Jamison v. Dow Chemical Co.
| Citation | 354 F.Supp.2d 715 |
| Decision Date | 13 January 2005 |
| Docket Number | No. 03-10226-BC.,03-10226-BC. |
| Parties | Justin JAMISON, Plaintiff, v. DOW CHEMICAL COMPANY, Defendant. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Eastern District of Michigan |
Victor J. Mastromarco, Jr., Manda L. Westervelt, Mastromarco & Jahn, Saginaw, MI, for Plaintiff.
Richard B. Lapp, Chicago, IL, Timothy H. Howlett, Dickinson Wright, Detroit, MI, for Defendant.
The plaintiff, Justin Jamison, was employed by defendant Dow Chemical Company in various capacities at its Midland, Michigan chemical plant from 1987 until he was discharged in May 2003. In February 2001, the plaintiff was diagnosed with an eye disease that rendered him hypersensitive to dust and chemical vapors, occasioning the imposition of work restrictions that limited his ability to work in many of the environments at the defendant's facility. The defendant placed Jamison in five different positions in an effort to accommodate his disability, but terminated his employment after it concluded that it could find no open position for him that fit his medical restrictions. The plaintiff commenced this action alleging that his termination violated the Americans With Disabilities Act (ADA), 42 U.S.C. § 12101 et seq., and the Michigan Persons With Disabilities Civil Rights Act (PWDCRA), Mich. Comp. Laws § 37.1101 et seq. Jamison, who is African-American, later amended his complaint to allege in addition that Dow's failure to find a suitable job for him constituted illegal discrimination on account of his race in violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1) et seq. and Michigan's Elliott-Larsen Civil Rights Act, Mich. Comp. Laws § 37.2101 et seq. The defendant has filed a motion for summary judgment, to which the plaintiff has responded. The Court heard the arguments of the parties through their respective counsel in open court on November 22, 2004 and the matter is now ready for decision. The Court finds that the plaintiff has not presented sufficient evidence to warrant a trial on the question of whether his termination was a result of illegal discrimination under federal or state law. The Court, therefore, will grant the defendant's motion for summary judgment.
Justin Jamison began work for Dow on January 5, 1987 in Midland, Michigan. As part of his employment, the plaintiff was represented by the United Steelworkers of America and his employment was governed by a collective bargaining agreement. Between 1987 and 2000, the plaintiff worked in various locations at the Midland complex including the mail room and different production plants. In 2000, the plaintiff became an engineer technician (ET) and worked in the "827 Building" where Dow produced its Citrucel product. The plaintiff was responsible for loading raw materials, mixing ingredients, processing materials, and packaging Citrucel. This work apparently was dusty, and the plaintiff wore safety glasses and goggles. William Moneypenny was the plaintiff's supervisor.
In February of 2001, the plaintiff was diagnosed with keratoconus and recurrent corneal erosions. According to the plaintiff's treating physician, Miriam Schteingart, M.D., this eye condition exists when the "normally round shape of the cornea is distorted and a cone-like bulge develops resulting in severe vision impairment, and the cornea is also susceptible to scratches and scars[,] which further impair vision." Pl.'s Resp. Br. Ex. 3, Schteingart Aff. at ¶ 4. As a result, the plaintiff is sensitive to chemicals, fumes, vapors, and dirt. He is also sensitive to bright lights, wind, sunlight, and is impaired when driving at night. According to Dr. Schteingart, the plaintiff should be restricted to working in areas "where he will not be exposed to any vapors, fumes, or strong odors in his environment." Id. at ¶ 6. The presence of irritating chemicals in the air can also cause him further corneal damage.
Dr. Schteingart also stated that the plaintiff is particularly sensitive to chemicals and heavy dust. The plaintiff's sensitivity is heightened further because his condition forces him to wear contact lenses, including two in the left eye, and the lenses absorb fumes, vapors, strong odors, dust, and chemicals. In fact, the lenses alone can "cause corneal erosion, oxygen deprivation, and blindness." Id. at ¶ 16. She states that protective goggles would help shield the plaintiff's eyes from dust and chemical splashes, but they would not protect his eyes from chemical vapors. Accordingly, Dr. Schteingart determined that the plaintiff should work in an environment with only mild dust exposure, such as a laboratory where a hood is present to remove most of the odors, fumes, and vapors from the air.
