Jane Doe v. John Doe

• Court: Idaho Supreme Court
• Writing for the Court: BURDICK, Justice.
• Citation: Jane Doe v. John Doe, 150 Idaho 88, 244 P.3d 232 (Idaho 2010)
• Decision Date: 30 November 2010
• Docket Number: No. 37453.,37453.
• Parties: In the Interest of Jane Doe, a Minor Child Under Eighteen Years of Age. IDAHO DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH & WELFARE, Petitioner–Respondent, v. John DOE, Respondent–Appellant.

150 Idaho 88

244 P.3d 232

In the Interest of Jane Doe, a Minor Child Under Eighteen Years of Age.

IDAHO DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH & WELFARE, Petitioner–Respondent,

v.John DOE, Respondent–Appellant.

No. 37453.

Supreme Court of Idaho, Pocatello, September 2010.

Nov. 30, 2010.

Bannock County Public Defender's Office, Pocatello, for appellant. Lindsey A. Blake argued.

Hon. Lawrence G. Wasden, Attorney General, Boise, for respondent. James P. Price, Deputy Attorney General argued.

BURDICK, Justice.

John Doe, biological father of Jane Doe ("Jane"), appeals the magistrate court's decision that he never perfected any parental rights to Jane and that, if he did have parental rights, his rights are terminated on grounds of abandonment, neglect and Jane's best interest. John Doe argues that he did not know he was Jane's biological father until he was served with the termination papers, from which point he has acted in a manner entitling him to parental rights. We affirm.

I. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

Jane is the youngest of four children born to Jane Doe II ("Mother"). She was born during Mother's marriage to John Doe II ("Father"), and Father is listed as Jane's father on her birth certificate. Father is the biological father of Jane's three siblings; however, John Doe is Jane's biological father, which was established by genetic testing during the course of the termination action.

Mother's sexual relationship with John Doe began when he was sixteen and lasted between six months to a year. During this time, Father was separated from Mother and was living outside of Idaho. Jane was conceived in approximately May 2005. When Mother was about four months pregnant, John Doe was convicted of statutory rape, stemming from a relationship he had with a high school sophomore while he was a high school senior, and was sentenced to two years determinate and six years indeterminate. John Doe knew Mother was pregnant and that the child might be his, as Mother communicated such information to him. Jane was born in 2006 while John Doe was still in prison. John Doe did not pay any costs associated with Mother's pregnancy or Jane's birth.

While in prison in March 2006, one month after Jane's birth, John Doe requested a paternity test from Child Support Services ("CSS"). CSS responded in writing on March 29, 2006, advising John Doe that Jane was the legal child of Mother and Father, that there was not a child support case relating to the child and that if he wished to challenge paternity he must pursue a private action. John Doe did not take any further action. John Doe wrote to Mother while he was in prison. A few months before he was released from prison, Mother wrote him and included pictures from when Jane was born.

On November 9, 2007, the Bannock County prosecutor filed a petition under the Child Protective Act. The petition listed Mother and Father as the parents of all four children, and alleged that an investigation indicated that the children were being neglected. On December 6, 2007, the magistrate court held an adjudicatory hearing, at which Mother and Father stipulated to the magistrate court taking jurisdiction and stipulated to placing the children under the protective supervision of the Department of Health and Welfare (the "Department").

John Doe was released from prison in April, 2008. He met Jane for the first time in May 2008 while living in Walla Walla, Washington, when Mother brought Jane to visit with him for a weekend. He and Mother agreed that he would reimburse her if she rented a car and travelled to Washington with Jane for the visit. While John Doe and Mother disagree as to whether he ever reimbursed her, the magistrate court found that John Doe paid some money for her visit. In early 2008, the Department became aware of John Doe but did not know his whereabouts. Beginning as early as May or June, 2008, the Department mailed quarterly letters to two addresses in Walla Walla, WA, where John Doe lived at different times, but the Department received neither a response nor a notification that the letters were undeliverable.

At a hearing held on August 15, 2008, the magistrate court removed the four children from the custody of Mother and Father, and placed the children in the legal custody of the Department. Mother claims to have kept John Doe informed of the child protection case throughout its duration. John Doe denies having had knowledge of the case, and the magistrate never made a finding on this issue. The Department filed a petition for the termination of parental rights of Mother, Father and John Doe on August 26, 2009. When served with the termination, John Doe requested and obtained an attorney to represent him. In October 2009 when John Doe was attending the termination hearing, he visited Jane at the Department. This was his second and final time visiting with Jane. Jane did not recognize him but warmed up to him by the end of the visit. During the termination hearing in December of 2009, a paternity test revealed that John Doe was Jane's biological father. Mother says she would have cooperated with paternity testing earlier, but John Doe never pursued one.

