Jamieson By and Through Jamieson v. Shaw

• Decision Date: 07 October 1985
• Docket Number: No. 84-4387,84-4387
• Citation: 772 F.2d 1205
• Parties: Charlotte Ann JAMIESON, By and Through Her Father and Next Friend, Billy G. JAMIESON, and Billy G. Jamieson, Individually, Plaintiffs-Appellants, v. John SHAW, James Algee, Willie F. Jones, David Seale, City of Holly Springs, William T. Barrett, and Donald Butler, Defendants-Appellees.
• Court: U.S. Court of Appeals — Fifth Circuit

Page 1205

772 F.2d 1205

3 Fed.R.Serv.3d 860

Charlotte Ann JAMIESON, By and Through Her Father and Next Friend, Billy G. JAMIESON, and Billy G. Jamieson Individually, Plaintiffs-Appellants, v. John SHAW, James Algee, Willie F. Jones, David Seale, City of Holly Springs, William T. Barrett, and Donald Butler, Defendants-Appellees.

No. 84-4387.

United States Court of Appeals Fifth Circuit.

Oct. 7, 1985.

Jim Waide, West Point, Miss., W.O. Luckett, Jr., Clarksdale, Miss., for plaintiffs-appellants.

Sumners, Hickman & Rayburn, S.T. Rayburn, Richard C. Coker, Oxford, Miss., for Shaw, Algee, Jones & Seale.

William C. Spencer, Holly Springs, Miss., for City of Holly Springs, Coopwood, Bonds, Collins, Henley, Warren & Strickland.

Donald G. Barlow, Stephen J. Kirchmayr, Sp. Asst. Atty. Gen., Jackson, Miss., for Barrett, Miss. Hwy. & Butler.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Northern District of Mississippi.

Before JOHNSON, JOLLY, and HILL, Circuit Judges.

ROBERT MADDEN HILL, Circuit Judge:

Charlotte Ann Jamieson, a minor, was seriously injured when the car in which she was riding struck a roadblock placed on a state highway by officers of the Holly Springs, Mississippi, Police Department and the Mississippi Highway Safety Patrol. Pursuant to 42 U.S.C. Sec. 1983, Jamieson, through her father, Billy G. Jamieson, brought this action alleging a deprivation of her constitutional rights. The district court dismissed Jamieson's first amended complaint under Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(6) and then denied leave to amend that complaint. We reverse because her second amended complaint stated a claim cognizable under the Fourth Amendment.

I.

Viewed in the light most favorable to her, Jamieson's first amended complaint alleged the following facts. ¹ In the predawn hours of July 25, 1982, Jamieson was a passenger in a car driven by Jerry Gammons. Gammons' wife, Versie, was the only other passenger. Gammons had been operating the car in conformity with all applicable laws when, as he halted at a traffic signal, a car occupied by three Holly Springs police officers stopped behind his car. When the signal changed, Gammons accelerated the car to a speed exceeding the speed limit; the police officers followed and a high speed chase ensued. The police officers knew there was no outstanding warrant for Gammons' arrest, that Gammons had been treated for mental illness, and that there were passengers in the car who were suspected of no wrongdoing.

During the chase the police officers called for assistance from the state highway patrol. William T. Barrett answered the call and set up a "deadman" roadblock in the highway just ahead of Gammons' car. The roadblock consisted of an unlighted police car parked laterally in the middle of the highway just over the crest of a hill. Just as Gammons' car, still traveling at a high rate of speed, reached the top of the hill, Barrett flashed a bright spotlight in Gammons' eyes, blinding him momentarily and causing him to lose control of the car and crash into the roadblock. Gammons was then arrested. Jamieson sustained severe injuries from the impact.

Jamieson's first amended complaint named as defendants John Shaw, James Algee, and Willie F. Jones, the Holly Springs police officers who occupied the chase car; Barrett, the highway patrolman who provided the roadblock car; the City of Holly Springs, its mayor and aldermen; its Chief of Police, David Seale; and the Mississippi Highway Safety Patrol and its chief, Donald Butler. The complaint alleged that use of the roadblock inflicted "cruel and unusual punishment" on Jamieson, deprived her of her "civil rights," and constituted assault and battery by the application of unnecessary, unreasonable, and excessive force in attempting to stop and arrest Gammons. Thus, she relied on the Eighth Amendment and certain, unnamed, "civil rights." She also asserted various claims of negligence in connection with the positioning of the roadblock.

