Jamieson v. Robinson

• Decision Date: 12 February 1981
• Docket Number: No. 79-1972,79-1972
• Citation: 641 F.2d 138
• Parties: Joseph C. JAMIESON, Appellant, v. William B. ROBINSON, Commissioner of Correction of Pennsylvania, and James F. Howard, Warden of State Correctional Institution.
• Court: U.S. Court of Appeals — Third Circuit

Page 138

641 F.2d 138

Joseph C. JAMIESON, Appellant, v. William B. ROBINSON, Commissioner of Correction of Pennsylvania, and James F. Howard, Warden of State Correctional Institution.

No. 79-1972.

United States Court of Appeals Third Circuit.

Submitted Dec. 16, 1980.

Decided Feb. 12, 1981.

Joseph C. Jamieson, pro se.

Robert S. Englesberg, William A. Webb, Deputy Attys. Gen., William C. O'Toole, Asst. Atty. Gen., Harvey Bartle, III, Atty. Gen., Pittsburgh, Pa., for appellees.

Before ADAMS, VAN DUSEN and WEIS, Circuit Judges.

OPINION OF THE COURT

ADAMS, Circuit Judge.

The principal question in this case is whether a prisoner's right to equal protection of the laws is violated by a state's failure to institute a work release program at a particular state institution.

On April 2, 1979, appellant, Joseph C. Jamieson, an inmate at the State Correctional Institute (S.C.I.) at Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania, filed a civil rights action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and 28 U.S.C. § 1343, alleging a deprivation of his right to equal protection of the laws as guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution. The complaint sought declaratory relief under 28 U.S.C. §§ 2201 and 2202, a preliminary and permanent injunction, and any other relief deemed just and equitable by the court.

Specifically, Jamieson averred that he had applied for work release pursuant to 61 P.S. § 1051 et seq. and Bureau of Corrections Directive BC-ADM 805 (Rev. 1/77), but that the defendants thwarted his request. The complaint states that Jamieson first approached prison counselor Kenneth Lechwar, who advised him that no work release program existed at S.C.I., Pittsburgh. Jamieson next approached James F. Howard, the Warden of S.C.I., Pittsburgh, who told him that "we have neither work release nor work release applications. I cannot give you something we don't have." (Inmate's Request to Staff Member, response dated November 30, 1978). At approximately the same time, Jamieson sought an application from the Commissioner of the Bureau of Corrections, William B. Robinson, who responded that not all state correctional institutions have "work release programs" in operation, but that if Jamieson met the necessary criteria for "pre-release status," he could apply through his prison counselor.

Jamieson thereafter filed his complaint against Robinson and Howard, claiming that he was denied the right to apply for a work release program because no such program existed at S.C.I., Pittsburgh, and that the lack of such a program subjected him to invidious discrimination in violation of state law, Bureau of Corrections regulations, and the equal protection clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. Jamieson sought a declaratory judgment that he was denied the right to apply for work release and that the absence of a work release program of S.C.I., Pittsburgh abridges the equal protection guarantee. He also requested a preliminary and permanent injunction compelling the defendants to take immediate steps to establish a work release program at S.C.I., Pittsburgh. Jamieson did not seek a reduction in the term of his sentence or damages for the alleged constitutional violations.

The defendants filed a motion to dismiss the complaint pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. Rule 12(b)(6). They asserted that Jamieson's factual contentions were incorrect, and they urged the court to dismiss the complaint as frivolous because Jamieson has no right, constitutional or otherwise, to be released from prison prior to his minimum release date.

In response, Jamieson submitted affidavits from other prisoners which averred that work release programs exist at the state correctional facilities at Graterford and Huntingdon. He also argued that he has a statutory entitlement, pursuant to 61 P.S. § 1051 et seq., to apply for work release, an entitlement that had been frustrated by the defendants. Finally, Jamieson complained that the defendants refused to expand the pre-release program to allow all qualified inmates to participate.

After consideration of the complaint and the motion to dismiss, the magistrate filed a Report and Recommendation that defendants' motion be granted. Focusing on Jamieson's request for the establishment of a work release program at S.C.I., Pittsburgh, the magistrate appears to have concluded that Jamieson should have asserted such a request in a petition for a writ of habeas corpus under 28 U.S.C. § 2254. ¹ The Report stated that federal courts lack authority to direct that a state prisoner be permitted to participate in a work release, so long as there is no allegation that the denial is arbitrary or capricious. ² Since no such allegation was set forth in the complaint, the magistrate recommended that defendants' motion to dismiss be granted.

