Janicki Logging Co. v. Mateer
| Decision Date | 13 December 1994 |
| Docket Number | No. 93-35871,93-35871 |
| Citation | 42 F.3d 561 |
| Parties | , 39 Cont.Cas.Fed. (CCH) P 76,727 JANICKI LOGGING CO., Plaintiff-Appellant, v. Bruce MATEER; Dale Robertson, Defendants-Appellees. |
| Court | U.S. Court of Appeals — Ninth Circuit |
William Lenihan, Schwabe, Williamson, Ferguson & Burdell, Seattle, WA, for plaintiff-appellant.
Robert M. Loeb, U.S. Dept. of Justice, Washington, DC, for defendants-appellees.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the Western District of Washington.
Before: BEEZER and FERNANDEZ, Circuit Judges, and ORRICK, District Judge. *
Janicki Logging Company, Inc. appeals from the district court's dismissal of its action against two officials of the United States Forest Service, Bruce Mateer and Dale Robertson. Janicki sued them in their individual, not official, capacities. It claimed that its constitutional rights were violated when a portion of its logging contract with the USFS was cancelled after the discovery of a Northern Spotted Owl's nest in the affected area. Janicki also claims that the district court erred when it failed to allow an amendment of the complaint and a transfer of the case to the United States Court of Federal Claims. 1 We affirm.
In March of 1986, Janicki entered into a contract with USFS. Under the contract USFS agreed to sell and Janicki agreed to cut and remove 4,100,000 board feet of timber from 129 acres located in the Mt. Baker-Snoqualmie National Forest in the State of Washington. The specified acreage was divided into four units.
Section C6.25 of the contract expressly permitted the USFS to "either cancel" or "unilaterally modify [the] contract" in order to provide additional protection for animals that were listed either as threatened or endangered under the Endangered Species Act, or as sensitive by the Regional Forester. The contract was expressly made subject to the Contract Disputes Act (CDA). 41 U.S.C. Secs. 601-613.
In May of 1986, a State of Washington wildlife biologist discovered a Northern Spotted Owl's nest in "Unit 1" of the acreage subject to the contract. After that sighting, the USFS contracting officer, Bruce Mateer, notified Janicki that the USFS was unilaterally modifying the contract pursuant to Sec. C6.25 by deleting Unit 1 from the relevant acreage. Janicki claims that virtually all of the high quality old growth Douglas Fir was in that unit. It contested the decision. It claimed that the unilateral modification was in fact a partial cancellation and that only the Chief of the USFS had authority to cancel a contract for environmental reasons. However, in January of 1991 Janicki received a letter from the Chief of the USFS in which he adopted the contracting officer's actions. That letter was not actually signed by the Chief, F. Dale Robertson. Rather, it was signed on his behalf.
Janicki then followed the terms of the contract and the CDA by filing a claim for damages with Mateer. Janicki asked for $381,014.15 in damages, but when Mateer issued his decision on January 8, 1991, he indicated that the total damages for cancellation of Unit 1 would be $128,273.63. Janicki was then informed that, pursuant to the CDA, it had a right to seek review either by filing an appeal with the Agriculture Board of Contract Appeals within 90 days, or by bringing an action directly in the Claims Court within twelve months of the decision. Janicki did neither. 2
On November 18, 1991, Janicki filed this action in the district court against Mateer and Robertson. It claimed that they had violated its substantive due process rights when they cancelled Unit 1. On January 21, 1992, Janicki finally filed a separate action against the United States in the Claims Court. It claimed that the contracting officer's actions constituted a breach of contract, a taking of property, and a denial of substantive On November 23, 1992, the Claims Court dismissed Janicki's complaint because the action was not filed within one year of the contracting officer's final decision, the Claims Court lost jurisdiction when Janicki filed its district court action, and the Claims Court did not have jurisdiction to grant relief based upon the due process clause of the Fifth Amendment. The Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit ultimately summarily affirmed the Claims Court decision based upon the second ground.
due process. It sought the same damages that it had already sought in its action against Mateer and Robertson.
In June of 1993, the district court determined that it did not have jurisdiction, as a result of which it dismissed the action without prejudice. It determined that because the CDA is a comprehensive remedial scheme, Janicki could not sustain a Bivens 3 action against the USFS officials. The court also pointed out that it had no jurisdiction over CDA actions as such. See 28 U.S.C. Sec. 1346(a)(2).
