Jane L. v. Bangerter

• Decision Date: 02 August 1995
• Docket Number: No. 93-4145,93-4145
• Citation: 61 F.3d 1505
• Parties: JANE L., on behalf of herself and all others similarly situated; Utah Women's Clinic, P.C.; Planned Parenthood Association of Utah; David Hansen, M.D.; Madhuri Shah, M.D.; John Carey, M.D.; Dan Chichester, M.D.; Kirtly Parker Jones, M.D.; Kathleen Kennedy, M.D.; Neil K. Kochenour, M.D.; Rhonda Lehr, M.D.; Claire Leonard, M.D.; Kenneth Ward, M.D.; Bonnie Jeanne Baty, M.D.; Susan Elizabeth Lyons, L.C.S.W.; Janet Lynn Wolf, L.C.S.W.; Leslie McDonald-White, L.C.S.W.; Reverend David Butler; Reverend Barbara Hamilton-Holway; Reverend George H. Lower; Reverend Lyle D. Sellards; Reverend Doctor Alan Condie Tull; Reverend Marie Soward Green; Rabbi Frederick L. Wenger; Jane J. Freedom, (Pseudo-Name); Julie Spouse, (Pseudo-Name); American College of Obstetricians and Gynecologists, Utah Sections; Penny Thompson; Wendy Edwards, Plaintiffs-Appellants, v. Norman H. BANGERTER, as Governor of the State of Utah; Paul Van Dam, Attorney General, as Attorney General of Utah, Defendants-Appellees.
• Court: U.S. Court of Appeals — Tenth Circuit

Page 1505

61 F.3d 1505

JANE L., on behalf of herself and all others similarly situated; Utah Women's Clinic, P.C.; Planned Parenthood Association of Utah; David Hansen, M.D.; Madhuri Shah M.D.; John Carey, M.D.; Dan Chichester, M.D.; Kirtly Parker Jones, M.D.; Kathleen Kennedy, M.D.; Neil K Kochenour, M.D.; Rhonda Lehr, M.D.; Claire Leonard, M.D. Kenneth Ward, M.D.; Bonnie Jeanne Baty, M.D.; Susan Elizabeth Lyons, L.C.S.W.; Janet Lynn Wolf, L.C.S.W. Leslie McDonald-White, L.C.S.W.; Reverend David Butler; Reverend Barbara Hamilton-Holway; Reverend George H. Lower; Reverend Lyle D. Sellards; Reverend Doctor Alan Condie Tull; Reverend Marie Soward Green; Rabbi Frederick L. Wenger; Jane J. Freedom, (Pseudo-Name); Julie Spouse, (Pseudo-Name); American College of Obstetricians and Gynecologists, Utah Sections; Penny Thompson; Wendy Edwards, Plaintiffs-Appellants, v. Norman H. BANGERTER, as Governor of the State of Utah; Paul Van Dam, Attorney General, as Attorney General of Utah, Defendants-Appellees.

No. 93-4145.

United States Court of Appeals, Tenth Circuit.

Aug. 2, 1995.

Leon Friedman of Hofstra Law School, Hempstead, NY (A. Howard Lundgren, of Keller & Lundgren, L.C., Salt Lake City, UT; Jeffrey R. Oritt, of Cohne, Rappaport & Segal, P.C., Salt Lake City, UT; Kathryn D. Kendell, of American Civil Liberties Union of Utah, Salt Lake City, UT; Janet Benshoof, Rachael N. Pine, Lenora M. Lapidus, and Eve C. Gartner, of The Center for Reproductive Law & Policy, New York City; and Roger K. Evans, of Planned Parenthood Federation of America, Inc., New York City, with him on the briefs), for plaintiffs-appellants.

