Jamieson v. Town of Fort Myers Beach
| Decision Date | 25 March 2020 |
| Docket Number | Case No. 2D19-238 |
| Citation | 292 So.3d 880 |
| Parties | James J. JAMIESON, Appellant, v. TOWN OF FORT MYERS BEACH, Florida, Appellee. |
| Court | Florida District Court of Appeals |
Ryan C. Reese of Moore Bowman & Reese, P.A., Tampa, for Appellant.
Hudson C. Gill and Jeffrey L. Hockman of Johnson, Anselmo, Murdoch, Burke, Piper & Hockman, P.A., Fort Lauderdale, for Appellee.
James J. Jamieson appeals a final summary judgment entered in favor of the Town of Fort Myers Beach (the Town) on his complaint alleging counts for inverse condemnation, partial inverse condemnation, and a violation of the Bert J. Harris, Jr., Private Property Rights Protection Act (the Bert Harris Act). In granting summary judgment, the trial court concluded that Jamieson's counts were barred because he bought the property with notice of a wetlands restriction and his claims were not ripe as he had not made meaningful application to the Town to develop the property. In this appeal, we find merit in Jamieson's arguments that the trial court erred in ruling that the wetlands designation that existed at the time of his purchase barred his takings claims and that the trial court erred in ruling that his claims were not yet ripe even though he had made several attempts to obtain approval from the Town to develop the land. Accordingly, we reverse the final summary judgment on all three counts of Jamieson's complaint.
In 2002, Jamieson and a partner purchased two parcels consisting of seven acres of vacant land in the Town of Fort Myers Beach. The two parcels are divided into forty platted lots, each 50 feet by 110 feet; the property was platted in 1919 as part of the Seagrape Subdivision. An aerial view of the property shows that the land surrounding the property on three sides is fully developed; the fourth side of the property is waterfront.
Prior to 1995, the property was under the jurisdiction of Lee County. In 1995, the Town was incorporated, and in 1998, the Town adopted a comprehensive plan that included a future land use map designating the entire subject property as wetlands, with a permitted maximum density of one dwelling unit per twenty acres. This designation was not supported by any environmental study or analysis but was carried over from the Lee County Comprehensive Plan. Under the Town's comprehensive plan, the property was subject to the "minimum use determination" (MUD) process, which allowed a property owner to apply for a determination of whether each plotted lot qualifies for residential use. In March 2003, a year after Jamieson purchased the property, the Town adopted its own development code which includes section 34-3274, providing that "[l]ots qualifying for a [MUD] may not place the home, accessory structures, or driveways on any land in the ‘wetlands’ or ‘recreation’ category on the future land use map of the comprehensive plan." Thus, this provision restricted the MUD process as it applied to property designated as wetlands on the future land use map of the comprehensive plan.
In 2010, Jamieson petitioned the South Florida Water Management District for a formal determination as to the extent of the wetlands existing on the property, and the District determined that 61% of the property was wetlands, 12% was surface waters, and 27% was upland. In 2011, Jamieson presented this determination to the Town in an application for administrative interpretation, asserting that the Town's wetlands designation was incorrect. The Town issued its determination that "no clear factual error" existed in designating the property as wetlands.
In 2012, Jamieson applied for a MUD for all forty lots, requesting a determination that all the lots qualified for residential use. The application was referred to the local planning agency, which denied the application on the basis that section 34-3274(c) of the land development code prevented a home, structure, or driveway from being placed on wetlands. Jamieson appealed the agency's decision to the Town Council, but the parties agreed to hold the appeal in abeyance pending Jamieson's application for a comprehensive plan amendment.
In 2013, Jamieson applied for a small-scale comprehensive plan amendment, seeking to transfer the historical density attached to his lots to other property that he owned in the Town so that he could develop the other property. Despite a favorable recommendation by the Town's staff, the Town denied the application in November 2014.
In December 2014, the Town Council heard Jamieson's appeal of the agency's decision. In Resolution 14-29, the Town Council reversed the agency's decision and granted Jamieson a MUD that allowed for construction of one single-family home per lot. However, the comprehensive plan still required Jamieson to comply with section 34-3274(c) of the land development code, which prevents a home from being placed on wetlands.