After the district court issued its judgment, Janicki sought reconsideration. It requested that the district court allow it to amend its complaint and that the court then transfer the amended complaint to the Claims Court. See 28 U.S.C. Sec. 1631. The district court denied the motion, and this appeal ensued.
We review de novo a decision to dismiss a complaint for lack of jurisdiction. See Reebok Int'l, Ltd. v. Marnatech Enters., Inc., 970 F.2d 552, 554 (9th Cir.1992); Hooker v. United States Dep't of Health & Human Servs., 858 F.2d 525, 529 (9th Cir.1988).
We review a denial of a motion to amend a complaint for an abuse of discretion. See Sorosky v. Burroughs Corp., 826 F.2d 794, 804 (9th Cir.1987). Similarly, we review decisions involving pretrial scheduling orders issued pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 16 for an abuse of discretion. See Johnson v. Mammoth Recreations, Inc., 975 F.2d 604, 607 (9th Cir.1992). We also review a district court's refusal to transfer a case pursuant to 28 U.S.C. Sec. 1631 for an abuse of discretion. See Miller v. Hambrick, 905 F.2d 259, 262 (9th Cir.1990).
The district court determined that because the CDA created a comprehensive remedial scheme for breaches of contract by the federal government, it did not have subject matter jurisdiction over the Bivens action. While we agree with the accuracy of the premise, we cannot agree with the particular conclusion.
It is clear that district courts do have jurisdiction over Bivens actions. Those actions are brought against employees of the federal government in their individual capacities and are brought to redress violations of citizens' constitutional rights. See Bivens, 403 U.S. at 395-96, 91 S.Ct. at 2004-05. They are firmly within the subject matter jurisdiction of the district courts. 4
It is true that Janicki cannot state a cause of action in this case, but that inability did not deprive the district court of jurisdiction. See Bell v. Hood, 327 U.S. 678, 682, 66 S.Ct. 773, 776, 90 L.Ed. 939 (1946) (); Mace v. Skinner, 34 F.3d 854, 859-60, 860 n. 6 (9th Cir.1994) ().
Although we determine that the district court incorrectly indicated that it lacked jurisdiction, that does not compel a reversal. Rather, as we have already intimated, it is
apparent that the district court's reasoning that the CDA precluded Janicki from stating a Bivens cause of action was correct. Given that, we may affirm the judgment. See Haddock v. Board of Dental Examiners, 777 F.2d 462, 464 n. 4 (9th Cir.1985) (); Black v. Payne, 591 F.2d 83, 86 n. 1 (9th Cir.) (dismissal was proper where the district court addressed the merits of the plaintiff's claim, even though the court denominated the dismissal as one for lack of subject matter jurisdiction rather than for failure to state a claim), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 867, 100 S.Ct. 139, 62 L.Ed.2d 90 (1979). Of course, there is nothing unusual about this approach. It is simply another iteration of our long-standing rule that we may affirm " 'on any basis fairly supported by the record.' " City of Las Vegas v. Clark County, 755 F.2d 697, 701 (9th Cir.1985) (citation omitted).
Our consideration of the merits of Janicki's appeal must proceed in two steps. The first is a consideration of the effect of the CDA upon the Bivens claim; the second is consideration of the district court's refusal to allow amendment and transfer of the action.
When the Supreme Court first determined that a damage action could be brought against federal employees who violated constitutional rights, it recognized that there might well be cases where another remedy would suffice. Thus, in answer to an assertion that there was no need for a money damage remedy in that case, the Court said:
[W]e cannot accept respondents' formulation of the question as whether the availability of money damages is necessary to enforce the Fourth Amendment. For we have here no explicit congressional declaration that persons injured by a federal officer's violation of the Fourth Amendment may not recover money damages from the agents, but must instead be remitted to another remedy, equally effective in the view of Congress.
Bivens, 403 U.S. at 397, 91 S.Ct. at 2005.
Since then, the Court has returned to that theme and has declared that a Bivens action will not lie when Congress has created "comprehensive procedural and substantive provisions giving meaningful remedies against the United States...." Bush v. Lucas, 462...
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