Jerrold S. Jensen, Asst. Atty. Gen., Salt Lake City, UT (Jan C. Graham, Utah Atty. Gen. and James R. Soper, Asst. Atty. Gen.; Mary Anne Q. Wood, Anthony B. Quinn, and Kathryn O. Balmforth, Salt Lake City, UT; and Paul M. Durham of Durham, Evans & Jones, Salt Lake City, UT, with him on the brief), for defendants-appellees.

Before SEYMOUR, Chief Judge, MOORE, Circuit Judge, and BROWN, Senior District Judge. ^*

SEYMOUR, Chief Judge.

The instant case is the attorneys fees arm of the Jane L. v. Bangerter abortion litigation that has been moving through the federal courts since 1991. The district court awarded attorneys fees to plaintiffs, but in an amount dramatically less than that requested. The court also awarded attorneys fees to defendants. We reverse in part and remand for two primary reasons. First, we reversed many of the district court's substantive decisions, altering plaintiffs' overall success level. See Jane L. v. Bangerter, 61 F.3d 1493 (10th Cir.1995). Second, the district court abused its discretion in penalizing plaintiffs for raising alternative legal theories and in awarding attorneys fees and expenses to defendants.

I. BACKGROUND

In April 1991, plaintiffs filed a complaint challenging the revised Utah Abortion Act, Utah Code Ann. Secs. 76-7-301 et seq., which they amended soon thereafter. Following a period of discovery, defendants filed a Motion to Dismiss and a Motion for Partial Summary Judgment. In Jane L. v. Bangerter, 794 F.Supp. 1537 (D.Utah 1992) (Jane L. II ), the district court granted several of defendants' motions. ¹ In Jane L. v. Bangerter, 794 F.Supp. 1528 (D.Utah 1992) (Jane L. I ), the district court denied plaintiffs' motion to voluntarily dismiss without prejudice claims arising under the Utah Constitution and instead dismissed these claims with prejudice. The Supreme Court heard arguments in Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pennsylvania v. Casey, --- U.S. ----, 112 S.Ct. 2791, 120 L.Ed.2d 674 (1992), one month before the district court issued Jane L. II. The district court kept plaintiffs' remaining claims under advisement pending the Supreme Court's June 29, 1992 decision in Casey. The district court subsequently resolved these pending claims, holding that the pre-20 week abortion restrictions and the spousal notification provision were unconstitutional. Jane L. v. Bangerter, 809 F.Supp. 865 (D.Utah 1992) (Jane L. III ). The court upheld the choice of method provisions, the serious medical emergency exception, and Plaintiffs appealed several of the holdings in Jane L. II and Jane L. III. We reversed in substantial part, holding that 1) the post-20 week abortion restrictions are not severable from the pre-20 week restrictions held violative of Casey; 2) the fetal experimentation provision is unconstitutionally vague; and 3) the choice of method provisions are unconstitutional. We affirmed the constitutionality of the serious medical emergency exception.

the stringent limitations on the availability of post-20 week abortions. Id.

Following its decision in Jane L. III, the district court entertained plaintiffs' and defendants' motions for attorneys fees pursuant to 42 U.S.C. Sec. 1988. Jane L. v. Bangerter, 828 F.Supp. 1544 (D.Utah 1993) (Jane L. IV ). The court calculated attorneys fees in three steps. First, it arrived at the lodestar by multiplying a reasonable number of hours by a reasonable hourly rate. It then reduced by thirty-five percent the number of hours requested by plaintiffs' attorneys because of imprecise, inflated, and generalized recording methods. In deciding the reasonable rate per hour, the district court applied commensurate Salt Lake City rather than New York City rates to those lawyers from New York. Second, the court further reduced the lodestar by seventy-five percent to reflect plaintiffs' "limited success." Third, the district court awarded defendants attorneys fees because it held that plaintiffs filed frivolous claims. In the end, the district court awarded plaintiffs $71,663.47 and defendants $68,952.80 in attorneys fees. The court ordered plaintiffs to pay $53,110.33 of defendants' attorneys fees and instructed plaintiffs' counsel to pay the remaining $15,847.47. The court denied plaintiffs' and defendants' requests for costs and partially granted their requests for expenses.