Over nearly four years, John Doe knew Jane might be his child, yet he never filed with the putative father registry. He did not commence a custody or paternity action. He did not pay child support or the costs of Jane's birth. He did not send Jane gifts or provide material support. John Doe claims to have sent Mother $380 because she was being evicted, but Mother disagrees. The magistrate court concluded that some money was sent. The magistrate court found that while there were times when John Doe had no information as to where Mother and Jane were, John Doe and Mother still had off-and-on personal contact.

On February 17, 2010, the magistrate court: (1) concluded that John Doe never perfected any parental rights in Jane; and (2) ordered his rights, should he have any, to be terminated on the bases of clear and convincing evidence of neglect, abandonment and Jane's best interest. The magistrate court also terminated the parental rights of Mother and Father in Jane and her three siblings on the same grounds. John Doe filed an expedited appeal with this court on March 2, 2010.

II. STANDARD OF REVIEW

This Court set forth the applicable standard of review in Doe v. Roe:

This Court exercises free review over the trial judge's conclusions of law. The determination of the meaning of a statute and its application is a matter of law over which this court exercises free review.

In an action to terminate parental rights, where a clear and convincing standard has been noted explicitly and applied by the trial court, an appellate court will not disturb the trial court's findings unless they are not supported by substantial and competent evidence. Only clearly erroneous findings are overturned, which means a reasonable person would not have relied on them in concluding as the fact finder did.

142 Idaho 202, 203, 127 P.3d 105, 106 (2005) (internal citations and quotations omitted).

III. DISCUSSION

A. The magistrate court correctly concluded that John Doe is not a parent.

In Doe, we explained that, "[o]nly after a parental interest has been identified can a court properly evaluate whether this interest may be terminated. Mere biology does not create a father with legal rights and responsibilities to a minor child." Id. at 205, 127 P.3d at 108. For a biological father to have parental rights, he must satisfy the definition of "parent" under I.C. § 16–2002.¹ Id. Idaho Code § 16–2002(11) defines "parent" as "(a) The birth mother or the adoptive mother; (b) The adoptive father; (c) The biological father of a child conceived or born during the father's marriage to the birth mother; and (d) The unmarried biological father whose consent to an adoption of the child is required pursuant to section 16–1504, Idaho Code." John Doe does not satisfy the requirements of I.C. § 16–2002(11)(a), (b), or (c), as he is not the mother, is not the adoptive father and was never married to the birth mother. The only way John Doe can be a parent under I.C. § 16–2002 is if his consent to an adoption is required pursuant to I.C. § 16–1504.

Consent to an adoption is required from a "biological parent who has been adjudicated to be the child's biological father by a court of competent jurisdiction prior to the mother's execution of consent." I.C. § 16–1504(1)(d). In Doe, 142 Idaho at 205, 127 P.3d at 108, this Court found that merely entering a paternity test into evidence during a termination action, which is what John Doe has done in this case, does not satisfy the requirements of I.C. § 16–1504(1)(d).

Consent to an adoption is also required from an "unmarried biological father who has filed a voluntary acknowledgement of paternity with the vital statistics unit of the department of health and welfare pursuant to section 7–1106, Idaho Code." I.C. § 16–1504(1)(i). John Doe never filed an acknowledgement of paternity.

Finally, consent to adoption is required from "an unmarried biological father of an adoptee only if the requirements and conditions of subsection (2)(a) or (b) of this section have been proven." I.C. § 16–1504(1)(e). Subsection (2)(a) provides, in relevant part:

(i) ... [A]n unmarried biological father shall have developed a substantial relationship with the child, taken some measure of responsibility for the child and the child's future, and demonstrated a full commitment to the responsibilities of parenthood by financial support of the child, of a fair and reasonable sum and in accordance with the father's ability, when not prevented from doing so by the person or authorized agency having lawful custody of the child; and either:

1. Visiting the child at least monthly when physically and financially able to do so, and when not prevented from doing so by the person or authorized agency having lawful custody of the child; or

2. Have regular communication with the child or with the person or agency

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