Jangula v. N.D. Dep't of Transp.

• Decision Date: 30 June 2016
• Docket Number: No. 20150286.,20150286.
• Citation: Jangula v. N.D. Dep't of Transp., 881 N.W.2d 639 (N.D. 2016)
• Parties: Jody James JANGULA, Petitioner and Appellant v. NORTH DAKOTA DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION, Respondent and Appellee.
• Court: North Dakota Supreme Court

881 N.W.2d 639

Jody James JANGULA, Petitioner and Appellant

v.NORTH DAKOTA DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION, Respondent and Appellee.

No. 20150286.

Supreme Court of North Dakota.

June 30, 2016.

Chad R. McCabe, Bismarck, N.D., for petitioner and appellant.

Michael T. Pitcher, Office of the Attorney General, Bismarck, N.D., for respondent and appellee.

CROTHERS, Justice.

[¶ 1] Jody Jangula appeals from a district court judgment affirming a Department of Transportation hearing officer's decision suspending his driving privileges for two years. We affirm, concluding the hearing officer did not abuse its discretion in admitting the analytical report of a blood sample into evidence at the administrative hearing.

I

[¶ 2] In January 2015 Jangula was charged with actual physical control of a vehicle while under the influence. Jangula was issued a report and notice form, notifying him of the Department's intent to suspend his driving privileges. Jangula requested an administrative hearing.

[¶ 3] At the February 2015 hearing the Department offered a number of exhibits into evidence, including exhibit 1 showing Jangula's blood alcohol concentration of .226 percent by weight. Jangula objected, contending the analytical report had not been certified or authenticated and the Department had not complied with the relevant statutes and rules of evidence. The hearing officer overruled Jangula's objections and admitted the exhibit into evidence.

[¶ 4] The hearing officer suspended Jangula's driving privileges for two years. Jangula appealed to the district court, which affirmed.

II

[¶ 5] Our review of an administrative agency decision to suspend a person's driving privileges is governed by the Administrative Agencies Practice Act, N.D.C.C. ch. 28–32. Painte v. Dir., Dep't of Transp., 2013 ND 95, ¶ 6, 832 N.W.2d 319. We review the agency decision under N.D.C.C. § 28–32–49 in the same manner as the district court under N.D.C.C. § 28–32–46. We will affirm the agency's decision unless:

“1. The order is not in accordance with the law.

2. The order is in violation of the constitutional rights of the appellant.

3. The provisions of this chapter have not been complied with in the proceedings before the agency.

4. The rules or procedure of the agency have not afforded the appellant a fair hearing.

5. The findings of fact made by the agency are not supported by a preponderance of the evidence.

6. The conclusions of law and order of the agency are not supported by its findings of fact.

7. The findings of fact made by the agency do not sufficiently address the evidence presented to the agency by the appellant.

8. The conclusions of law and order of the agency do not sufficiently explain the agency's rationale for not adopting any contrary recommendations by a hearing officer or an administrative law judge.”

N.D.C.C. § 28–32–46.

[¶ 6] “In deciding whether an agency's findings of fact are supported by a preponderance of the evidence, our review is confined to the record before the agency and to determining whether a reasoning mind reasonably could have determined the factual conclusions were proven by the weight of the evidence.” Painte, 2013 ND 95, ¶ 7, 832 N.W.2d 319 (quotation marks omitted). We defer to an agency's ruling by not making independent findings of fact or by substituting our own judgment for that of the agency, but questions of law are fully reviewable on appeal. Id. “When an appeal involves the interpretation of a statute, a legal question, this Court will affirm the agency's order unless it finds the agency's order is not in accordance with the law.” Roberts v. N.D. Dep't of Transp., 2015 ND 137, ¶ 5, 863 N.W.2d 529 (quoting Harter v. N.D. Dep't of Transp., 2005 ND 70, ¶ 7, 694 N.W.2d 677 (quotation marks omitted)).

III

[¶ 7] Jangula argues the hearing officer erred admitting the analytical report into evidence because the Department did not comply with either N.D.C.C. § 39–20–07(8) or N.D.R.Ev. 902.

[¶ 8] “The admissibility of evidence at an adjudicative hearing before an administrative agency is governed by the North Dakota Rules of Evidence.” Dawson v. N.D. Dep't of Transp., 2013 ND 62, ¶ 12, 830 N.W.2d 221 (quoting May v. Sprynczynatyk, 2005 ND 76, ¶ 24, 695 N.W.2d 196 ); see also N.D.C.C. § 28–32–24(1). A hearing officer has broad discretion in controlling the admission of evidence at the hearing and the hearing officer's decision to admit or exclude evidence will only be reversed on appeal when there is an abuse of discretion. Dawson, at ¶ 12; May, at ¶ 24. “A hearing officer abuses her discretion when she acts in an arbitrary, unreasonable, or capricious manner or misapplies or misinterprets the law.” Dawson, at ¶ 12; see also Knudson v. Dir., N.D. Dep't of Transp., 530 N.W.2d 313, 316 (N.D.1995).

