Jan G. v. Semple
| Decision Date | 12 January 2021 |
| Docket Number | AC 43794 |
| Citation | 244 A.3d 644,202 Conn.App. 202 |
| Court | Connecticut Court of Appeals |
| Parties | JAN G. v. Scott SEMPLE et al. |
Jan G., self-represented, the appellant (plaintiff).
Jacob McChesney, assistant attorney general, with whom, on the brief, were William Tong, attorney general, and Clare E. Kindall, solicitor general, for the appellees (defendants).
The self-represented plaintiff, Jan G., appeals from the judgment of the trial court dismissing his action against the defendants, state employees of the Department of Correction (department).1 On appeal, the plaintiff claims that the court improperly concluded that it lacked subject matter jurisdiction over (1) his claims against the defendants in their individual capacities on the basis of statutory immunity pursuant to General Statutes § 4-165, and (2) his claims against the defendants in their official capacities on the basis of the doctrine of sovereign immunity.2 We affirm the judgment of the trial court.
The following facts are alleged in the plaintiff's complaint. At all times relevant to this appeal, the plaintiff
has been incarcerated at the Cheshire Correctional Institution (Cheshire). Prior to 2015, the court issued a protective order barring the plaintiff's contact with his mother. In February, 2015, the court terminated the protective order against the plaintiff. Following the court's termination of the protective order, the plaintiff and his mother submitted to the department various requests to approve contact visits between them while the plaintiff is incarcerated. The defendant Scott Erfe, then the warden of Cheshire, denied the plaintiff's and his mother's requests.
In response to Erfe's denial of the contact visitation requests, the plaintiff submitted to the department two inmate grievance forms—a May 9, 2018 inmate administrative remedy form (level one grievance), and a June 22, 2018 inmate grievance appeal form (level two grievance). The plaintiff attached as exhibits to his complaint, inter alia, his level one grievance, his level two grievance, and the department's responses to each. In those grievance forms, the plaintiff again requested that the department add his mother to his contact visitation list, and he referenced the court's termination of the protective order against him. On June 21, 2018, the department denied the plaintiff's level one grievance, stating: 3 On August 1, 2018, the department denied the plaintiff's level two grievance, stating: "You are appealing a level one grievance regarding visiting at [the] Cheshire [Correctional Institution]. The response given by [the department] was appropriate. The removal of the protective order
does not negate the fact that [your mother] is a victim of your crime. Your level [two] grievance appeal is denied."4
On January 2, 2019, the plaintiff commenced this action against the defendants in both their individual and official capacities. In his complaint, the plaintiff alleged federal civil rights claims pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983.5 Specifically, the plaintiff alleged that the defendants, by denying requests for contact visitation with his mother, violated his right to freedom of association and his right to due process of law as guaranteed by the first and the fourteenth amendments to the United States constitution.6 Additionally, in an "[i]ntroduction"
to his complaint, the plaintiff alleged "the torts of denial of visits of elderly infirm (80 year old) mother" and "denial of freedom of association."7 The plaintiff sought declaratory and injunctive relief, as well as monetary damages.
On February 25, 2019, the defendants moved to dismiss the plaintiff's action. With respect to the plaintiff's claims brought against them in their individual capacities, the defendants provided three bases for dismissing the plaintiff's claims. The defendants first argued that the court lacked personal jurisdiction over them in their individual capacities due to the plaintiff's failure to serve them in that capacity, as required by General Statutes § 52-57 (a).8 Second, the defendants argued that the court lacked subject matter jurisdiction over the plaintiff's claims brought against them in their individual capacities as they are entitled to statutory immunity pursuant to § 4-165.9 Third, the defendants argued that they additionally are entitled to qualified immunity, barring the plaintiff's § 1983 claims brought against them in their individual capacities. With respect to the plaintiff's claims brought against the defendants in their official capacities, the defendants argued that those claims are barred by sovereign immunity.
On April 1, 2019, the plaintiff filed an objection to the defendants’ motion to dismiss in which he argued that "statutory and sovereign immunity does not apply
in a § 1983 federal civil rights action filed in state court" because "[t]he supremacy clause preempts state statutes and state common law of Connecticut." The plaintiff further argued that the defendants are "not entitled to any qualified immunity."10
On August 20, 2019, the trial court granted the defendants’ motion to dismiss, concluding that the plaintiff's claims against the defendants in their individual capacities are barred by statutory immunity pursuant to § 4-165, and that his claims against the defendants in their official capacities are barred by sovereign immunity.11 This appeal followed.
We begin by setting forth our standard of review. "A motion to dismiss ... properly attacks the jurisdiction of the court, essentially asserting that the plaintiff cannot as a matter of law and fact state a cause of action that should be heard by the court. ... A motion to dismiss tests, inter alia, whether, on the face of the record, the court is without jurisdiction. ...
light. ... In this regard, a court must take the facts to be those alleged in the complaint, including those facts necessarily implied from the allegations, construing them in a manner most favorable to the pleader." (Citations omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Lawrence v. Weiner , 154 Conn. App. 592, 596–97, 106 A.3d 963, cert. denied, 315 Conn. 925, 109 A.3d 921 (2015).
On appeal, the plaintiff first claims that the trial court improperly concluded that it lacked subject matter jurisdiction over his claims brought against the defendants in their individual capacities on the basis of statutory immunity pursuant to § 4-165 (a). The defendants contend that the court properly dismissed the plaintiff's state tort claims brought against them in their individual capacities on the basis of statutory immunity pursuant to § 4-165 (a). The defendants concede, however, that there was "apparent error in [the court's] overbroad application of ... § 4-165" to the plaintiff's § 1983 claims brought against them in their individual capacities.12 Consistent with the defendants’ arguments set forth in their memorandum of law in support of their motion to dismiss, the defendants provide two alternative bases for affirming the court's dismissal of the plaintiff's § 1983 claims brought against them in their individual capacities: that the court lacked subject matter jurisdiction over the plaintiff's claims on the basis of the doctrine of qualified immunity, and that the court
lacked personal jurisdiction over the defendants in their individual capacities.
We agree with the defendants that (A) the court lacked subject matter jurisdiction over the plaintiff's state tort claims brought against them in their individual capacities on the basis of statutory immunity pursuant to § 4-165 (a), and (B) the court lacked subject matter jurisdiction over the plaintiff's § 1983 claims brought against them in their individual capacities on the basis of the doctrine of qualified immunity. Furthermore, we agree with the defendants that (C) the court lacked personal jurisdiction over them in their individual capacities. Accordingly, we conclude that the court properly dismissed the plaintiff's claims brought against the defendants in their individual capacities.
We first address the plaintiff's claim that the court improperly concluded that the defendants are entitled to statutory immunity pursuant to § 4-165 (a). The defendants contend that, to the extent that the plaintiff alleged state tort claims, the court properly dismissed such claims brought against them in their individual capacities on the basis of statutory immunity. We agree with the defendants.
Section 4-165 (a) provides in relevant part: "No state officer or employee shall be personally liable for damage or injury, not wanton, reckless or malicious, caused in the discharge of his or her duties or within the scope of his or her employment. ..." Section 4-165 "grants state employees immunity from suit from negligence claims regarding conduct arising out of the scope of their employment, but such immunity does not extend to conduct by a state employee that is alleged to be wanton, reckless, or malicious." Lawrence v. Weiner , supra, 154 Conn. App. at 594, 106 A.3d 963.
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