Jamieson filed objections to the magistrate's Report, insisting that it contained three errors. First, Jamieson asserted that contrary to the magistrate's analysis, he was not seeking an order directing the prison authorities to allow him to participate in a work release program. He maintained rather, that the state is under a duty to establish such programs, that it has refused to do so, and that Jamieson sought to correct this omission. Second, Jamieson argued that there was invidious discrimination against inmates at S.C.I., Pittsburgh, because at least two other maximum security facilities in Pennsylvania had established work-release programs, while there was none at S.C.I., Pittsburgh. He noted that he had submitted sworn affidavits to support these contentions and that the magistrate had failed to consider them. Jamieson also objected to the Report on the ground that the magistrate simply ignored his allegations that he was denied his statutory right to apply for a work-release program.

After considering the magistrate's Report and Jamieson's objections to it, the district court, on June 12, 1979, entered an order adopting the Report and dismissing the complaint, Jamieson filed a timely notice of appeal.

On appeal, Jamieson urges that the district court should not have dismissed his complaint unless it appeared beyond a doubt that he could not have established facts that would have entitled him to relief. He again sets forth his claims of invidious discrimination violative of the equal protection clause. Defendants respond that under the applicable "minimal scrutiny" or "rational basis" equal protection analysis, Jamieson's allegations failed to state a claim upon which relief could be granted. For reasons that are somewhat at variance with those advanced by the magistrate, the district court, and by the defendants, we affirm.

I. Habeas Corpus

The magistrate predicated his Report and Recommendation on the theory that Jamieson's complaint challenging the availability of work release programs at S.C.I., Pittsburgh and his ability to qualify for such a program sounded in habeas corpus. In making such a determination, the magistrate was without the benefit of our opinion in Wright v. Cuyler, 624 F.2d 455 (3d Cir. 1980), which was handed down after the magistrate filed his report.

In Wright, which concerned the same sections of Pennsylvania law that are involved here, this Court determined that the eligibility or lack of eligibility for temporary home furloughs may be called into question directly under section 1983, without recourse to habeas corpus and its concommitant exhaustion requirements. Central to our decision in that case was the distinction between a challenge to the fact or duration of confinement, such as a request for an immediate or speedier release from confinement, which is the core of habeas corpus, and an attack on the conditions of confinement, which is cognizable under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Id. at 457-58. See Preiser v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 475, 498-99, 93 S.Ct. 1827, 1840-1841, 36 L.Ed.2d 439 (1973). We determined in Wright that when a prisoner questions his failure to be admitted to a home furlough program, he attacks the conditions, rather than the ultimate duration, of his confinement. The present suit is also distinguishable from a habeas corpus proceeding. As Jamieson points out, the relief he requests would not serve to diminish the length of his incarceration; rather, he seeks only to alter the conditions of his confinement.

To the extent that the magistrate and the district court failed to anticipate Wright or to apply Preiser, their rationale for dismissing the complaint was incorrect. Our analysis of the merits of Jamieson's claims, however, leads to the conclusion that the dismissal of his complaint must be affirmed nonetheless.

When reviewing the dismissal of a complaint, we must accept as true the well-pleaded allegations of the pleading. "(A) complaint should not be dismissed for failure to state a claim unless it appears beyond a doubt that the plaintiff can prove no set of facts in support of his claim which would entitle him to relief." Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 45-46, 78 S.Ct. 99, 102, 2 L.Ed.2d 80 (1957). In Scheuer v. Rhodes the United States Supreme Court explained:

When a federal court reviews the sufficiency of a complaint, before the reception of any evidence either by affidavit or admissions, its task is necessarily a limited one. The issue is not whether a plaintiff will ultimately prevail but whether the claimant is entitled to offer evidence to support the claims. Indeed it may appear on the face of the pleadings that a recovery is very remote and unlikely but that is not the test. Moreover, it is well established that, in passing on a motion to dismiss, whether on the ground of lack of jurisdiction over the subject matter or for failure to state a cause of action, the allegations of the complaint should be construed favorably to the pleader.

416 U.S. 232, 236, 94 S.Ct. 1683, 1686, 40 L.Ed.2d 90 (1974).

Pro se complaints are held to less stringent standards than formal pleadings drafted by lawyers. Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 92 S.Ct. 594, ...