[¶ 9] Jangula contends the hearing officer erred in receiving the analytical report into evidence because the report is not a “certified” copy under N.D.C.C. § 39–20–07. He contends a “certified” copy must comply with N.D.C.C. § 31–04–10, which states:

“Whenever a copy of a writing is certified for the purpose of evidence, the certificate must state in substance that the copy is a correct copy of the original, or of a specified part thereof, as the case may be. The certificate must be under the official seal of the certifying officer, if there is any, or if such officer is a clerk of a court having a seal, under the seal of such court.”

[¶ 10] Jangula argues that to establish the documents are certified, the Department must authenticate the documents before being admitted into evidence. He essentially contends the Department must establish either the authenticity of the documents with extrinsic evidence under N.D.R.Ev. 901, or as self-authenticating documents under N.D.R.Ev. 902. He asserts the documents in this case were not “under seal” and did not “establish from an employee certified under seal that the signer had the official capacity and that the signature was genuine.”

[¶ 11] Generally, statutory interpretation presents a question of law. Dakota Res. Council v. N.D. Public Serv. Comm'n, 2012 ND 72, ¶ 8, 815 N.W.2d 286.

“ ‘Questions of law, including the interpretation of a statute, are fully reviewable on appeal from an administrative decision.’ [Industrial Contractors, Inc. v. Workforce Safety & Ins., 2009 ND 157, ¶ 6, 772 N.W.2d 582 ] (quotation omitted). ‘Words in a statute are given their plain, ordinary, and commonly understood meaning, unless defined by statute or unless a contrary intention plainly appears. N.D.C.C. § 1–02–02. Statutes are construed as a whole and are harmonized to give meaning to related provisions. N.D.C.C. § 1–02–07.’ Id. at ¶ 11 (quotation omitted). When a statute is clear and unambiguous, ‘the letter of [the statute] is not to be disregarded under the pretext of pursuing its spirit.’ N.D.C.C. § 1–02–05.”

Dakota Res. Council, at ¶ 8.

[¶ 12] At an administrative hearing, certain records of the Department and state crime laboratory are statutorily deemed prima facie evidence of their contents without further foundation. See N.D.C.C. § 39–20–05. At the time relevant to this case, N.D.C.C. § 39–20–05(2) (2013), stated, “[A] copy of a certified copy of an analytical report of a blood ... sample from the director of the state crime laboratory or the director's designee, ... and a copy of a certified copy of a certificate of the director of the state crime laboratory designating the director's designees, establish prima facie the alcohol concentration ... shown therein.” Also, N.D.C.C. § 39–20–05(4) (2013) provided:

“At a hearing under this section, the regularly kept records of the director and state crime laboratory may be introduced. Those records establish prima facie their contents without further foundation. For purposes of this chapter, the following are deemed regularly kept records of the director and state crime laboratory:

a. Any copy of a certified copy of an analytical report of a blood or urine sample received by the director from the director of the state crime laboratory or the director's designee or electronically posted by the director of the state crime laboratory or the director's designee on the crime laboratory information management system and certified by, and received from, a law enforcement officer or an individual who has authorized access to the crime laboratory management system through the criminal justice data information sharing system, or a certified copy of the checklist and test records received by the director from a certified breath test operator;

b. Any copy of a certified copy of a certificate of the director of the state crime laboratory or the director's designee relating to approved methods, devices, operators, materials, and checklists used for testing for alcohol concentration or the presence of drugs received by the director from the director of the state crime laboratory or the director's designee, or that have been electronically posted with the state crime laboratory division of the attorney general at the attorney general website; and

c. Any copy of a certified copy of a certificate of the director of the state crime laboratory designating the director's designees. ”

(Emphasis added.)

[¶ 13] Although not an exclusive method to admit test results into evidence, N.D.C.C. § 39–20–07 provides a “shortcut” to ease the burden in laying evidentiary foundation for a blood-alcohol report. See Painte, 2013 ND 95, ¶ 20, 832 N.W.2d 319 ; Schlosser v. N.D. Dep't of Transp., 2009 ND 173, ¶ 10, 775 N.W.2d 695. Section 39–20–07, N.D.C.C., provides in part:

“Upon the trial of any civil or criminal action or proceeding arising out of acts alleged to have been committed by any individual while driving or in actual physical control of a motor vehicle while under the influence of intoxicating liquor, drugs, or a combination thereof, evidence of the amount of alcohol concentration or presence of other drugs, or a combination thereof, in the individual's blood, breath, or urine at the time of the act

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