In his disability report to the Social Security Administration, the plaintiff appended a document entitled "Living with Keratoconus" in which he explained this condition in his own words. He stated that his vision is severely impaired; his treatment requires him to wear two contact lenses in one eye and one in the other; he is sensitive to bright light, wind, dust, strong odors, and fumes; the contact lenses often dry out and are painful; he cannot read street signs at night; he experiences pain from opening his eyes after sleeping because it tears his corneal scars; the doctor has had to remove scar tissue at times with a scalpel; he cannot read small print without squinting; and short of medical miracle he will have the disease for his whole life and may eventually need a corneal transplant.
Dr. Schteingart stated in her affidavit that the plaintiff's condition "substantially limits" and "constantly effects [sic]" the plaintiff's "ability to see." Pl.'s Resp. Br. Ex. 3, Schteingart Aff. at ¶ 4. The contact lenses improve his vision, but he cannot wear them in the dust- and vapor-laden atmosphere of the chemical plant because the lenses can exacerbate corneal erosion. However, the plaintiff stated both in his deposition and disability report that despite his condition he can perform many basic tasks. He confirmed that he can drive, run his own errands, go shopping, care for himself unassisted, complete household chores, play basketball, football, and baseball, and read books, magazines, and newspapers. Def.'s Mot. Summ. J., Jamison Dep. at 50-52. The plaintiff also can ride a bicycle, prepare all types of meals, pay bills, watch movies with friends, and in engage in other social activities. Def.'s Mot. Summ. J. Ex. 3, Jamison Sworn Statement at 2-4. With the use of his glasses or contact lenses, the plaintiff can perform "detailed work." Id. at 4.
The plaintiff was placed on sick leave beginning February 25, 2001. He underwent surgery on his eye in March 2001 and eventually returned to work on August 2, 2001. On October 11, 2001, Dow's health department notified the plaintiff's supervisor that the plaintiff could not be exposed to dust or chemicals in the air but he could wear protective eye equipment. Moneypenny, apparently aware of these restrictions, placed the plaintiff in a number of positions in the 827 Building and finally assigned him to update the Operating Discipline Management System procedures. The plaintiff believed that this position fit well with his medical conditions; however, he said that Moneypenny harassed him: "Bill Moneypenny was telling me that I wouldn't have a job because of my restrictions." Def.'s Mot. Summ. J. Ex. 2, Jamison Dep. at 167. The plaintiff complained to the company by e-mail on October 18, 2001.
The plaintiff was the only African-American employee in the department, and he had complained previously about Moneypenny's treatment of him. Before the plaintiff was diagnosed with keratoconus, he complained to James McDaniel and Rolland Wallace (both African-Americans) in Dow's Work Force Issues Department that he felt that Moneypenny was singling him out by admonishing him in front of coworkers and disciplining him for violating the company's e-mail policy. They investigated the plaintiff's complaints and determined that there was no substantiation for the allegations.
According to Dr. Marcia Lee in Dow's medical department, on November 8, 2001, Dr. Schteingart sent a note indicating that the plaintiff was suffering cornealirritation from exposure to chemicals in the 827 Building and the plaintiff should avoid further exposure. The plaintiff asserts that he was tolerating the environment in his office position, but Dr. Lee took Dr. Schteingart's note to mean that Jamison could not work anywhere in the 827 Building. Moneypenny then contacted Cal Morgan, who was in charge of the Employee Development Training Resource Pool (EDTRP), told him of the plaintiff's restrictions, and suggested that the plaintiff should be released into the EDTRP for placement outside the 827 Building. Moneypenny asserts that there were no ET positions in that or any other building that satisfied the plaintiff's restrictions.
The plaintiff was placed into EDTRP in December 2001. This move also was approved by the union's joint committee. However, the plaintiff maintains that the transfer was instigated by Moneypenny in retaliation for past complaints of racial discrimination and that the placement departed from Dow's usual practice with respect to the EDTRP. Consequently, the Court will take some time to review the testimony as to Dow's customary procedures by which employees are released into the Pool.
Morgan stated that the primary function of the EDTRP is to place "folks that had either lost their job through a work force reduction or failed off the job." Def.'s Mot. Summ. J. Ex. 16, Morgan Dep. at 5. Generally, Morgan would receive a call from Kevin Ellis in the company's labor-relations unit who would advise him that an employee had been released into the Pool. Sometimes...
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