Jamie L., In Interest of, s. 90-1990

• Court: United States State Supreme Court of Wisconsin
• Citation: 172 Wis.2d 218,493 N.W.2d 56
• Docket Number: Nos. 90-1990,s. 90-1990
• Parties: In the Interest of JAMIE L., A Person Under the Age of 18. CYNTHIA E., Appellant, v. LaCROSSE COUNTY HUMAN SERVICES DEPARTMENT, Respondent, Peder G. Arneson, Guardian Ad Litem for Jamie L., Petitioner. In the Interest of GREGORY L., A Person Under the Age of 18. CYNTHIA E., Appellant, v. LaCROSSE COUNTY HUMAN SERVICES DEPARTMENT, Respondent, Peder G. Arneson, Guardian Ad Litem for Gregory L., Petitioner. In the Interest of SEGER E., A Person Under the Age of 18. CYNTHIA E., Appellant, v. LaCROSSE COUNTY HUMAN SERVICES DEPARTMENT, Respondent, Peder G. Arneson, Guardian Ad Litem for Seger E., Petitioner. In the Interest of SEGER E., a Person Under the Age of 18. CYNTHIA E., Appellant, v. LaCROSSE COUNTY HUMAN SERVICES DEPARTMENT, Respondent, Peder G. Arneson, Guardian ad Litem for Seger E., Petitioner. to 90-1992, 91-0148 to 91-0150. . Oral Argument:
• Decision Date: 05 October 1992

Page 56

493 N.W.2d 56 172 Wis.2d 218 In the Interest of JAMIE L., A Person Under the Age of 18.
CYNTHIA E., Appellant,
v.
LaCROSSE COUNTY HUMAN SERVICES DEPARTMENT, Respondent,
Peder G. Arneson, Guardian Ad Litem for Jamie L., Petitioner.
In the Interest of GREGORY L., A Person Under the Age of 18.
CYNTHIA E., Appellant,
v.
LaCROSSE COUNTY HUMAN SERVICES DEPARTMENT, Respondent,
Peder G. Arneson, Guardian Ad Litem for Gregory L., Petitioner.
In the Interest of SEGER E., A Person Under the Age of 18.
CYNTHIA E., Appellant,
v.
LaCROSSE COUNTY HUMAN SERVICES DEPARTMENT, Respondent,
Peder G. Arneson, Guardian Ad Litem for Seger E., Petitioner.
In the Interest of SEGER E., a Person Under the Age of 18.
CYNTHIA E., Appellant,
v.
LaCROSSE COUNTY HUMAN SERVICES DEPARTMENT, Respondent,
Peder G. Arneson, Guardian ad Litem for Seger E., Petitioner. Nos. 90-1990 to 90-1992, 91-0148 to 91-0150. Supreme Court of Wisconsin. Oral Argument: Oct. 5, 1992.
Opinion Filed: Dec. 16, 1992.

Page 58

[172 Wis.2d 221] For the Guardian Ad Litem there were briefs by Peder G. Arneson, Ellen M. Frantz and Johns & Flaherty, S.C., LaCrosse, and oral argument by Ms. Frantz.

For the appellant there was a brief by Richard J. Auerbach and Auerbach and Porter, Madison, and oral argument by Richard J. Auerbach.

Amicus curiae brief was filed by John Franz, Madison, for The Wisconsin Council on Human Concerns.

CECI, Justice.

This case comes before the court on a petition for review by the guardian ad litem for Jamie L., Gregory L., and Seger E. of an unpublished decision of the court of appeals, dated December 12, 1991, which reversed orders of the circuit court for LaCrosse[172 Wis.2d 222] County, Michael J. Mulroy, Circuit Judge. The circuit court's orders terminated Cynthia E.'s parental rights to Jamie L., Gregory L., and Seger E. and denied Cynthia E. post-termination relief. The court of appeals reversed, holding that the written orders which initially placed the children outside the home and into foster care and the written orders which extended that placement did not contain the notice which sec. 48.356(2), Stats., requires. We disagree with the court of appeals and reverse. Additionally, we remand for consideration of issues raised by Cynthia E. before the court of appeals which the court of appeals did not address.

The relevant facts are undisputed. In 1986, La Crosse County held Children in Need of Protection or Services (commonly referred to as CHIPS) hearings for Cynthia E.'s three children, Jamie L., Gregory L., and Seger E. A judge concluded that the three children were in need of protection or services and entered dispositional orders placing the children in foster homes.

Cynthia E. attended the dispositional hearings. During those hearings, the court orally informed Cynthia E. that her parental rights could be terminated if, after a cumulative period of one year or more, her children remained outside her home pursuant to a court order and she substantially neglected, willfully refused or was unable to remedy the conditions which had resulted in her children's removal and there was a substantial likelihood she would be unable to remedy those conditions in the future.