Plaintiffs appeal the district court's decision, contesting each step in the calculation of their fee award. Plaintiffs also appeal the district court's denial of their request for costs and its partial denial of their request for expenses. "[A]n attorney's fee award by the district court will be upset on appeal only if it represents an abuse of discretion." Mares v. Credit Bureau of Raton, 801 F.2d 1197, 1201 (10th Cir.1986). We similarly review the district court's determination of costs and expenses for an abuse of discretion. See Riggs v. Scrivner, Inc., 927 F.2d 1146, 1149 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 502 U.S. 867, 112 S.Ct. 196, 116 L.Ed.2d 156 (1991). We will reverse subsidiary factual findings only if they are clearly erroneous. Mares, 801 F.2d at 1201. Because we greatly altered plaintiffs' success level in our decision on the merits, we necessarily must reverse the district court's determination of attorneys fees, expenses, and costs to the extent the court based those awards on plaintiffs' limited success below. In addition, we will address those issues raised by plaintiffs that will likely reoccur in the redetermination of attorneys fees and costs on remand.

II. LODESTAR CALCULATION

Title 42 U.S.C. Sec. 1988(b) provides that in federal civil rights actions "the court, in its discretion, may allow the prevailing party, other than the United States, a reasonable attorney's fee as part of the costs." A plaintiff who "succeed[ed] on any significant issue in litigation which achieves some of the benefit the parties sought in bringing suit" is a "prevailing party." Hensley v. Eckerhart, 461 U.S. 424, 433, 103 S.Ct. 1933, 1939, 76 L.Ed.2d 40 (1983) (quoting Nadeau v. Helgemoe, 581 F.2d 275, 278-79 (1st Cir.1978)). To determine a reasonable attorneys fee, the district court must arrive at a "lodestar" figure by multiplying the hours plaintiffs' counsel reasonably spent on the litigation by a reasonable hourly rate. Blum v. Stenson, 465 U.S. 886, 888, 104 S.Ct. 1541, 1543, 79 L.Ed.2d 891 (1984); Hensley, 461 U.S. at 433, 103 S.Ct. at 1939.

At the district court level, plaintiffs succeeded in invalidating the pre-20 week abortion restrictions and the spousal notification provision. On appeal, plaintiffs further succeeded in invalidating the post-20 week abortion restrictions, the fetal experimentation provision, and the choice of method provisions. Plaintiffs argue that the district court abused its discretion in calculating the lodestar by excessively reducing the number of The district court reduced the number of compensable hours by 35%, concluding that "plaintiffs' requested hours far exceed the hours that reasonably would be required by reasonably competent attorneys in handling this litigation." Jane L. IV, 828 F.Supp. at 1551. The district court found that "with few exceptions, plaintiffs' counsel as a whole have not adequately excluded requests for 'excessive, redundant, or otherwise unnecessary' hours." Id. at 1548 (applying standard enunciated in Hensley, 461 U.S. at 434, 103 S.Ct. at 1939-40). The court further found that "[p]laintiffs' time records include unspecified or inadequately specified 'review' time, excessive travel time, unnecessary and duplicative time spent in conference calls, meetings, and hearings, noncompensable public relations time, noncompensable time expended after the judgment was rendered, and noncompensable clerical or 'overhead' time." Id. at 1549. Plaintiffs contend that the district court's reduction was excessive, but only appeal its reduction for time spent on review, travel, and the attorneys fees application, as well as on overlapping and duplicative time entries.

compensable hours and by erroneously applying Salt Lake City rather than New York City hourly rates.

We review the district court's determination of reasonable hours for an abuse of discretion. See Mares, 801 F.2d at 1201. Plaintiffs' burden in an application for attorneys fees is to "prove and establish the reasonableness of each dollar, each...