In 2015, Jamieson applied for a variance from section 34-3274(c). The Town did not process the application, stating the following:
In 2016, Jamieson filed a formal "notice of claim" pursuant to section 70.001, Florida Statutes (2015), the Bert J. Harris, Jr., Private Property Rights Protection Act (the Bert Harris Act). The Town responded with an offer to administratively remove three lots from the wetlands category to allow Jamieson to develop those lots with residential units. However, the offer required Jamieson to agree that the development of these three lots "represents the full amount of development rights to which the property owner is entitled under Resolution 14-29."
Jamieson rejected the Town's Bert Harris offer by filing suit against the Town in January 2017. He asserted a count for inverse condemnation (count I), a count for partial inverse condemnation (count II), and a count for a violation of the Bert Harris Act (count III). In November 2017, Jamieson filed a motion for summary judgment on count I. The Town responded and filed a cross-motion for summary judgment.
After a hearing, the trial court granted summary judgment in favor of the Town on count I. The court ruled that Jamieson's claim is without merit because when he purchased the property in 2002, the property was not eligible for development as a single-family residence and had not been since at least as early as 1995. The court also ruled that the claim is not ripe because Jamieson did not make a meaningful application to the Town to develop the property by applying to amend the wetlands designation or maximum density.
The Town then moved for summary judgment on counts II and III, arguing that the reasoning for summary judgment on count I also supported summary judgment on counts II and III. Jamieson moved for rehearing of the trial court's order on count I, which the trial court denied. Jamieson then moved for summary judgment on counts II and III, and the Town responded. After a hearing, the trial court granted summary judgment in favor of the Town on counts II and III, finding that Jamieson's claims are not ripe, based on the same reasoning applied to count I. The trial court entered final judgment in favor of the Town, which Jamieson now appeals.
"We review de novo the trial court's determination that [the Town] was entitled to—and that [Jamieson] was not entitled to—a judgment as a matter of law." Highlands-In-The-Woods, L.L.C. v. Polk County, 217 So. 3d 1175, 1178 (Fla. 2d DCA 2017). In count I, Jamieson alleged a categorical taking under the inverse condemnation theory. "Inverse condemnation is a cause of action by a property owner to recover the value of property that has been de facto taken by an agency having the power of eminent domain where no formal exercise of that power has been undertaken." Sarasota Welfare Home, Inc. v. City of Sarasota, 666 So. 2d 171, 173 (Fla. 2d DCA 1995) (citing City of Pompano Beach v. Yardarm Rest., Inc., 641 So. 2d 1377 (Fla. 4th DCA 1994) ). Relevant to this case, the Supreme Court has recognized a category of takings "where regulation denies all economically beneficial or productive use of land." Lucas v. S.C. Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 1015, 112 S.Ct. 2886, 120 L.Ed.2d 798 (1992). "[W]hen the owner of real property has been called upon to sacrifice all economically beneficial uses in the name of the common good, that is, to leave his property economically idle, he has suffered a taking." Id. at 1019, 112 S.Ct. 2886 (emphasis omitted). Jamieson alleged that the Town's regulations caused him to suffer a permanent and total deprivation of all use and enjoyment of his property.
In ruling that Jamieson is not entitled to relief as a matter of law on count I, the trial court found that it was undisputed that the property was not eligible for development with single-family residences when Jamieson took title in 2002. The trial court referenced the comprehensive plan adopted in 1998 that restricted development to one dwelling unit per twenty acres.
In Palazzolo v. Rhode Island, 533 U.S. 606, 626, 121 S.Ct. 2448, 150 L.Ed.2d 592 (2001), the Supreme Court considered whether "[a] purchaser or a successive title holder like petitioner is deemed to have notice of an earlier-enacted restriction [such that he] is barred from claiming that it effects a taking."
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Jamieson v. The Town of Fort Myers Beach
...reversed the first final summary judgment, finding reversible error in both of the trial court's reasons for granting it. See Jamieson I, 292 So.3d at 886-88 (holding (1) that Jamieson "acquired the full rights when he bought the property, including the right to challenge the [preexisting] ......