A social worker served Cynthia E. with a copy of the written dispositional orders. The social worker's "recommendations" were attached to the orders. Prefacing the recommendations was a statement telling Cynthia E. she had to meet the recommendations in order for her children to be returned to her. Also, attached to each order [172 Wis.2d 223] was a "Warning to Parents," which summarized grounds for termination of parental rights under sec. 48.415, Stats.

At the time of the hearings in this case, sec. 48.415 contained six grounds for termination of parental rights: (1) abandonment; (2) continuing need of protection or services; (3) continuing parental disability; (4) continuing denial of periods of physical placement (known as continuing denial of visitation rights in 1986); (5) child abuse; and (6) failure to assume parental responsibility. The warning attached to each dispositional order paraphrased the statutory text of all of these grounds except failure to assume parental responsibility.

Page 59

Two extension hearings were held in 1987. Cynthia E. received the same oral notice and the same warnings attached to written orders as she had received at the earlier dispositional hearings.

In 1988, La Crosse County petitioned for the termination of Cynthia E.'s parental rights; and in 1989, a jury trial was held. At the time of the trial, the children had been in foster care continuously since the dispositional hearings in 1986. The jury found the children were in continuing need of protection or services. This was the basis for the termination of Cynthia E.'s parental rights under sec. 48.415, Stats. See sec. 48.415(2), Stats. The court then found Cynthia E. unfit to be the parent of Jamie L., Gregory L., and Seger E. and entered an order terminating Cynthia E.'s parental rights.

Cynthia E. filed a motion challenging the termination on several grounds, including the validity of the written orders she had received. In order to terminate parental rights because a child is in continuing need of protection or services, sec. 48.415(2), Stats., requires, among other things, that "the child has been adjudged to be in need of protection or services and placed, or continued[172 Wis.2d 224] in a placement, outside his or her home pursuant to one or more court orders ... containing the notice required by s. 48.356(2)." Section 48.415(2)(a), Stats. Section 48.356(2) requires that "any written order which places a child outside the home under [sec. 48.356(1) ] shall notify the parent or parents of the information specified under [sec. 48.356(1) ]." Part of the information which sec. 48.356(1) specifies is oral notice of "any grounds for termination of parental rights under s. 48.415 which may be applicable...." This is what Cynthia E. asserted the written orders lacked. Cynthia E. argued that the written dispositional and extension orders did not comply with sec. 48.356(2) because the "Warning to Parents" attached to those orders contained more grounds for termination than the specific ground that applied to her. The circuit court denied Cynthia E.'s motion.

Cynthia E. appealed from the final orders which granted the petitions to terminate her parental rights and which denied her motion for post-termination relief. She raised several issues, including the validity of the written orders. The court of appeals reversed on the issue of the written orders, concluding that they did not comply with sec. 48.356(2) because they "did not give 'specific' notice of the CHIPS grounds for termination of parental rights under 48.415(2), Stats.--the only 'applicable grounds' for termination...." In the Interest of J.L., G.L., and S.E., Nos. 90-1990, 90-1991, 90-1992, 91-0148, 91-0149, 90-0150, unpublished slip op. at 9 (Ct.App. Dec. 12, 1991). Because the court of appeals reversed on the issue of the validity of the written orders, it did not address the other issues Cynthia E. had raised.

The issue in this case is whether the written dispositional and extension orders Cynthia E. received complied[172 Wis.2d 225] with sec. 48.356(2), Stats. Resolving this issue requires us to interpret and apply sec. 48.356(2). Questions of statutory interpretation and the application of a statute to undisputed facts are questions of law, which we review without deference to the trial court or court of appeals. City of Muskego v. Godec, 167 Wis.2d 536, 545, 482 N.W.2d 79 (1992).

The goal of interpreting a statute is to ascertain the legislature's intent. In Interest of J.A.L., 162 Wis.2d 940, 962, 471 N.W.2d 493 (1991). To find that intent, we first look to the statute's language. Id. If the statute's words unambiguously declare the legislature's intent, this court's duty is to apply that intent to the facts presented; we may not look beyond the statute's language to determine what that language means. Id. Consequently, we will only construe a statute if the statute is ambiguous. Id. A statute is ambiguous if well-informed persons could reasonably reach different conclusions concerning its meaning. Girouard v. Jackson Circuit Ct., 155 Wis.2d 148, 155, 454 N.W.2d 792 (1990). In construing an ambiguous statute, we examine the statute's history, context, subject matter, scope, and object. J.A.L., 162 Wis.2d at 962-63, ...