Jamison v. The Pantry, Inc.
| Decision Date | 13 March 1990 |
| Docket Number | No. 1490,1490 |
| Citation | 392 S.E.2d 474,301 S.C. 443 |
| Court | South Carolina Court of Appeals |
| Parties | Robert JAMISON, Appellant, v. THE PANTRY, INC., Respondent. Nellie W. RUFF, as Administratrix of the Estate of Opal Ruff, Appellant, v. THE PANTRY, INC., Respondent. Kyle RUFF, a minor under the age of eighteen (18) years, by his duly appointed Guardian ad Litem, Nellie W. RUFF, Appellant, v. THE PANTRY, INC., Respondent. . Heard |
Kenneth M. Mathews of Scott & Mathews and John F. Hardaway, Columbia, for appellants.
Charles E. Carpenter, Jr. and Michael A. Pulliam, both of Richardson, Plowden, Grier & Howser, Columbia, for respondent.
These personal injury actions against The Pantry, Inc., by Robert Jamison, Nellie W. Ruff, as administratrix of the estate of Opal Ruff, and Kyle Ruff arise out of an alleged unlawful sale of beer. The actions were consolidated for trial. The trial court directed a verdict in The Pantry's favor. Jamison and the Ruffs appeal. The question on appeal concerns only the sufficiency of the evidence as to proximate cause. We reverse and remand.
The three complaints, among other things, allege that The Pantry sold beer to Willis Dean DeBruhl, a minor, that DeBruhl's consumption of the beer resulted in a head-on collision that injured Jamison and Kyle Ruff and fatally injured Opal Ruff, and that the sale of the beer by The Pantry was a proximate cause of the collision and of the injuries the collision brought about.
At trial, the trial judge granted The Pantry's motion for a directed verdict, finding simply that "as a matter of law there [is] insufficient evidence to submit the case to the jury." The grounds for The Pantry's motion were that Jamison and the Ruffs failed to prove that "any beer purchased at The Pantry was ever consumed prior to this accident [and] that any beer purchased from The Pantry was [a] proximate cause of the accident in question."
In determining the question of whether the trial judge properly granted The Pantry's motion for a directed verdict, we are required, as was the trial judge, to view the evidence and all reasonable inferences that can be drawn therefrom in the light most favorable to Jamison and the Ruffs and if there is even a "scintilla of evidence" tending to prove the allegations of the complaints, the motion should have been denied. Sweatt v. Norman, 283 S.C. 443, 322 S.E.2d 478 (Ct.App.1984). Because a direction of a verdict is not favored, a case must be clear, certain, or indisputable to warrant a trial judge's granting of a motion seeking a directed verdict. 88 C.J.S. Trial § 257(b) at 627 (1955).
A review of the evidence and its reasonable inferences in the light most favorable to Jamison and the Ruffs follows.
On September 5, 1986, Mark Uggiano talked to DeBruhl, a nineteen-year-old, at a high school football game and arranged to meet him after the game at The Pantry.
Uggiano left the game sometime near the end of the third quarter or the beginning of the fourth quarter. In high school football, a quarter is 12 minutes. The game ended at approximately 9:30 p.m.
Thirty or forty minutes after leaving the game, Uggiano met DeBruhl and Richard Derodo in Dusty Bend at The Pantry, a convenience store. DeBruhl, who was not intoxicated at the time, 1 bought a case of beer from The Pantry.
The beer, which The Pantry was licensed to sell, was put into a paper bag and DeBruhl carried it to his car. DeBruhl got into the car and handed the beer to Uggiano who sat on the back seat. The beer DeBruhl purchased was the only beer in the car. 2
At 10:45 p.m., a mile from The Pantry, DeBruhl's car collided head-on with another car. The collision killed both DeBruhl and the driver of the other car, Opal Ruff, and injured the passengers in her car, Jamison and Kyle Ruff. DeBruhl was the at-fault driver.
