Ashley’s attorney was unable to attend, and it was postponed again when the plaintiff, who recently had been released from prison, failed to appear for the March hearing.

On July 7, 2012, before a hearing could be held and while the Probate Court’s initial temporary custody orders were still in effect, Toni wandered, unattended, outside the family home. Her body was discovered shortly thereafter in a neighbor’s pond.

In 2013, the plaintiff filed a timely notice of claim with the claims commissioner, requesting permission to sue the state. The claims commissioner dismissed the claim in 2016. The plaintiff sought review by the legislature; see General Statutes (Rev. to 2017) § 4-158 (b); which, in 2017, vacated the decision of the claims commissioner and remanded the claim for a hearing on the merits. See Substitute House Joint Resolution No. 67, File No. 644 (March 31, 2017). Following an opportunity for the parties to conduct discovery, a magistrate judge who was authorized to assist the claims commissioner; see Public Acts 2016, No. 16-127, § 5; ₇₄₄conducted a hearing in June, 2018. The following month, the magistrate recommended that the claims commissioner grant the plaintiffs request to sue the state. The claims commissioner accepted the magistrate’s recommendation three years later, in September, 2021, and the plaintiff filed the present action in 2022.

The complaint alleges that DCF’s negligence was the proximate cause of Toni’s suffering and death. The allegations of negligence relate both to DCF’s recommendations to the Probate Court regarding the children’s best interests and to DCF’s alleged failure to properly execute various independent duties to protect the children from abuse and neglect.

DCF moved to dismiss the action, contending that the trial court lacked subject matter jurisdiction because the state is entitled to absolute judicial or quasi-judicial immunity for its activities integral to the judicial process. In particular, DCF argued that all of its challenged actions were performed in the course of conducting a court-ordered investigation and issuing court-ordered recommendations. The trial court agreed with DCF’s analysis and dismissed the action. The trial court concluded that the DCF workers (and, by extension, DCF and the state) were entitled to absolute quasi-judicial immunity while functioning as an arm of the Probate Court, that the claims commissioner cannot waive that immunity, and that “[t]he bare-boned...