The district court dismissed the claims against officers Shaw, Algee, Jones, and Barrett for two reasons. First, the court concluded that Parratt v. Taylor, 451 U.S. 527, 101 S.Ct. 1908, 68 L.Ed.2d 420 (1981), precluded recovery under the Fourteenth Amendment since the complaint "alleged little more than automobile negligence." Second, as to the excessive force allegations, the court concluded that Shillingford v. Holmes, 634 F.2d 263 (5th Cir.1981), which involved the "excessive use of force" by police, did not apply. The court stated that use of the roadblock "fell leagues short of the egregious exercise of physical violence prohibited by the Constitution...." The court held that the Eighth Amendment claim was without merit, since that amendment does not protect litigants not convicted of a crime. See Thibodeaux v. Bordelon, 740 F.2d 329, 333-34 (5th Cir.1984) ("the eighth amendment protects only those who have been convicted of a crime"). ² The court also dismissed the claims against Chief Butler of the Mississippi Highway Safety Patrol and Chief Seale of the Holly Springs Police Department for failure to allege a pattern of similar incidents and dismissed the claims against the Patrol itself on Eleventh Amendment grounds. Finally, the court dismissed the claims against the city of Holly Springs, its mayor and five aldermen for unstated reasons.

Jamieson then sought leave to file a second amended complaint in which she asserted that her Fourth Amendment rights had been violated. This complaint alleged, based on the same factual background as that stated in the first amended complaint, that the officers intentionally violated the Fourth Amendment by attempting to stop Gammons' car without probable cause and by using unreasonable means, i.e., the roadblock, to make an arrest. ³ The district court found that the proposed complaint was nothing more than "window dressing" on the prior claims of negligence, and that Jamieson lacked "standing" to assert the Fourth Amendment claim since she was not the target of the pursuit and stop. The court therefore denied leave to file the second amended complaint and entered final judgment dismissing Jamieson's suit.

II.

Jamieson challenges the district court's refusal to permit her to amend her complaint a second time. As noted, the court refused the amendment because it found that the amendment added nothing to her previous complaint and because it determined that Jamieson did not have standing to assert a Fourth Amendment violation. The amendment was refused, in short, because the court thought it futile.

Fed.R.Civ.P. 15(a) ⁴ permits amendment of a pleading after a responsive pleading has been served with leave of court. However, the court should freely give leave to amend "when justice so requires." It is often said that this determination rests in the sound discretion of the district court. See, e.g., Chitimacha Tribe of Louisiana v. Harry L. Laws Co., 690 F.2d 1157, 1163 (5th Cir.1982), cert. denied, --- U.S. ----, 104 S.Ct. 69, 78 L.Ed.2d 83 (1983). However, the Rule "evinces a bias in favor of granting leave." Id. (quoting Dussouy v. Gulf Coast Investment Corp., 660 F.2d 594, 597 (5th Cir.1981)). The policy of the federal rules is to permit liberal pleading and amendment, thus facilitating adjudication on the merits while avoiding an excessive formalism. Dussouy, 660 F.2d at 598, (citing Foman v. Davis, 371 U.S. 178, 182, 83 S.Ct. 227, 230, 9 L.Ed.2d 222 (1962); Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 48, 78 S.Ct. 99, 103, 2 L.Ed.2d 80 (1957)). Thus, if the district court lacks a "substantial reason" to deny leave, its discretion "is not broad enough to permit denial." Id.

Among the acceptable justifications for denying leave to amend are undue delay, bad faith, dilatory motive, repeated failure to cure deficiencies by prior amendment, undue prejudice to the opposing party, and the futility of the amendment. Union Planters National Leasing, Inc. v. Woods, 687 F.2d 117, 121 (5th Cir.1982). Even if substantial reason to deny leave exists, the court should consider prejudice to the movant, as well as judicial economy, in determining whether justice requires granting leave. Id. When futility is advanced as the reason for denying an amendment to a complaint, the court is usually denying leave because the theory presented in the amendment lacks legal foundation or because the theory has been adequately presented in a prior version of the complaint. See, e.g., Pan-Islamic Trade Corp. v. Exxon, 632 F.2d 539, 546 (5th Cir.1980), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 927, 102 S.Ct. 427, 70 L.Ed.2d 236 (1981). Consequently, review of such a denial tends to blur the distinction between analysis of the procedural context under Rule 15(a) and analysis of the sufficiency of the complaint under Rule 12(b)(6). Id. at 546; see also Emory v. Texas State Board of Medical Examiners, 748 F.2d 1023, 1027 (5th Cir.1984); Chitimacha Tribe, 690 F.2d at 1164; Dussouy, 660 F.2d at 599-600.

The district court here denied leave to amend only because it considered the amendment futile. The district court did not conclude, nor have the defendants argued, that permitting amendment would have caused undue delay or prejudice, or that the amendment was offered in bad faith or with a dilatory motive. Denial was premised solely on the court's evaluation of the amendment as insufficient to state a claim under the Fourth Amendment. Thus, if the court's evaluation was deficient, we must reverse the order denying leave to amend.

III.

In reviewing the sufficiency of a complaint, we accept the allegations as true, viewing them in the light most favorable to the plaintiff. Scheuer v. Rhodes, 416 U.S. 232, 236, 94 S.Ct. 1683, 1686, 40 L.Ed.2d 90 (1974). The complaint must stand "unless it appears beyond doubt that the plaintiff can prove no set of facts in support of [her] claim which would entitle [her] to relief." Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 45-46, 78 S.Ct. 99, 101-102, 2 L.Ed.2d 80 (1957). This standard exhorts...