A highway patrolman found opened beer cans inside the car, along with unopened beer cans in a paper bag and inside an ice chest. DeBruhl's blood alcohol level was determined to be .135. This amount of alcohol is sufficient to bring a person under its influence to such an extent as to impair the person's faculties. See State v. Sheppard, 248 S.C. 464, 150 S.E.2d 916 (1966) ().
We think the evidence just recited supports the inferences that DeBruhl purchased beer at The Pantry no later than about 9:58 p.m., 3 or approximately 47 minutes before the accident at 10:45 p.m., that the beer sold DeBruhl by The Pantry was the only beer in the car, that DeBruhl consumed from the opened cans found in his car some of the beer purchased from The Pantry, and that his consumption of the beer caused him to be under the influence of alcohol and impaired his driving ability.
We also think the evidence just recited supports the inference that The Pantry's sale of beer to DeBruhl, a minor, in violation of Sections 61-9-40 and 61-9-410 of the South Carolina Code of Laws (1976) (Rev.1990) 4 was a proximate cause of the injuries suffered by Jamison and the Ruffs. 5 It was reasonably foreseeable that a nineteen-year-old who was sold a case of beer by a convenience store in violation of statutes would consume a portion of the beer, would become intoxicated, would drive an automobile, would collide with another vehicle, and would injure or kill someone. Freeman v. Finney, 65 N.C.App. 526, 309 S.E.2d 531 (1983).
A jury issue existed, therefore, regarding whether The Pantry's sale of the beer to DeBruhl in violation of Sections 61-9-40 and 61-9-410 was a proximate cause of the injuries sustained by Jamison and the Ruffs. Id.; Michnik-Zilberman v. Gordon Liquors, Inc., 14 Mass.App. 533, 440 N.E.2d 1297 (1982), aff'd, 390 Mass. 6, 453 N.E.2d 430 (1983); see Christiansen v. Campbell, 285 S.C. 164, 328 S.E.2d 351 (Ct.App.1985), cert. denied, S.C.Sup.Ct.Order dated June 27, 1985 (the question of proximate cause was for the jury to determine where a licensed retailer sold beer to an intoxicated person in violation of Section 61-9-410); Bartley v. Floyd, 695 P.2d 781 (Colo.App.1984), aff'd, 727 P.2d 1109 (Colo.1986) (). 6
REVERSED AND REMANDED.
1 We infer from the following that DeBruhl was not intoxicated:
Q. (By Mr. Hardaway): Did you see Willis Dean DeBruhl on September the 5th, 1986?
A. (By Mr. Uggiano): Yes, sir.
....
Q. When did you first see him?
A. I saw him at the football game at Camden High.
....
Q. Did he appear to be drunk?
A. No, sir, he didn't.
....
Q. When you saw Willis Dean DeBruhl at The Pantry when he came there that night, describe what he looked like then?
A. Nothing out of the ordinary, same way.
Q. Was he drunk?
A. Not that I could tell.
....
And from the following:
Q. (By Mr. Pulliam): ... In your opinion, as an eyewitness, was he drunk or intoxicated when he went into [The] Pantry?
A. (By Mr. Uggiano): As far as I know, no.
....
2 We infer from the following that the beer bought by DeBruhl from The Pantry was the only beer in the car:
Q. (By Mr. Hardaway): ... Was there any particular reason for ya'll to meet at this particular Pantry?
A. (By Mr. Uggiano): To buy beer so that we could head out to sorority night.
....
Q. How much beer did he buy?
A. A case.
....
Q. How much beer did Willis Dean DeBruhl buy that night?
A. I only saw a case.
....
Q. (By Mr. Mathews): Now, when Dean went into The Pantry and he came back out, did he give you something in the back seat?
A. He gave me the beer.
....
Q. Did you see any other beer in the car at that time?
A. No, sir. I didn't.
....
Q. (By Mr. Hardaway): When ... Willis Dean DeBruhl bought that beer and brought it back to the car, was there any other beer in the car?
A. Not that I could see.
Q. Were there any other coolers in the car?
A. Not that I know of.
....
3 We determined the time this way:...
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